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Resumo
Durante os últimos 25 anos, a rexión de Galicia aprobou tres leis de regulación de 
usos de solo (1985, 1997 e 2002),  que pretendían controlar  a  desorganización 
territorial en boa parte do territorio. Sen embargo, os feitos indican que despois 
destes 25 anos, moitos municipios seguen sen planeamento municipal e só un 12 
% ten un plan aprobado con respecto á ultima lei, LOUGA, despois de case 10 
anos  de  vixencia.  Esta  investigación  pretende  entender  por  que  uns  poucos 
municipios  decidiron  adaptarse  á  LOUGA mentres  a  meirande  maioría  parece 
reacio a facelo. A aproximación teórica utilizada é a da literatura institucional. Na 
literatura institucional hai catro tipos principais de correntes: o institucionalismo 
racional,  o  histórico,  o  sociolóxico  e  o  discursivo.  Para  cada  un  deles 
consideráronse tanto  as  razóns de cambio institucional  que propoñen como as 
razóns de resistencia ó cambio. Como boa parte das razóns se centran máis na 
resistencia ó cambio que en analizar os propios cambios, elaborouse un modelo de 
cambio institucional baseado no concepto de contradición institucional co que se 
pretende  entender  tanto  a  aprobación  da  LOUGA como  a  adopción  e  non 
adopción da mesma por parte dos municipios.
Os  resultados  da  investigación  indican  que  o  concepto  de  contradición 
institucional é útil para entender tanto a aprobación da LOUGA como o patrón de 
difusión que tivo nos municipios. A LOUGA aprobouse por un cambio lexislativo 
a nivel estatal e que os municipios que se adaptaron fixérono non por mandato 
legal, senón porque a LOUGA creaba inseguridade xurídica á hora de conceder 
licencias dada a obsolescencia do seus planeamentos. Se embargo, na dirección e 
obxectivos  que  finalmente  tomou  tanto  a  LOUGA como  os  diferentes  plans 
aprobados, obsérvase a influencia doutras fontes de cambio institucional e o papel 
da  axencia.  En  canto  ás  razóns  de  resistencia  hai  que  mencionar  os  efectos 
redistributivos  que ten calquera cambio institucional.  Os municipios que aínda 
non iniciaron os trámites non o fixeron porque ou ben non teñen apenas actividade 
urbanística,  ou  na  súa  meirande  parte  porque  teñen  plans  moi  expansivos 
aprobados  ó  abeiro  da  lei  de  1997.  O custo  político  de  retirar  os  dereitos  de 
construción que concederon en plans anteriores explica a resistencia dos gobernos 
locais á hora de adoptar a LOUGA. 
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Resumen
Durante los últimos 25 años, la región de Galicia aprobó tres leyes que regulan el 
uso  del  suelo  (1985,  1997  y  2002)  y  que  trataban  de  controlar  el  desorden 
territorial de buena parte del territorio. Sin embargo, después de estos 25 años, 
muchos  municipios  siguen  sin  tener  un  plan  y  sólo  el  12%  tienen  un  plan 
aprobado con respecto a la última ley del suelo (LOUGA) después de casi 10 años 
de vigencia. Esta investigación tiene como objetivo entender por qué unos pocos 
municipios han decidido adaptarse a la LOUGA mientras que la mayoría parecen 
reacio a hacerlo. El enfoque teórico para comprender esta falta de aplicación de la 
ley es la literatura institucional. En la literatura institucional hay cuatro grandes 
tipos de corrientes: el institucionalismo racional, el histórico, el sociológico y el 
discursivo.  Se  consideran  para  cada  uno  de  ellos  las  fuentes  de  cambio  y 
resistencia institucional. Como buena parte de ellos se centra más en la resistencia 
al  cambio  que  en  analizar  los  cambios,  se  elabora  un  modelo  de  cambio 
institucional basado en el concepto de contradicción institucional, con el que se 
pretende entender tanto la aprobación de la LOUGA como la adopción y la no 
adopción de la misma por parte de los municipios.
Los  resultados  de  la  investigación  indican  que  el  concepto  de  contradicción 
institucional  es  útil  para  entender  tanto  la  aprobación de la  LOUGA como el 
patrón de difusión que ha tenido en los municipios. La LOUGA se aprobó por un 
cambio legislativo a nivel estatal y los municipios que se adaptaron lo hicieron no 
por mandato legal, sino porque la LOUGA creaba inseguridad jurídica a la hora de 
conceder licencias dada la obsolescencia de sus planes. Sin embargo, la dirección 
y objetivos que finalmente tomaron tanto la LOUGA como los diferentes planes 
aprobados,  sólo  se  explica  por  la  influencia  de  otras  fuentes  de  cambio 
institucional y el papel de la agencia. En cuanto a las razones de resistencia hay 
que mencionar los efectos redistributivos que tiene cualquier cambio institucional. 
Los municipios que no iniciaron los trámites son aquellos que o bien no tienen 
apenas actividad urbanística, o bien en su mayoría tienen planes muy expansivos 
aprobados de acuerdo a la ley de 1997. El coste político de retirar derechos de 
edificación  que  concedieron  planes  anteriores  explica  la  resistencia  de  los 
gobiernos locales a adoptar la LOUGA.
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Abstract
In the last 25 years, the region of Galicia passed three land-use acts (1985, 1997 
and 2002) aiming at  controlling urban sprawl.  However,  after  25 years,  many 
municipalities still do not have a plan and only 12% have one in compliance with 
the  last  land-use  act,  LOUGA,  after  nearly  10  years  of  being  in  force.  This 
research aims to understand why a few municipalities have decided to adopt a 
plan in compliance with LOUGA while most of them seem reluctant to do it. The 
theoretical approach to understanding this lack of implementation is based on the 
institutional theory. In the institutional literature there are four main streams: the 
rational, historical, sociological and discursive institutionalism. In each of them, 
we consider the sources of change and institutional resistance. Since most of these 
paradigms focus more on institutional stability than on institutional change, we 
developed a model of institutional change based on the concept of institutional 
contradiction, aiming at understanding the passing of LOUGA and its adoption 
and non-adoption by the municipalities. 
Results  show  that  the  concept  of  institutional  contradiction  is  very  useful  to 
explain  the  passing  of  the  LOUGA  and  the  pattern  of  adoption  by  the 
municipalities. The LOUGA was passed due to a legislative change at state level. 
Municipalities did not adopt the LOUGA because it was a legal mandate, they 
rather adopted it because the LOUGA created legal insecurity for municipalities 
when issuing building permits because their plans were quite outdated. The scope 
and goals that eventually took both the LOUGA and the plans adopted can only be 
explained by other sources of institutional change and the role of agency. With 
regard to sources of stability, the distributional effects of all institutional changes 
play  a  key  role.  The  non-adopters  are  either  municipalities  in  remote  areas, 
without any planning activity, or, most of them, municipalities in peri-urban areas 
that adopted very expansive land-use plans in compliance with the act of 1997. 
The political costs of taking away development rights that previous plans granted 
to landowners explain the reluctance of local authorities to adopt the LOUGA.
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Chapter 1: Institutions and Institutional change. A 
new  approach  to  understanding  land  planning 
implementation
1. Introduction 
In 2004, the research group Land Laboratory (University of Santiago de 
Compostela,  Spain)  started  working  on  the  making  of  the  land-use  plan  of 
Guitiriz, a rural municipality in the province of Lugo. The plan was based on the 
legal  framework of  the  land-use  Act  passed  in  Galicia  in  2002,  called  Act  of  
Urban Planing and Protection of Rural Areas (LOUGA, Galician acronym). The 
team  of  planners  developed  a  quite  innovative  approach  to  municipal 
comprehensive land-use planning in Galicia.  The plan tried to combine zoning 
regulations with a strategic view for the development of the municipality based on 
its natural resources.
While plan-making was starting, the mayor of the municipality stated what 
would be one of the main goals  of the plan.  She considered the future of the 
municipalities was linked to its residential character and that once the land-use 
plan  was  approved,  Guitiriz  would  become  a  municipality  very  attractive  for 
people searching for a second home in a relaxing environment1. Resources like its 
health spa, rivers and nature would become the key elements driving the plan-
making  by  promoting  the  local  natural  resources  along  with  the  residential 
character.
Five years later, in 2009, the plan was ready for public exhibition, so that 
citizens could make amendments to it. The plan received around 800 amendments 
(14% of the population). At the same time, around six sectorial administrations 
also made amendments to the plan. In particular, the amendments made by the 
General  Directorate  of  Cultural  Heritage were  quite  numerous.  Very often  the 
amendments made by the sectoral administration forced the planners to change the 
answer  to  the  amendments  made by the  citizens.  Though no amendment  was 
against  the  main  goals  of  the  plan,  the  corrections  of  the  plan  was  a  time-
consuming task that considerably delayed the final approval. Parallel to the plan-
making,  an  increasing  building  activity  in  the  urban  area  of  the  municipality 
began in 2006.  The building activity  was boosted by the housing bubble and, 
presumably, by the approval of the plan as well, since the new plan would reduce 
the amount of developable areas. The building activity made inapplicable several 
of the original plan objectives with regard to preserving certain open spaces. 
In a municipal council held on 4th of July 2009, the municipality approved 
the land-use plan on a provisional basis,  awaiting a definitive approval by the 
regional  government.  In  that  municipal  council,  the  opposition  party,  the 
conservative party,  accused the plan of not having “concreteness” in regard to 
future development. Furthermore, the opposition party argued that the plan was 
“aggressive against the neighbors' property” and that the possibilities for growth 
in rural areas were scarce2.
A couple of years later, the party in the opposition organised a meeting to 
explain the plan to the neighbors. Several hundred people attended that meeting, 
1 http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/hemeroteca/2004/08/13/2935660.shtml
2 http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/lugo/2009/09/17/0003_7976082.htm
1
which aimed at setting up a platform of people affected by the plan. In a press 
release after the meeting, the neighbor association pointed out the plan restricts 
the growth of Guitiriz, for there are few developable areas. In addition they also 
said that not everybody was harmed by the plan in the same way. A few owners 
accumulated almost all developable areas. Many people understood that they had 
the right to have their properties in developable areas as well3. A few weeks after 
this meeting, on 22nd of may 2011, the conservative party won the local elections. 
The new mayor mentioned, among several reasons, the delay in plan-making and 
approval as one of the reasons for the victory in the local elections.4 The new 
mayor  showed  himself  dissatisfied  with  the  plan  and  rejected  it.  Today,  one 
decade after starting the plan-making, the plan has not been yet approved.
One  might  think  this  is  a  very  uncommon  or  unusual  situation. 
Unfortunately  it  is  not  so.  Since  the  LOUGA  was  passed  in  2002,  many 
municipalities have followed a similar pattern. The case of the municipality of 
Guitiriz raises us two main questions with regard to planning. How is land-use 
planning  able  to  overcome  forces  such  as  private  interests  and  be  effectively 
implemented? Why is land-use planning very often not able to overcome those 
forces and therefore is not able to be effectively implemented? In the end, the 
main question is: why does planning exist? It seems, at first, a strange question. 
Academic  planning  departments  offer  many  answers  to  that  question  in  their 
courses. Are these answers wrong? 
The core idea of the answers given by planning departments has usually 
been that planning exists because of the divergence between collective interests 
(or public interests) and individual interests (or private interests)5. This may be 
true sometimes, especially when it is possible to prove that such divergence exists 
and can be measured. But this is not usually the case in land-use planning. How 
can this divergence be measured when planning is about regulating noise levels, 
open  space,  the  amount  of  farmland  to  be  preserved,  pollution  levels,  the 
preservation of natural and historical sites, and rural or balanced development? 
How is it possible to recognise the point from which planning emerges or takes 
place? In all these examples the “collective interests” is less clear  than planners 
usually believe. For instance, a plan that preserves farmland may increase housing 
prices  since  it  reduces  the  supply  of  land  available  for  this  use.  What  is  the 
collective interest? Lower housing prices or larger areas of farmland?
The  famous  case  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  “Ambler 
Realty  Co.  vs.  Village  of  Euclid”  (1926),  which  served  to  bolster  zoning 
ordinances  throughout  the USA, also suggested the same difficulties to justify 
government intervention: “the ordinance must find its justification in some aspect 
of the police power, asserted for the public welfare. The line, which separates the 
legitimate  from  illegitimate  exercise  of  power  is  not  capable  of  precise  
demarcation” (emphasis mine). Then, the question is: when is it possible to make 
this demarcation?
A land-use plan can be understood from different points of view, but from 
an institutional perspective, a land use plan is just a set of rules to regulate land 
uses. Notice that this implies to regulate the behaviour of landowners. A land-use 
plan  very  often  implies  not  only  an  assignment  but  also  a  reassignment  of 
3 http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/lemos/2011/05/01/0003_201105M1C7992.htm
4 http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/lugo/2011/05/24/0003_201105L24C7999.htm
5 The expression “private interest” can be substituted by “market”, and the expression “public 
interest”  by  government.  Thus,  planning  can  be  understood  as  a  divergence  between  the 
market's and the government goals.
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property rights.  Some landowners might  receive property rights over land that 
they did not have in former assignments and some other rights might be taken 
away. Then, the question of why does planning exist could be similar to why do 
societies assign and reassign property rights?
The answer to this question differs widely depending on the perspective 
we take. Although everybody recognises that there are institutions and that these 
institutions regulate our behaviour, there is no consensus on the way they do that 
and  for  what  purposes.  The  purposes  of  institutions,  that  is  the  purpose  of 
planning itself, depends on the institutional paradigm or approach that frames the 
question and the answer to that question.  For instance,  for an old institutional 
economist  like  Commons  (1931:331)  planning  arises  to  solve  conflicts,  when 
saying  that  property  “is  not  only  a  claim  but  is  also  a  conflict  of  claims  to 
whatever is scarce, but rights of property are the concerned action which regulates 
the conflict”. However, from a more orthodox institutional point of view, property 
rights are regarded as an efficient institutional arrangement resulting from a costs-
benefit analysis (Demsetz, 1967). An old institutionalist like Commons (1931:21) 
argues that institutions (in this case, land planning) “are the result of collective 
action, exercised in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action”. More 
orthodox approaches tend to  neglect  the role  of  collective action and political 
processes  by  relying  on  self-organization  of  society  (Kingston  and  Caballero, 
2009). 
These are theoretical explanations of planning or lack of it. We face many 
events in the real world that sometimes are difficult to explain. For instance, there 
is at this moment wide knowledge about climate change and how it could threaten 
society and ecosystems. However, we still lack strong political measures to deal 
with it. In other cases, like that of acid rain, scientific data was able to generate a 
discourse  that  led  to  effective  political  action  (Healey,  2006;  Hajer, 1995). 
Sometimes  one  publication  such  as  “Silent  Spring”,  with  its  assumptions  and 
hypotheses about the use of pesticides can drive a political process that sets limits 
on  the  use  of  pesticides  and  went  beyond  that  by  creating  the  modern 
environmental movement. Very often what happens is that ideas about justice can 
also drive changes, like the regulations about child labour. Can we say something 
about the reasons why some of these changes took place and others did not? If we 
can,  then  we  can  also  give  reasons  about  the  existence  of  planning.  This 
dissertation  tries  to  find  these  reason  as  well  as  the  reasons  of  resistance  to 
planning  by  taking  an  institutional  perspective.  The  work  avoids  normative 
approaches to planning, which are so frequent in academic planning departments 
when explaining  the  need for  planning.  Seminal  works  like  “Reasons  for  and 
Against  Planning”  by  Klosterman  (1985)  usually  follow  this  logic.  This 
dissertation does not try to find out what planning should do, which by the way is 
not the best perspective if the aim is to understand real planning process. The 
question is just: why do societies make land-use plans, and why not?
1.1. Land-use planning in the region of Galicia 
The region of Galicia (Northwestern Spain) has some characteristics that 
make it a good laboratory to try to find the answers to the questions mentioned 
above. It is not a region with a long tradition in land-use planning. The Galician 
territory  has  been  managed by informal  institutions  à  la  Ostrom for  centuries 
(Tubío-Sánchez  et  al.,  2013).  Only  in  the  last  25  years  has  the  regional 
government carried out several attempts at providing a legislative framework that 
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could solve the problems of local land-use planning. Three land-use acts  were 
passed in these 25 years, in 1985, 1997 and in 2002. However, until the end of the 
1990s, most Galician municipalities did not have a land-use plan. One of the main 
features of Galicia is the fragmentation of land property. It has been argued very 
often  that  the  fragmentation  of  land  property  (many  owners  and  many  small 
parcels per owner) and its consequences (environmental and social problems) is 
the  basis  of  the  main  legislative  attempts  in  Galician  land  policies  (Crecente, 
Alvarez  and  Fra,  2002;  Ónega-López,  Puppim-Oliveira  and  Crecente-Maseda, 
2010; Tubío-Sánchez et al.,  2013), and at the same time there is a feeling that 
these legislative attempts did not achieve the expected performance because the 
fragmentation of land-property.
2. Problem-setting
In 2002 Galicia adopted a new land-use act (the third one in its history), 
called  “Local  Planning  and  Protection  of  Rural  Areas  Act”  (from  now  on, 
LOUGA, the Galician abbreviation) which required each of the 315 municipalities 
to make one legally binding land-use plan for the whole municipal territory before 
the year 2006. The Galician government even arranged to cover the expenses for 
the plan-making. Notwithstanding this, almost one decade after having passed the 
Act, only 51 municipalities have adopted a land-use plan against 264 that did not. 
Almost all municipalities that did not adopt the new land-use plan are working on 
its making, while only 19 municipalities of them did not even start the process of 
plan-making. Therefore, in Galicia not adopting a land-use plan seems to be the 
rule  rather  than  the  exception.  It  is  interesting,  therefore,  that  almost  51 
municipalities have evaded this rule. 
LOUGA differs from prior acts because, for the first time, it tries to assign 
land-uses to the whole municipal territory paying special attention to rural land 
uses. This is so because the main goal of the act is to control urban sprawl in rural  
and  peri-urban  municipalities.  The  LOUGA is  also  a  result  of  the  increasing 
awareness  of  the  Galician  society  about  the  problems related  to  urban sprawl 
(Tubío-Sánchez et al., 2013).
2.1. The regulation of urban development in Galicia
The land-use Act of 2002 is, as said above, the third land-use act in 30 
years. To better understand why this land-use act came into force it is important to 
explain the process of urbanization in Galicia during the last decades. Compared 
to other Spanish regions, urbanization in Galicia was historically lagging behind. 
There  is  not  an  urban  Galicia  until  the  1960s.  Only  after  1970  processes  of 
considerable  urban growth start  taking place,  which  ended up in  processes  of 
urban sprawl, mostly located in coastal areas and in municipalities close to big 
cities (Torres Luna and Lois González, 1995). Although Galicia has always had a 
dispersed settlement pattern,  the dispersion was in balance with the landscape. 
However, between the 1960s and 1980s Galicia experienced a marked transfer of 
population from the rural to the urban areas. In the 1980s and 1990s, and due to 
the improvement of the standard of living, the urban areas began a process of 
counter-urbanization,  what  led  to  the  rise  of  settlements  in  peri-urban  areas 
(Aldrey  Vázquez,  2002).  Some  authors  argued  that  this  was  the  main  socio-
economic and socio-cultural change in the history of Galicia (Pino Vicente et al., 
2010). This territorial change had led some authors to refer to Galicia as a diffused 
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city  (Docampo,  Dalda  and  Harguindey,  2005)  or  as  a  “rururban  weft”,  with 
characteristics  both  of  urban  and  rural  landscape  (Oliveira  et  al.,  2009).  The 
dividing line between  urban and rural has become blurred.
In the 1980s and 1990s Galicia passed two land-use acts (LASGA in 1985 
and LSGA in 1997) that did not really address the problem that was causing the 
territorial  transformation.  The  LOUGA  passed  in  2002,  which  replaced  all 
previous acts, focuses for the first time on rural areas, what is clearly illustrated in 
the title: “Local Planning and Protection of Rural Areas Act”. The body of articles 
regulating urban planning are practically the same as in the two previous acts. The 
new part of the act addresses directly the protection of rural areas from urban 
sprawl. 
The  LOUGA  introduces  the  comprehensive  municipal  land-use  plan 
(CMLP),  which  regulates  all  uses  to  which  land  may  be  put  in  the  whole 
municipality. Today 233 municipalities are working on a land-use plan. The plans 
have to be detailed and almost the whole plan design is prescribed in the land-use 
act. The room for discretion is, therefore, limited. Plans are normally made by a 
private planning bureau hired by the municipal local authority. The administrative 
procedure consists of six phases. In two of them the plan has to be presented to 
regional government officials in order to confirm that the plan is in compliance 
with  the  land-use  act’s  legal  requirements.  Many  municipalities  deliberately 
produce plans that do not meet the legal requirements of the LOUGA, and that, 
therefore, are not approved by the regional government, who is the agent that has 
the final decision regarding adoption of land-use plans after been approved at the 
local council. In this way municipalities can work on the land-use plans for years. 
Not  only  are  the  administrative  procedures  complex,  there  is  also  legislative 
instability:  the LOUGA has  undergone four  modifications  in  eight  years.  This 
means that if one municipality is making a plan, it is forced to readjust the content 
so that the plan has to be in compliance with the changes in the act. 
2.2. The research problem
The lack of implementation of land-use planning is subject of much of the 
planning literature in Galicia. This literature focuses usually on implementation 
failure. From the legal point of view, and with regard to the LOUGA, it has been 
argued that the act is too technical, which hampers implementation, since it is not 
flexible enough to cope with very different cases (Meilán Gil et al., 2009). This 
leads,  in  addition,  to  the  loss  of  the  visionary  side  of  plans.  Meeting  legal 
requirements becomes the main goal  instead setting a  vision for future spatial 
development (Busquets,  2008). In addition,  it  is not only the instability of the 
land-use legislation which may be the cause of the problem, but also the unsettled 
legislation that land-use plans have to take in account. For example, 17 regional 
and state directives, which have effects on the application of the act, have been 
issued  in  the  last  five  years.  And  this  without  taking  into  account  additional 
legislation about cultural  heritage,  water,  telecommunication and infrastructure, 
etc. that regulate land-use activities. This legislative body in continuous change 
makes plan-making much more complex (Mosqueira Lourenzo and Silva Méndez, 
2005; Meilán Gil et al., 2009). In this sense, municipal authorities complain that 
they do not have enough human and financial resources to integrate all sectoral 
policies in the plan.
The goal of the LOUGA has also been criticised. Some authors point out 
that the goals of the LOUGA do not address the main issues of Galicia land-use 
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planning.  The  law  came  into  being  after  a  campaign  by  the  most  important 
regional  newspaper,  supported  by  a  group  of  influential  architects  and 
geographers, who claimed the regional government was responsible for chaotic 
urban development. In those days, the term ‘uglinism’ was used to refer to how 
land development had gone out of control, damaging the aesthetic value of the 
landscape.  But  the aim of spatial  planning is  not  only an aesthetic  one,  some 
author criticised, therefore, the act is not addressing the many other issues that a 
land-use act should address, such as the search of equity (García-Vidal, 2003).
There are also arguments from the perspective of local public finance. It 
has been pointed out that municipalities are reluctant to restrict land development 
via  zoning because property tax revenues  have become their  largest  source of 
income (Rodríguez González, 2008). 
All  this  literature (which will  be analysed more in detail  in Chapter 4) 
seems to focus only on the reluctance of municipalities to approve a land-use plan. 
However,  despite all  the difficulties and setbacks that have been stated by the 
many  scholars,  51  municipalities  have  been  able  to  adopt  a  land-use  plan 
according to the land act of 2002. This fact is usually overlooked in the literature. 
When understanding adoption of land-use planning, it is important to ask not only 
the reasons that lead to adoption, but the reasons that prevent municipalities from 
adoption as well. This leads to two different but complementary questions: why 
are  some  municipalities  willing  to  adopt  a  land-use  plan  and  why  are  most 
municipalities reluctant to do it?
2.3. Research question
To better understand the scope of the research question it is necessary to 
explain  how the  local  land-use  planning  works.  A land-use  plan  in  Galicia  is 
considered a tool to assign or reassign land uses, similar to zoning ordinances in 
the USA. Fischel (1987) defined zoning “as  the division of a community into 
districts  or  zones  in  which  certain  activities  are  prohibited  and  other  are 
permitted”.  This definitions is also suitable in Spain, where zoning is also the 
most  important  tool of  land  use  regulation  undertaken  by  local  governments 
(Fischel,  1999).  Although Fischel  (1999) considers  in  his  analysis  subdivision 
regulations,  historic  preservation  rules  or  environmental  regulation,  which  are 
often reviewed under a separate ordinance, as part of zoning, this work just focus 
on the act's mandate of having a land-use plan, without taking into consideration 
other land use regulations or going into detailed analysis of the plans. In Galician 
land-use planning, as in the American zoning, land classification can be changed 
without the consent of affected property owners.
The landscape of land-use regulations in Galicia is quite complex. As of 
2011, municipalities may have adopted land-use plans in compliance with five 
land-use acts: the acts of 1976 and 1978, passed by the Spanish Government and 
the acts of 1985, 1997 and 2002, passed by the Galician Government. In terms of 
number of planning tools defined by these land-use acts, municipalities can be in 
eight different states. First, they may not have any formal land-use plan; this does 
not mean that municipalities without land-use regulations do not regulate their 
land-uses. In these cases the Regional Government provides the municipalities 
some  guidelines  that  may  help  them  to  make  decisions  about  land-uses. 
Municipalities without land-use plan may thus have:
1.- Delimitation of urban growth boundaries (DUGB). This land planning tool is 
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quite  simple.  It  only  fixes  the  growth  boundaries  of  urban  areas  without 
attempting to describe specific urban land-uses. The delimitation of urban growth 
boundaries is based on the sct passed by the Spanish government in 1978. It is 
therefore a very outdated planning tool, and it is not considered a land-use plan.
2.- Provincial subsidiary rules (PSR). The development and land-use planning of 
many municipalities in Galicia (1/3) is guided by these rules that are set forth in 
the Parliamentary Ordinance 14/5/1991. They are guiding rules, instead of a land-
use regulation. The main difference relies on that they are not legally enforced. 
Therefore, it can not be said that these rules are land-use planning tools, since they 
are something similar to a set of rules of best practices. The determinations of 
these rules have the following nature: a) they are subsidiaries of a comprehensive 
municipal land-use plan, that is, the work in the absence of this. These rules will 
be  also applicable  in  the  municipalities  that  have urban growth boundaries  as 
land-use planning tool; b) they will complement the existing municipal land-use 
use planning tools, whatever they are. The complementary nature of the rules will 
apply: 1) in municipalities with a land-use plan in compliance with the act of 
1976;  2)  in  municipalities  that  have  urban  growth  boundaries  with  zoning 
ordinances;  3)  meet  the  uncertainties  and  gaps  in  current  municipal  land-use 
planning, but in no case PSR can change the classification of land, or alter the 
land-use plans adopted by the municipalities. 
PSR were created in 1991 to meet the needs of those municipalities for 
which the making of comprehensive land-use plan could be very complex and 
costly in terms of human or economic resources.
Second, municipalities may have one of the four land-use planning tools 
established  by  past  and  current  legislation.  These  tools,  and  their  main 
characteristics, are the following ones:
1.-  Subsidiary rules of municipal planning (SRMP). These rules can substitute a 
comprehensive  municipal  land-use  plan,  and  unlike  PSR,  they  are  legally 
enforced.  They  are  approved  by  the  local  authorities.  A land-use  plan  made 
according to these rules is usually less complex and has less information. It can be 
said that this procedure is a step forward in providing municipalities with a land-
use planning instrument when they do not have enough resources to make a whole 
comprehensive municipal land-use plan.
2.-  Regulation plan for rural areas (RPRA). The land-use act of 1997 envisaged 
the possibility  that  rural  municipalities  might  adopt  a planning tool  that  could 
meet their demands, particularly when processes of urban development were not 
the main issue. It is not a popular planning tool, since only nine municipalities 
have adopted it.
3.-  General urban plan (GUP). This has been the main land-use planning tool (in 
terms  of  level  of  detail  and  complexity)  until  the  land-use  Act  of  1997.  The 
making of this land-use plans was based on the Spanish land-use act of 1976 and 
the Galician  land-use act of 1985. They are,  therefore,  very outdated planning 
tools, though it is still in force in 13 municipalities.
4.- Comprehensive municipal land-use plan (CMLUP). The Act of 1997 abolishes 
the subsidiary rules of municipal planning (SRMP) and consider only two main 
instruments to plan land-uses: 1) Regulation plan of rural areas (RPRA) and 2) 
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Comprehensive municipal land-use plan (CMLUP). However it was not until the 
land-use act of 2002 that the CMLUP became the only tool to plan land-uses. 
From that year (2002) on, all municipalities with land-use planning tools had to 
adapt them to be in compliance with the new  land-use act within a maximum 
period  of  three  years.  The  municipalities  that  did  not  have  any  land-use 
regulations were legally enforced to make a land-use plan according to this law 
within a maximum period of four years, that is to say, in 2006 all municipalities 
should have adopted a land-use plan according to this Act.
To better understand the situation of land-use planning in Galicia, the next 
table shows the number of municipalities that have the planning tools described 
above.  We differentiate  two big  groups:  municipalities  where  local  authorities 
have adopted own land-use planning tools and those municipalities where there 
are not any land-use regulation or these cannot be properly understood as a land-
use planning tool.
Without own land-use 
planning instruments 
(in these cases apply 
the subsidiary norms: 
PSR) 
Municipalities with own land-use planning instruments
Planning 
instruments 
Without planning tool 
or only DUGB
SRMP RPRA GUP CMLUP 
land-use 
act 1997
land-use 
act 2002
Number of 
municipalities
68 109 9 12 64 53
Percentage of 
the total 
number of 
municipalities 
21,5% 34,6% 2,8% 3,8% 37,1%
21,5% 78,5%
Table 1: Types of planning tools and number of municipalities where they are in  
force. Source: COAG (2011)
Almost  22% of  municipalities  regulate  their  land uses  using subsidiary 
norms (PSR), which are very general and their application is not legally enforced. 
The rest of municipalities (78,5%) regulate their land-uses with a true land-use 
planning tool. In this category it is observed that two tools are the most used: 1) 
subsidiary  rules  of  municipal  planning  (SRMP) and  comprehensive  municipal 
land-use plan (CMLUP). With regard to comprehensive municipal land-use plans, 
only 53 land-use plans have been made according to the land-use act 2002. It is 
important to consider that many municipalities were working on their CMLUP in 
compliance with 1997 act when the LOUGA came into force. In those cases, the 
LOUGA  considered  two  possibilities.  Either  municipalities  could  adapt  the 
LOUGA through a transitional provision6 in the case the plan making were almost 
fulfilled, which 21 municipalities did. Or they could make a plan completely in 
6 The transitional  provision establishes:  “Those municipalities that  were making their  land-use 
plans in accordance with the land-use act of 1997 can continue with the procedure due in that law 
up to a maximum of 6 months. After 6 months, all the contents of the plan  have to be adapted to 
the land-use act of 2002”.
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compliance with the LOUGA in the case the plan making was in a early stage, an 
option that municipalities tried to skip. Municipalities were eager to choose the 
transitional provision instead of dealing with the complex process of adapting the 
contents of their  plans to the new land-use act.  However,  many municipalities 
could not finish the plan within the period established in the transitional provision 
and their plans had to be adapted completely to the LOUGA. Therefore, among 
the 53 municipalities that in 2011 had a CMLUP in compliance with the LOUGA, 
21 started their plan-making according to the land-use act of 1997. It is important 
to consider this because it raises some methodological questions in terms of what 
municipalities are going to be considered as LOUGA - adopters. By analysing 
adoption of one legal planning instrument, it seems reasonable to consider only 
those municipalities that first had the desire of adopting it, because the aim of this 
dissertation is to understand why municipalities decide to make a land-use plan in 
compliance  with  LOUGA.  Thus,  the  municipalities  considered  as  adopters 
between 2002 and 2011 are those that started the plan-making with the LOUGA. 
There was 53 municipalities adopters of the LOUGA, but 21 of them had either 
started the plan-making before the land-use act was passed, or their land-use plans 
were quashed by the regional government and were forced to make a new land-
use plan in compliance with the LOUGA. In the following table are listed the 
municipalities considered as LOUGA – adopters in this study.
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Municipality with 
land-use plan-2002
Previous planning 
tool
Year of approval of 
the previous plan
Year of adoption of 
LOUGA
Political party *
Arzúa SRMP 1986 2008 BNG
Capela, A PSR 1987 2006 PSOE 
Cerdido DUGB 1982 2006 PP
Oleiros GUP 1997 2009 AV
Paderne SRMP 1986 2009 PSOE
Pobra do 
Caramiñal
SRMP 1984 2007 BNG
Santiago de 
Compostela
GUP 1990 2007 PSOE
Toques DUGB 1994 2007 PSOE-BNG-PP
Vedra SRMP 1995 2007 PSOE
Zas DUGB 1985 2007 PP
Touro NSP - 2010 PP
Dodro NSPM 1977 2010 PSOE-BNG
Outes NSPM 1977 2011 PP
Muros - - 2010 BNG
Castroverde SRMP 1984 2008 PSOE
Paradela PSR - 2007 PP
Ribas de Sil DUGB 1986 2009 PSOE
Sober SRMP 1986 2009 PP
Pedrafita do 
Cebreiro
NSP - 2010 PSOE
Esgos PSR - 2009 PP
Xunqueira de 
Ambía
2005 PP
Cualedro NSP 1991 2010 PP
Sandiás NSP 1991 2007 PP
Arnoia DSU 1994 2010 PP
Sandiás NSP 1994 2007 PP
Vilar de Barrio SRMP 2009 PP
Vilardevós without planning 
tool
- 2008 PSOE
Rodeiro - - 2009 IDR
Valga PXOM 1998 2010 PP
Table 2: Municipalities with a LOUGA plan
* PP: right-wing party; BNG and PSOE: left-wing parties
In the rest of municipalities 284, either municipalities are working on the a 
LOUGA plan, at different stages of the plan-making (in many of them, around 
146, the making is well advanced). The rest of municipalities (19) either started 
the plan making and are on a very initial  start  or did not start  at  all  the plan 
making. In the following table are listed these municipalities:
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Municipality without starting 
the plan-making
Planning instrument Year in which it was 
adopted
Land-use act
Carral NSPM 1993
Coirós PXOM 2002 Act 1997
Ferrol PXOM 2000 Act 1997
Oza dos Ríos PXOM 2001 Act 1997
Ponteceso PXOM 2002 Act 2002**
Santa Comba PXOM 2002 Act 997
Abadín DSU 1997
Negueira de Muñiz DSU 1997
Outeiro de Rei NSP 1992
Ribeira de Piquín NSP 1991
Boboras NSPP 1991 Act 1991
Carballeda de Valdeorras NSP 1995
Castro Caldelas PXOM 1999 Act 1997
Maceda PXOM 2002 Act 1997
Covelo PXOM 1999 Act 1997
Forcarei PXOM 2002 Act 1997
Mondariz-Balneario PXOM 2002 Act 2002**
Tomiño PXOM 2001 Act 1997
Ames PXOM 2002 Act 1997
Table 3: Municipalities that did not started plan-making
Though most part of the municipalities are working on the plan making, 
this  dissertation  does  not  try  to  explain  why  this  group  of  municipalities  are 
delayed in completion of the plan. The question that this research tries to answer 
is why some municipalities adopted the act and why others did not, in the time 
frame  2002-2011. 
2.4. Methodology
The aim of this research is to understand what factors and reasons have 
had a critical influence on the adoption of CMLUP in compliance with LOUGA, 
as  well  as  to  understand  what  factors  have  an  influence  on  the  rest  of 
municipalities for not adopting it  after  nine years,  insofar as all  municipalities 
operate within a similar institutional context. As we have explained before, this 
can be considered as a matter of time, since the most part of the municipalities are 
working on the  plan-making.  But  trying  to  simplify  the  methodology and the 
research question, we will focus solely on the variable adoption or not adoption. 
As several authors have argued, a theory of institutional change has to explain not 
only why changes do occur, but also why changes can be blocked (Olsen, 2009; 
Immergut, 2006). 
The methodology of this research is a mix methods research methodology. 
In  general,  mixed  methods  methodologies  provide  breath  and  depth  of 
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understanding and corroboration of the hypotheses (Johnson et  al.,  2007).  The 
qualitative  method  provides  relationships,  which  may  help  disregard  some 
hypotheses and generate new ones. On the other hand, the qualitative methods 
help to understand causation in the relationships discovered through qualitative 
analysis (Creswell and Clark, 2011).  In this research, qualitative analysis is used 
to  find  out  a  pattern  of  implementation  of  LOUGA  by  identifying  the 
characteristics –physical, socio-economic, etc. – of the adopters and non adopters. 
The  qualitative  approach  allows  to  understand  more  in  deep  the  reasons  that 
municipalities may have to adopt or not adopt the LOUGA. It  is  important to 
mention  that  both  methods  are  not  used  separately.  The  findings  through  the 
qualitative approach are intended to be reflected the qualitative methods and vice 
versa.
In the quantitative methodology, the aim was to characterise municipalities 
by using physical, economic and social variables to carry out a cluster analysis. 
These  variables  help  us  to  group municipalities  with  similar  characteristics  in 
order to determine the relationship between such characteristics and the adoption 
or rejection of the LOUGA. Municipalities were grouped into five large groups or 
clusters, each of which had members with great similarities with respect to the ten 
variables  mentioned  in  the  above  paragraph.  The  municipalities  for  the  case 
studies  were  selected   taking into  account  the  results  of  this  analysis.  Ward’s 
hierarchical  clustering  method  was  used  to  group  municipalities  with  similar 
characteristics. The software used is R.
The  qualitative  analysis  is  dived  into  parts.  In  the  first  part  a  set  of 
questions  is  developed containing  the  most  important  hypothesis  found in  the 
literature. The local planners of adopters and non adopters were interviewed. A 
semi-structured interview was carried out to find out the reasons of non adoption 
or adoption.  
In  the  second part  of  the qualitative  analysis,  we undertook four  cases 
studies.  The  case  study  is  preferred  in  examining  contemporary  events, 
particularly  when  the  relevant  behaviour  of  the  main  authors  cannot  be 
manipulated. The case study strategy is also most likely to be appropriated for 
“how” and “why” questions and when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident. In addition, case study research will in this case 
facilitate the development of a theory of institutional  change applied to land-use 
planning that will allow generalizations (Yin, 2009).  Because of the multiplicity 
and involvement of different actors, case studies use multiple sources of evidence, 
such  as  documents,  interviews,  observations,  etc.,  in  order  to  contrast  the 
information obtained by different sources.
In selecting the case studies, we wanted to find out the causal relationships 
that  neither  were  found  in  the  qualitative  analysis  nor  in  the  semi-structured 
interviews. The choice criteria are set up to gain more knowledge comparing the 
cases in several directions. These criteria (having or not a plan before adoption of 
LOUGA, being rural or urban) were found to be the most relevant in explaining 
adoption and non adoption (see Chapter 4). The cluster analysis made in Chapter 
4 is also used to select the case studies. Abadín and Castroverde belong to cluster 
3, that is the group of municipalities with similar characteristics (they are rural) 
that  have  a  higher  percentage  of  adopters,  but  Castroverde  is  an  adopter  and 
Abadín a non-adopter. Oleiros and Ames are municipalities that belong to cluster 
two, the set of urban municipalities that showed a lower percentage of adoption. 
Oleiros is an adopter, and Ames is a non-adopter. 
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Rural Urban
With a previous plan Ames Oleiros
Without a previous plan Castroverde Abadín
Table 4: The four case studies
2.5. Sources of data
In the cluster analysis the variables analysed as well their source were: 1) 
Total number of building permits in 2000 and 2009 (Galician Institute of Statistics 
– IGE), 2) rural land prices between 2008 and 2011 (Land Bank of Galicia); 3) 
agricultural labour force in 2001 (IGE); 4) 2010 population density (IGE); 5) crop 
areas (Spanish Land Use Information System - SIOSE); 6) forest areas (SIOSE); 
7) artificial land area (SIOSE); 8) population centres (INE); 9) human settlements 
(INE) and 10) proportion of labour force engaged in services (IGE). 
For  the  quantitative  analysis  we  use  a  mix  of  documents,  reports, 
newspaper articles and interviews.
Documents:
-Current and past land-use plans. Land-use plans have a section where the 
justification of its making is explained. They also explain the planning history of 
the municipality and the main goals that have been achieved or not in the past. 
With the review of land-use planning we try to understand better which factors 
have influenced the adoption of new land plans. This information is available on-
line: 
http://www.planeamentourbanistico.xunta.es/default.asp 
-Local and regional press. Local and regional newspaper pay attention to 
the land-use plan making. The electronic newspaper libraries are a good source to 
understand  the  conflicts  related  to  the  plan-making process,  and therefore  the 
reasons for and against the plan that were given by the main agents involved in 
the processes.
-Interviews:
-Local planners of the municipality adopters and non-adopters.
-Local authorities: Interviewing local authorities we try to discover 
who were  the  main  actors  that  initiated  the  plan-making and the  reasons  that 
pushed them.  With  local  authorities  we mean mainly  the  mayor,  the  planning 
councillor and the municipal planner. 
-Plan-maker: The plan-maker is a firm hired by the local authorities 
and responsible for the municipal land-use plan making. It has a close relationship 
with the local authorities, knowing very well the preferences of the municipality 
and the reasons for that preferences. The interviews with the plan-maker as useful 
to verify the information obtained from the local authorities.
-NGO's:  Although  NGO's  do  not  have  presence  in  all 
municipalities, they play  a key role when land-use plans are made. NGO's are 
interviewed in order to obtain information about the land-use process that had not 
been offered by the more political agents due its political sensitivity.
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3. Literature review
3.1. Introduction
The Galician literature related to the research question proposed in this 
work  usually  argues  that  the  land  planning  in  Galicia  suffers  from  an 
implementation problem. Although implementation can be considered a neglected 
topic in planning literature (Calbick, Day and Gunton, 2003), there is a number of 
papers  that  have  tried  to  identify  key  factors  that  enhance  successful 
implementation.  This  literature  usually  emphasizes  the  role  of  planning  staff, 
consistence and coherence of plans, or in the last times, stakeholder involvement 
to  explain  planning  implementation.  In  doing  so,  implementation  studies  are 
regarding  outcomes  of  the  implementation  process  as  the  causes  of  the 
implementation. There is a sort of endogeneity in this kind of explanations. In the 
next section is presented a short review of planning implementation literature. 
3.2. Implementation literature on land-use planning
There is  a scarce literature about  land-use plan implementation.  Some authors 
have  argued  that  implementation  is  a  neglected  field  of  research  within  the 
planning literature (Calbick, Day and Gunton, 2003). Other authors state that the 
research that does exist suggest that plan implementation theories has been quite 
ineffective in explaining effective implementation (Margerum, 1999; Burby, 2003; 
Joseph, Gunton and Day, 2008). 
Implementation  studies  (non  only  on  land-use  planning,  but  on  public 
policies) has shifted from old debates about competing paradigms labeled top-dow 
vs. bottom-up to substitute it by terms such as government of governance and 
policy networks in order to better describe new realities (Saetren, 2005). In the 
1970s, planning implementation was considered to be a function of plan-making 
and political mandates (Dalton and Burby, 1994; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). 
It was believed that plan implementation required a strong public authority. It was 
argued that a key factor that allowed plan implementation is the quality of plans, 
where the objectives and strategies are well-defined (Dalton and Burby, 1994; 
Mazmanian  and  Sabatier,  1989).  In  this  way,  high-quality  plans  could  be  an 
effective implementation guide by serving to communicate, educate, and provide 
clear  policy  guidance  (Berke  et  al.,  2006).  Thus,  to  achieve  effective 
implementation,  clear  and  consistent  plans  are  considered  one  of  the  most 
important factors (Joseph, Gunton and Day, 2008). This has been the dominant 
idea about plan-making and plan implementation during many decades since the 
end  of  the  World  War  II.  Plans  are  considered  as  policy  mandates  and 
implementation  is  seen  as  unproblematic  because  societies  were  quite 
homogeneous and a basic common interests were well established.
In the last  decades,  with the increasing fragmentation of interest  in  the 
current  societies,  and  the  general  loss  of  confidence  in  political  systems  as 
mechanisms for conflict mediation and management of collective affairs (Healey, 
1996), plan implementation studies moved to a more sociological approaches, and 
in a context where the public sector lost part of its weight, governance arises as a 
way to “get things done”.  Governance in planning is therefore the shift in the 
mode  of  decision-making  and  plan  implementation,  from  one  based  in  the 
bureaucratized welfare state, to another one more entrepreneurial (Healey, 2006). 
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On the  other  hand,  the  behavioural  revolutions  in  political  studies  during  the 
1950s and the 1960s introduced an array of new ideas and aims, like its focus on 
science and methodology (aiming to transforms political studies into a science), 
anti-normative  bias,  assumptions  of  individualism,  etc.  The  behavioural 
revolutions tended to denied the importance of formal institutions for determining 
the outputs of the government and pay more attentions to interest group activity 
and even less legal forms of articulations (Peters, 1999). It was recognised that 
planners can produce better plans and increase the potential for government action 
on issues that initially lack publics if they succeed in involving a broad spectrum 
of stakeholders in the plan-making process (Burby, 2003). This thesis argues that 
stakeholder  involvement  produces  better  plans  and  higher  rates  of 
implementation.  Implementation  success  was  considered  the  commitment  of 
people that lead to stakeholder involvement (Butler and Koontz, 2005). Planners' 
activity in relation to implementation is seen, therefore, as an educational activity 
through a collective learning process, information exchange, and responsibility for 
policy  decisions  (Butler  and  Koontz,  2005;  Moote,  Mcclaran  and Chickering, 
1997).
The  implementation  problem  of  this  line  of  argument  is:  how  can 
stakeholder  support  be  generated?  The  answer  to  this  question  in  the 
implementation  literature  seems to be  the  recent  development  of  collaborative 
planning (Joseph, Gunton and Day, 2008). Advocates argue that if stakeholders 
develop  the  plan,  they  are  more  likely  to  support  its  implementation.  A key 
element in collaborative planning is the so-called consensus building, that aims to 
achieve  agreement  among stakeholders  who would  otherwise  not  talk  to  each 
other. This facilitates implementation because the consensus building processes 
are  less  likely  to  produce  unhappy  stakeholders  who  might  sabotage 
implementation  (Innes  and  Booher,  2004;  Innes,  1996).  In  a  paper  about  key 
criteria for implementation success, Joseph, Gunton and Day (2008) point out that 
all  models  of  implementation  stress  the  importance  of  strong  support  by 
stakeholders.  Collaborative  planning,  in  addition,  would allow stakeholders  to 
move from intense conflict to respectful negotiation, facilitating implementation 
by  resolving  conflicts  (Frame  and  Gunton,  2004;  Moote,  Mcclaran  and 
Chickering,  1997;  Carr,  Selin  and  Schuett,  1998).  In  addition,  collaborative 
planning has also been viewed as a mean to achieve more efficient decisions, by 
reducing negotiation time (Granberg, 2008; Pinson, 2002).
But  in  the  realm  of  implementation,  collaborative  planning  has  been 
submitted to critics. Its predominant process-oriented focus leaves unexplored the 
question  of  how  the  institutional  context  affects  collaborative  processes  and 
outcomes (Pinel, 2009; Newman, 2008). Collaborative planning often ignores the 
role  of  power  in  decision  making,  this  means,  it  ignores  the  role  of  formal 
governments  (Ploger,  2001).  In  addition,  several  case studies have shown that 
despite all the rhetoric and debate about governance and partnerships, the policy 
making  is  still  rather  traditional.  Government  can  recognise  the  need  for 
cooperation, but the implementation of decisions is made top-down (Teisman and 
Klijn,  2002;  Ploger,  2001;  Imrie  and  Raco,  2009),  because  implementation 
requires an enforcement power, and power has to eliminate unpredictable reasons, 
which are frequent in stakeholder involvement processes (Ploger, 2001).
On the other hand, the close relationship between plan implementation and 
planning practice  that  surrounds the  recent  literature  comes form the  work of 
authors  like  Healey  and  Faludi  who  attempt  to  link  plan  implementation  to 
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planning practice (Berke et al., 2006). But this link is of the same sort as the link 
between implementation and planning agency commitment (Dalton et al., 1989), 
implementation and plan flexibility (Alterman and Hill, 1978), or implementation 
and the awareness and willingness of decision-makers (Alterman, 1980). In the 
following it will be explained that these terms are not cause-effect, rather they are 
the same, but at a different level. 
All these concepts, that have evolved over time from a top-down paradigm 
to  a  bottom-up  one,  represent  in  the  implementation  literature  what  Bromley 
(2006) would  define  as  a  “deductive  belief”,  where  the  main  axiom relies  on 
“consensus  building  leads  to  plan  implementation”.  This  sort  of  belief  is,  as 
Bromley indicates, descriptive (it might be possible that collaboration of actors 
and  implementation  take  place  simultaneously,  but   in  spite  many  efforts  to 
demonstrate  it,  it  is  still  not  clear  (Newman,  2008;  Margerum,  1999),  and 
tautological.  This allows some researchers to believe that  plan implementation 
depends on planning quality,  enforcement style,  etc.  when these characteristics 
may  be  the  consequence  of  implementation  processes,  not  their  causes.  The 
endogeneity of these explanations leads to a vicious circle that does not explain 
the reasons why plan implementation really happens.
A closer look to the concept of collaborative planning will provide some 
insights that help us to understand it better. Collaborative planning is a tool of so-
called deliberative democracy. The central claim, according to Mouffe (1999), is 
that it is possible, thanks to adequate procedures of deliberation, to reach forms of 
agreement that would satisfy both rationality (understood as defence of liberal 
rights)  and  democracy  legitimacy  (as  represented  by  popular  sovereignty). 
Another  important  aspect  of  deliberative  democracy  is  the  insistence  on  the 
possibility  of  grounding  authority  and  legitimacy  on  some  forms  of  public 
reasoning  and  the  shared  belief  in  a  form of  rationality  which  is  not  merely 
instrumental but that has a normative dimension. But as Mouffe (1999) points out 
citing Wittgenstein, it is impossible to achieve agreement in opinions if there is no 
agreement in “forms of life”. Maybe an effective implementation requires some 
tools like collaborative planning, but it is difficult that collaborative planning can 
provide agreement among fundamental disagreements. The question of successful 
implementation underlines the necessity that a considerable number of agreements 
in judgements already exist in a society before a given set of procedures (whatever 
they  are,  from the  top-down paradigm,  skilled  planning officials,  or  from the 
bottom-up  paradigm,  the  consensus  building  formation)  can  work.  Plan 
implementation,  as  institutional  design,  requires  that  there  is  a  priori  a  partial 
source of social right, a postulated, a priori consensus (Ploger, 2001).
Because of all this, the literature on land-use planning implementation do 
not offer a conclusive answer to the question of why societies do implement land-
use policies and tools. This literature has still been hanging over old paradigms. 
Land-use planning has been considered during several decades of the 20th century 
as a technical matter. It was thought that a land-use plan well-defined from the 
technical  point  of  view and  with  clear  objectives  and  consistent  with  a  deep 
empirical analysis should not find barriers in the implementation process (Puppim 
de  Oliveira,  2006).  The  main  reasons  behind  this  conception  of  planning  are 
related to the view of physical environments as the main forces shaping societies 
and  neglecting  the  capacity  of  societies  to  shape  environments  (Graham  and 
Healey,  1999).  A  physical  paradigm  of  planning,  which  Friedmann  (1993) 
conceptualized as an “euclidian mode of planning”, was grounded on instrumental 
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rationality, where ends are rationally pursued and calculated. 
Behind  instrumental  rationality  underlies  a  difference  between  plan-
making  (or  policy  formulation)  and  plan  implementation  (or  policy 
implementation). This separation can lead to a paradoxical outcomes that cannot 
be understood within this paradigm. For example, if one plan or policy has well-
established goals and can lead after their implementation to a situation B that is 
much better according to well-established indicators than a situation A, why was 
the  plan  not  implemented?  Take  for  example  the  Oakland  Project  from  the 
influential study on implementation by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). These 
authors  differentiate  the  policy  formulation  of  the  project,  carried  out  by  the 
administration in Washington from the local implementation of the project7. The 
goals of the program were based on what it is called social justice, since it tried to 
develop  the  depressed  areas  of  the  United  States.  Pressman  and  Wildavsky 
(1973:6) pointed out that the main reasons of the implementation failure were “the 
difficulties of translating broad agreement into specific decisions, given a wide 
range of participants and perspectives; the opportunities for blockage and delays 
that result from a multiplicity of decisions points, and the economic theories on 
which the program was based”. One could argue that the failure was caused due to 
the high costs to achieve agreement. However, the failure of the Oakland Project 
could be interpreted in other way: maybe the depressed zones of the USA desired 
the plan goals, but the way of doing things proposed by the plans was interpreted 
by the main authors in ways that could be in contradiction with the plan goals. In 
this  way  policy  formulation  is  closely  related  to  plan  implementation  since 
policies  are  formulated  as  response  to  problems,  and  with  problems  is  meant 
modes of acting that lead to undesirable outcomes. The separation between policy 
design and policy implementation is actually very common in all models of public 
policy implementation.
Some authors have developed implementation models of land-use plans 
(Joseph, Gunton and Day, 2008; Berke et al., 2006). All these models rely on the 
same conceptual framework. The  implementation process is normally split into 
the following steps: plan implementation, and separately, goals definition. This is 
the  classical  model  of  plan  formulation.  This  separation  follows  a  means-end 
rationality,  does  not  have  explanatory  power  to  depict  real  processes  of 
implementation,  because,  as  it  will  be  shown  along  this  dissertation, 
implementation  processes  start  usually  by  imagining  possible  definition  of 
problems (Taylor, 1998). Thinking about problems and solutions are the two sides 
of the same coin. 
If a land use plan is regarded as a set of institutions (rules) that regulates 
land-uses (Buitelaar, 2007; Bromley, 2006), then institutional theory seems to be 
applicable to explain how and why do these institutions emerge and are adopted 
by  societies.  In  this  way, institutional  theory   could  be  a  suitable  theoretical 
framework that can better explain why institutions change and evolve over time 
and why they persist and are reluctant to change. However, it is not clear within 
institutional  theory what institutions mean,  and therefore what  a land-use plan 
may be from an institutional point of view. The meaning of institutions, and by the 
way, the meaning of land-use regulations, depends on the institutional paradigm 
7 This  separation  is  very  common since  the  earlier  studies  on  implementation.  For  instance, 
although Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) pointed out that this separation of policy design from 
policy  implementation  is  fatal,  they  also  recognise  that  there  must  be  something  prior  to 
implementation, like a policy or a programme. 
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used to define it. In the literature four institutional paradigms exist, and each one 
of  them defines  institutions  differently.  In  the  rational  choice  institutionalism, 
institutions are viewed as rules that constrain behaviour. The persistence of the 
institutions  depends on the benefits  they can deliver,  like reducing transaction 
costs for making deals or arrangements (Buitelaar, 2007; Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Historical  institutionalism  defines  frequently  institutions  as  “the  formal  or 
informal  procedures,  routines,  norms  and  conventions  embedded  in  the 
organisation  structure  of  the  polity  or  political  economy”,  emphasising  the 
importance of path dependency to explain the reluctance to change as well  to 
explain how new institutional arrangements depend on the arrangements made in 
the past (Hall and Taylor, 1996). However, within the paradigm of sociological 
institutionalism, institutions are defined in a much more broad way, insofar as it is 
defined culture  of  a  given community  as  institutions  (Hall  and Taylor,  1996). 
Finally,  discursive  institutionalism  lends  insight  into  the  role  of  ideas  and 
discourse in politics while providing a more dynamic approach to institutional 
change  than  the  older  three  new  institutionalisms  (Schmidt,  2008).  The  next 
sections describe the main assumptions of each institutional paradigm with regard 
to how institutions arise (the purpose of institutions) and evolve over time (the 
change and resilience of institutions).
3.3. Rational choice institutionalism
This institutional paradigm argues that actors use institutions to maximize 
their utility. In  general rational  choice  institutionalism  reduces  collective 
behaviour to individual behaviour (Peters, 1999) and it is reluctant to accept the 
role of government in making institutional arrangements, because it tends to view 
institutional  creation  as  a  quasi-contractual  process  marked  by  voluntary 
agreement among relatively equal and independent actors (Peters, 1999; Kingston 
and  Caballero,  2009).   With  regard  to  land-use  planning,  the  most  recurrent 
argument for planning given in this literature is that planning institutions are tools 
to deal with externalities  (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1990; Chung, 1994; Sorensen, 
1994;  Needham,  2006:58;  van  der  Krabben,  2009).  In  a  first  consideration  it 
seems that rational choice institutionalism was the approach that had a widespread 
answer about the reason for planning. If fact, the question of why society chooses 
to  adopt   institutions  of  government  regulation  of  land uses  had already been 
stated by some scholars that find comfortable within this paradigm (Lai, 1997; 
Chung, 1994).
To  better  understand  the  reasons  given  by  the  rational  choice 
institutionalism  to  the  research  question  it  is  necessary  to  explain  some  key 
concepts  used  within  this  paradigm.  The  theoretical  background  discussed  in 
rational choice institutionalism is  provided mainly by Pigou and Coase.  These 
scholars have had a considerable influence in how planning is understood and 
interpreted nowadays.  In his  work “The Economics of Welfare”,  Pigou (1932) 
suggested that the free play of self-interest in markets does not lead always to 
allocative  efficiency  of  resources,  and,  therefore,  government  intervention  is 
required when market is hampered by inefficiencies. By allocative inefficiency of 
resources is meant that a market organization that is not Pareto efficient implies 
that a certain change in allocation of goods may result in some individual being 
made  “better  off”  with  not  individual  being  made  worse  off.  It  is  commonly 
accepted  that  outcomes  that  are  not  Pareto  efficient  are  to  be  avoided,  and 
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therefore  Pareto  efficiency  has  been  an  important  criterion  for  evaluating 
economic systems or public policies (Frohock, 1979)8. 
Taken  this  into  consideration,  a  land-use  plan  can  be  regarded  as  a 
government intervention in the housing or land market when the market cannot 
achieve by itself an competitive equilibrium  or Pareto-Optimity, that is to say, 
that the government can do better than the markets does. It is commonly argued 
that Pareto efficiency is not achieved because of existence of externalities. And 
again,  in  welfare  economics  these  market  failures  are  considered  to  be 
justification for government intervention, i.e.,  land-use planning. Coase (1960), 
when  reflecting  on  the  Pigou's  approach,  included  a  new  concept  called 
“transaction costs” which captured very well some of the flaws of the Pigouvian 
arguments. Transaction costs can be defined as “the costs involved in operating 
the  various  social  arrangements”  (Coase,  1960) or  the  costs  of  “operating  the 
economic system” (Lai, 1997). For instance, when transaction costs are close to 
zero, markets achieve the most efficient outcome, that is to say, they achieve a 
Pareto-optimum.  However,  the  world  of  economic  transactions  if  full  of 
transaction  costs,  and  market  transactions  are  almost  never  frictionless.  Land 
planning  can  be  understood  as  way  to  lower  transactions  costs  in  order  to 
rearrange  property  rights  more  efficiently,  and  land  use  planning  can  be 
understood as an institutional arrangement to reduce transaction costs (Alexander, 
2001).
The literature based on Coasian and Pigovian approaches recognizes that 
there are externalities and that there are land-use regulations exist to tackle these 
externalities. Also both  approaches make a set of assumptions related to actors' 
behaviour. The source of externalities is the  self-interested and goal oriented way 
of actors' behaviour, with a well-established scale of preferences (Héritier, 2007; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996). In both approaches is clear that, if the externalities are the 
reason, the driving force that gives a shape to new institutional arrangements to 
deal with negative externalities is the search of efficiency. Pigovians believe that 
markets  should  tend  to  a  Pareto  optimum  with  the  government  intervention 
whereas Coasians believe that new institutional arrangements are made or have to 
be  made9 to  reduce  the  transaction  costs,  aiming  at  avoiding  externalities. 
Therefore,  if  zoning as institutional arrangement is  still  popular  in our current 
societies it is because it provides a more efficient way to deal with externalities 
(Lai, 2005; Webster, 1998). In chapter 2 and more specifically in chapter 6, it will 
be  shown  that  the  Pigovian  approach  as  well  as  the  Coasian  approach,  are 
normative in terms of assigning external goals to markets. They do not explain 
how markets really work, the tell us how markets should work.
However,  there  is  a  difference  in  the  two approaches.  In  the  Pigovian 
approach, market intervention is justified when external effects move from the 
optimal  Pareto-equilibrium to an inefficient  state.  Despite  this,  nothing is  said 
8However, this way of evaluation has been criticised by several scholars, for it makes not sense to 
compare  real  political  choices  with  an  attainable  Pareto-optimum (Dahlman,  1979;  Buitelaar, 
2004; Needham, 2006).  
9 Héritier  (2007)  divides  rational  choice  explanation  of  institutional  change  into  functional 
(intentional) approach which views institutions as an efficient and stable solution to a particular 
collective action problems (The most part of historical   institutionalist could belong to this group) 
and a rational non-intentional evolutionary approach viewing the outcome of institutional change 
as  a  selection and  adjustment  process.  The first  approach  influenced authors  like Williamson, 
whereas the second one has little influence on explaining institutional change because it would 
focuses  more  on  how  institutions  survive  over  time  rather  than  how  and  why  they  change 
(Kingston and Caballero, 2009; Hall and Taylor, 1996)
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about  the  nature  of  these  external  effects.  The  Coasian  approach  goes  a  step 
forward and understands externalities as a consequence of high transaction costs. 
Even more, Coase (1960) pays attention to the role of courts in differentiating 
harmful effects from nuisances and in creating legal liabilities, which in the end 
means  defining  externalities.  The  Coasian  approach,  and  Transaction  Costs 
Theory based on property rights have  been quite influential  in recent times in 
trying to explain what kind of institutional arrangements in land-use regulation 
can better  reduce transaction costs  (Buitelaar,  2007;  Alexander,  2001;  Musole, 
2009). However, this literature leaves several key questions unresolved regarding 
understanding institutional change.
-  Externalities: If  the main reason for the existence of land-use regulation are 
externalities,  why  does  a  society  adopt  and  implement  land-use  regulations 
whereas other similar society in terms of externalities does not?
-Efficiency:  Is  the  search  of  efficiency  the  driving  force  that  shapes  new 
institutional arrangements to deal with negative externalities? 
With regard to the second questions, several scholars (Buitelaar, Lagendijk 
and Jacobs,  2007;  Libecap,  1999;  Bromley,  2006)  have   pointed  out,  rational 
choice institutionalism cannot explain why it rarely observes efficient institutional 
arrangements that persist over time. Within organisational studies, the idea that the 
search of efficiency drives institutional change has also been widely criticized. In 
their seminal paper, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pointed out that institutional 
change in organisations  seemed less  and less  driven by competition or  by the 
search  for  efficiency.  Accordingly,  the  rising  interest  in  institutions  reflects  a 
growing disenchantment with theories that portray efficiency as the driving force 
behind decision making or that consider variations in formal structure as rational 
adaptations to technical and environmental conditions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
Some of these ideas will be discussed in Chapter 2. The first question will be 
mostly discussed in Chapter 6,  which is dedicated to understand the relationship 
between land-conflicts and externalities.
In conclusion we can say that rational choice institutionalism is not a well 
developed body of theory that accurately explain institutional change. There are 
several reasons for this lack of explanatory power. The first reason is that rational 
choice institutionalism has its real strength in explaining why existing institutions 
continue to exist, and this is about the economic benefits that institutions provide 
to the society (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Kingston and Caballero, 2009). In this way, 
rational  choice  institutionalism  is  not  really  addressing  the  question  of 
institutional change. The second reason is that rational choice institutionalist is 
highly functionalist (Pierson, 2000; Héritier, 2007). The problems of explaining 
institutional persistence is confused with the problem of explaining institution's 
origins (Hall and Taylor, 1996; See also Robert Bates, 1987). The third reason is 
that many of rational choice analysis of institutional change are highly voluntarist, 
that is to say, they tend to view institutional creation as a quasi-contractual process 
marked by voluntary agreement (Hall and Taylor, 1996), tending to neglect the 
role  of  collective  action  and  the  political  processes  (Kingston  and  Caballero, 
2009; Bromley, 2006).
Taking  all  this  into  consideration,  rational  choice  institutionalism  can 
explain only a small portion of institutional change in land-use regulations, those 
related to high information costs that can  create uncertainty among the market 
actors.  With  regard  to  institutional  stability,  rational  choice  has  found  good 
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arguments  in  behavioural  economics  to  explain  reluctance  to  change.  Libecap 
(1999) points out that it is difficult to make institutional arrangements that modify 
property  rights  because  these  arrangements  usually  entail  redistribution  of 
benefits.
3.4. Historical institutionalism 
Historical  institutionalism  was  virtually  the  first  version  of  the  new 
institutionalism to  emerge in the discipline of political  science.  It  was derived 
from the materialist views of Marx and the comparative history of Weber. For 
many years it was a perspective that assumed that the material interests of political 
and economic actors motivated politics and that these interest were institutionally 
determined (Campbell, 1998). In general, in rational choice versions of historical 
institutionalism, there are strands of economic institutionalism that also have a 
pronounced  historical  element.  In  this  way,  historical  institutionalism  can  be 
considered  a  paradigm  that  is  in  the  middle  of  sociological  and  economic 
institutional  approaches,  since  it  combines  both  “calculus”  and  “culture” 
(Immergut,  2005;  Hall  and  Taylor,  1996;  Ishiyama  and  Breuning,  2010). 
Historical  institutionalism  tends  to  conceptualize  the  relationship  between 
institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms, by developing an 
instrumental approach as well as cultural one. The last one tends to see individuals 
as satisficers, rather than utility maximizers, and to emphasize the degree to which 
choice of a course of actions depends on the interpretation of a situations rather 
than  on  purely  instrumental  calculation.  However,  unlike  rational  choice 
approaches, it emphasizes the asymmetries of power and information associated 
with the operation and development of institutions. In addition, and unlike other 
approaches, historical institutionalist emphasize path dependence and unintended 
consequences  (Hall  and  Taylor,  1996).  For  this  reason,  institutional  change  is 
usually  considered  by  many  historical  institutionalists  as  gradual.  There  is  a 
tension between the need of change and the old learned paths (North, 1990). 
The  concept  that  sumarizes  all  these  attributes  is  the  concept  of  path 
dependence  (Peters,  1999;  Hall  and  Taylor,  1996).  As  we  have  said  above, 
historical  institutionalism  is  a  mix  of  quite  different  institutional  paradigms, 
namely rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Thus, it is expected to 
find  definitions  of  path dependence  that  may be closer  to  a  paradigm than to 
another.  In  fact,  Thelen (1999) differentiates  two ways of  thinking about  path 
dependence  within  historical  institutionalism.  The  first  one  understands  path 
dependence  from an economic  point  of  view and is  quite  deterministic  in  the 
sense that when a path is chosen, it then becomes “locked in”. The relevant actors 
adjust  their  strategies  to  accommodate  the  prevailing  pattern.  It  is  difficult  to 
change  initial  selections  because  the  costs  (learning  costs  in  the  case  of 
technologies or transformation in the case of political changes) are too high (see 
for example the explanation of David (1985) about the origin of the keyboard). 
The costs are high enough to the extend that actors will not change institutional 
arrangement even if more efficient alternatives in the long term are available.
In addition to the learning costs, the use of institutions have increasing 
returns; the more they are used, the more benefits they provide. North (1990), 
argues that “in a world in which there are no increasing returns to institutions and 
markets are competitive [transaction costs are zero], institutions do not matter”. 
Actors  initially  have  incorrect  models  and act  upon them,  they  either  will  be 
eliminated  or  efficient  information  feedback will  induce  them to  modify  their 
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models.  However,  with  increasing  returns,  institutions  matter.  The  concept  of 
increasing returns, or what  North (1990) calls “network externalities”, seems to 
add more complexity to the functional view of institutions elaborated under the 
paradigm of rational choice institutionalism. Planning literature based on rational 
choice institutionalism believes that is able to explain institutional change under 
scenarios of high transaction costs or Pareto-inefficiency. But this left unexplained 
why almost always in such scenarios institutional change does not occur. Path 
dependence as a result of increasing returns (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989), or of 
network  externalities,  complementarities,  and  economies  of  scope  (North, 
1990;1998) could explain the existence of inefficient institutional arrangements. 
Notice  that,  in  this  way,  Demsetz's  (1967)  argument  about  the  emergence  of 
property rights (benefits provided by this institution are higher than the costs to 
maintain  it)  would  be  threatened  by  the  concept  of  increasing  returns  since 
increasing  returns  may  play  a  role  in  defining  the  pay-off  of  such  equation, 
property rights may provide benefits because they are widely used and are not 
widely used because the benefits they provided at the beginning. Path dependence 
has already been used in the planning realm to explain the failure of the Dutch 
city-province (see Buitelaar, Lagendijk and Jacobs, 2007).
But  to  what  extent  is  path  dependency  addressing  the  reluctance  to 
institutional change despite the so-called external or internal pressures? Are we 
understanding  correctly  the  nature  of  path  dependence  when  arguing  that 
decisions made in the past constraint the available choices in the future, and this 
leads, therefore, to inefficient institutional setups? It cannot be, on the contrary, 
that the major role of path dependence is to eliminate available choices and to 
provide certainty about the future, no matter if the past choices have been efficient 
or  not?  Is  path  dependency  constraining  the  evolution  toward  more  efficient 
institutional  structures  or  it  is  providing  and  securing  appropriate  patterns  of 
behaviour, in terms in which March and Olsen (1989) would refer to it? It seems 
that in many cases, there are always explanations of reluctance to chance apart 
from those that rely on the path dependence.   
Thelen  (1999)  argues  that  the  second  way to  look  at  path  dependence 
within  historical  institutionalism  is  from  the  point  of  view  of  sociological 
institutionalism. Zucker (1977) states that to arrive at shared definitions of reality, 
individual actors transmit an exterior and objective reality, while at the same time 
this reality defines what is real for these same actors. Generational transmission 
provides the clearest example of this process. The young are enculturated by the 
previous generation and so on. Cultural persistence can be explained, therefore, 
through a process of institutionalisation. This process affects directly three fields: 
transmission and maintenance (what some authors call institutional reproduction 
(see Seo and Creed, 2002)) and resistance to change.  The reluctance to change 
cannot be explained by historical constraints, it is explained in an easier way: we 
act according to learned patterns of behaviour, and these patterns define what is 
real, what is a problem and how to face it. Ikenberry (1994) argues that once the 
path is  set,  it  tends  not to change, but not because it  is  costly to change, but 
because interests and behaviour get defined by the political culture. In a certain 
sense North (1998) is, as good historical institutionalist,  close to this approach 
when arguing that “the informal constraints of norms, conventions, and codes of 
conduct that have deep seated cultural antecedents are particularly important as 
sources  of  path  dependence”.  The  problem  with  this  statement  is  the  word 
“constraint”,  for learned patterns of behaviour are  not constraints,  they are,  as 
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Bromley (2006) points out, elements that allow for action. Culture itself  would 
be,  therefore,  enough to  understand  the  reluctance  to  change,  and  changes  in 
culture (substitution of cultural elements, patterns of behaviour) can be considered 
as institutional changes. But how do explain change historical institutionalists?
According to Thelen (1999), historical institutionalism has developed two 
explanations  of  institutional  change.  The  first  one  is  based  on  what  in  the 
literature  is  called  “critical  junctures”.  Policies  emerge  in  certain  founding 
moments, when a critical juncture forces actors to make collective decisions. The 
basic of the policies gets established at these critical moments, and subsequent 
changes  tend  to  be  a  variation  or  extension  on  the  well-established  logic  of 
policies  (Ikenberry,  1994).  However,  in  the  literature these “critical  junctures” 
have been criticized for being incomplete, as it is not clear what causes the switch 
from  stability  to  instability  (Immergut,  2006;  Hall  and  Taylor,  1996;  Thelen, 
1999). Scholars have also been particularly weak in specifying the mechanism 
that translates critical junctures into lasting institutional arrangements, that is to 
say,  in  explaining  the  mechanism  of  reproduction  (Thelen,  1999).  Other 
explanations of institutional change for historical institutionalists point out that 
new institutions arise when groups in society perceive a possibility of availing 
themselves  of  profits  that  cannot  be  realized  under  prevailing  institutional 
conditions. The reasons of institutional change are therefore “change in relative 
prices and fluctuations in population growth” (North, 1990; p. 158). However, it 
has been pointed out that changes in relative prices may at most, change the costs 
and benefits of collective action on the part of different classes, but they cannot 
predetermine  the  balance  of  class  forces  on  the  outcome  of  social  conflicts 
(Bardhan, 1992). This means, that in a context of changing prices it is unclear how 
change  in  prices  can  drive  a  process  of  institutional  change.  With  regard  to 
institutional  stability,  historical  institutionalists  offered  better  explanations  like 
path dependence. These ideas will be explored with more detail in Chapter 5. 
3.5. Discursive institutionalism 
The  reviewed  institutional  paradigms   pay  more  attention  to  the 
institutional  structure  and  the  stable  character  of  institutions  than  to  their 
mutability  and  the  role  of  agents  in  institutional  change.  This  gap  is  what 
discursive institutionalism tries to fill. Discursive institutionalism, which is quite 
close  to  sociological  institutionalism  in  many  aspects,  explains  institutional 
change  based  on  the  emergence  of  new  ideas  an  discourses.  Discursive 
institutionalism makes use of discourse analysis from the social  constructivism 
point of view, to understand the processes in which some changes are organized 
into politics while other attempts do not succeed. In the end, institutional change 
occurs when one discourse wins over the others. Discourse analysis has a clear 
institutional dimension, for discourses are defined as a specific ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categorizations that are produced and transformed in a particular set 
of practices and through which meaning is giving to physical and social realities 
(Hajer,  1995).  In  this  way,  discursive  institutionalism  defines  institutions  as 
“simultaneously structures and constructs internal to agents” (Schmidt, 2008) and 
as  factors  internal  to  the  institutional  development  (Buitelaar,  2009).  This 
approach to institutions make for a more dynamic, agent-centered understanding 
of institutional change than in the older three institutionalisms, where institutions, 
even  in  the  sociological  approach,  are  considered  external  to  the  actors 
collectively  (Schmidt,  2008).  In  discursive  institutionalism,  discourses  are  not 
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viewed  as  restricting  the  set  of  policy  ideas  that  the  decision-makers  find 
acceptable,  like  for  example  in  historical  institutionalism.  Discourses  are  not 
regarded  as  constraining  political  action,  but  as  facilitating  this  action  by 
providing participants in policy debates with a conceptual repertoire for actively 
framing the political options (Campbell, 1998).
Discursive  institutionalism,  however,  does  not  provide  an  convincing 
explanation for institutional change. The main point of discursive institutionalism 
in trying to explain institutional change, relies on considering discourses as an 
interactive process. This is what enables agents to change institutions, because the 
deliberative  nature  of  discourse  allows  them  to  conceive  of  and  talk  about 
institutions as objects at distance, and to dissociate themselves from them even as 
they continue to use them. In this approach, institutional change is endogenous to 
the mind of actors,  leaving unexplained why some actor come up with certain 
ideas at certain specific moments.
3.6. Sociological institutionalism
North (1984) pointed out the important role that ideas and ideology have in 
the  stability  and  of  change  in  institutions.  However,  what  today  is  called 
sociological institutionalism has its roots in organizational theory (Ishiyama and 
Breuning, 2010; Hall and Taylor, 1998) and it arose as an opposition to rational 
choice institutionalist and the means-ends rationality. Sociological institutionalists 
regard  institutional  rules,  norms,  and  structures  as  not  inherently  rational  or 
dictated by efficiency concerns, but instead as culturally constructed (DiMaggio 
and  Powell,  1983;  Barley  and  Tolbert,  1997;  Meyer  and  Rowan,  1977). 
Sociological institutionalists usually take a normative approach to the study of 
institutions, tending to blur the line between institutions and culture (Ishiyama and 
Breuning, 2010; Hall and Taylor, 1998). 
Sociological  institutional  arguments,  like  other  types  of  institutional 
arguments, largely do not address the condition under which institutions change, 
beyond black-box expectation of exogenous shocks that may disrupt or render less 
salient norms, schemas, and their embedded resources. In addition, the origins of 
new norms and schemas raise questions of power that currently have little salience 
in sociological accounts. More generally, sociological institutionalism focuses on 
explaining  stability  around  a  dominant  and  consistent  institutional  structure. 
Instability around competing, contest sets of norms and schemas, led by different 
forces, lies largely outside the purview of sociological theory (Leicht, 2009). For 
example,  some sociological institutionalist  in planning,  like Healey,  have been 
criticized for not considering the power relationships in the construction of social 
reality  (Pløger,  2001).  Although  institutional  change  is  regarded  within 
sociological  institutionalist  as  the  consequence  of  legitimacy  search  (Healey, 
2006; Hall and Taylor, 1998), and that institutional evolution follows a logic of 
social  appropriateness  instead  of  a  logic  of  social  instrumentality  (March  and 
Olsen,  1989;  Campbell,  1998).  Nothing  is  said,  however,  about  why  do 
institutions turn inappropriate and therefore why does institutional change occur. 
For this reason, sociological institutionalist are said to be more concerned with 
institutional stability than with institutional change (Leicht, 2009).  
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4. Key definitions
4.1. A definition of institutions
A definition of institutions seems to be a controversial issue. Commons 
already pointed out in 1934 the “uncertainty of meaning of the word institution” 
(p.  69).  Sometimes the concept institution,  Commons argues,  appears  to mean 
behaviour of individual and other times “structure” (the body of regulations or 
laws). Although many attempts have been carried out to define institutions, this 
uncertainty  around  their  meaning  remains.  For  example,  one  of  the  most 
prominent scholars in the realm of institutional economics,  Geoffrey Hodgson, 
wrote an article called “What are institutions?” (Hodgson, 2006). The reader who 
expects to find an answer there will be  quickly disappointed. Hodgson uses an 
unbelievable amount of intertwined concepts to define institutions as conventions, 
rules, norms, constraints, laws, beliefs, habits, customs, organizations, values, etc. 
(and this set of words could double if adjectives such as formal or informal are 
added to each one). The logic of his definition of institution becomes chaotic and 
confusing.  In  a  first  instance  Hodgson  defines  institutions  as  rules.  Then  he 
defines rules as customs (rules have to be customary to become institutions). Then 
he defines custom as habit (customs are shared habits of thought), and finally he 
defines habit with the broad concept of “psychological mechanism”. But, what is 
a “psychological mechanism”? If institutions are psychological mechanisms, does 
it mean all psychological mechanism are institutions? Although the reader does 
not find a satisfying definition of institutions in Hodgson's article, (s)he would 
also be disappointed if (s)he believes that at least the place where institutions are 
located is clear. Since institutions are psychological mechanism, they must be in 
the  mind.  However,  Hodgson explains  on the page  14 that  rules  are  followed 
because they are normative beliefs (that is, they are in actor's mind), but there are 
rules  as  well  that  are  followed because they are convenient  for  the actor,  and 
therefore they do not need to be in actor's mind. At this point (almost the end of 
the paper), the reader neither knows what institutions are nor even where they are.
Hodgson's article offers however a couple of characteristics that seem to 
be  immanent  to  almost  all  attempts  carried  out  to  define  institutions.  First, 
institutions are defined by most institutionalists not in terms of what they are, but 
rather in terms of what they do. Second, Hodgson's definition of institutions seem 
to  be  trapped  by  the  duality  structure-behaviour  (or  agency),  mentioned  by 
Commons  above.  To  overcome  that  duality,  Hodgson  ends  up  relying  on  a 
psychological or mental explanation of institutions. This makes the concept of 
institutions both incomprehensible and of little use.
This flip-flop between structure/behaviour goes through the most relevant 
literature on institutions. Some institutionalists seem to understand institutions as 
structure –this means that they exists objectively and they have a kind of physical 
appearance –, whereas other scholars emphasize the meaning of institutions as an 
internalized but shared pattern of behaviour. As an example of the first category, 
we cite North (1990) and his definitions of institutions as the rules of the game, 
that  is,  as  constraints  that  restrain  behaviour.  Many  institutionalists  have 
understood institutions as an inalterable structure (similar to the North's metaphor 
that defines institutions as “jail” or the one that is used by Commons that defines 
institutions as “building”), rather than as as structure modifiable according to the 
actors'  purposes  (Sewell,  1992;  Hirsch  and  Lounsbury,  1997).  In  this  sense, 
institutions are conceived as invariable and permanent  over time. Accordingly, 
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institutionalists who tend to equate institutions with stability or durability, have 
developed  various  explanations  of  reluctance  to  change  (Clemens  and  Cook, 
1999; Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002; Sorensen, 2011b). Institutions become 
institutions  because  of  their  invariability  over  time,  for  institutions  are  by 
definition  “the  more  enduring  features  of  social  life”  (Giddens,  1984;  p.  24). 
Explaining  institutions seems therefore equivalent to explaining their durability 
and persistence  (Hodgson, 2006). However,  we observe that in the real world, 
institutions are continuously in a process of becoming, that is, institutions change. 
By describing institutions as endurable, we are nor describing anything real.
 As  mentioned  above,  other  institutionalists  take  a  step  forward  and 
understand  institutions  as  internalized  patterned  behaviour.  Institutions  emerge 
after a repeated behaviour under certain circumstances. Institutions can be called 
institutions if they are internalized in the actors' mind. Notice, that this is also the 
second step in Hodgson's definition of institutions (from “rules” to “habits”). For 
these institutionalists, institutions are a sort of rules that bind expectations, like in 
the case of reciprocity rules (Ostrom, 1998), where actors act according to the 
expectations that other actors have. The same happens when actors act following 
what has been called “a logic of appropriateness”. In this case actors behave in 
different situations in the way that is more socially appropriate (March and Olsen, 
1989; Olsen, 2009). In both cases, actors' behaviour is defined by society, to the 
extent that it shapes bound expectations in all members. Another interesting aspect 
is that, for these institutionalists, institutions seem to emerge like products of self-
organization. It does not matter if we refer to institutions like property rights in the 
case  of  Demsetz  (1967)  or  to  institutions  like  “reciprocity  rules”  in  Ostrom 
(1998).  This  concept  of  institutions  seem  to  be  very  narrow  and  it  does  not 
describe all kind of institutions that can be found in the real world. For instance, 
many of the most relevant institutions are explicitly designed and are far away 
from being a product of self-organization processes.
Other  institutionalists  take  even  another  step  forward  and  consider 
institutions to be generated by interactions among actors, a sort of mental script –
notice that this follows Hodgson's outline to define institutions, for mental script 
is what Hodgson meant by the concept of  “psychological mechanism”. Mental 
scripts are culturally embedded in the mind of actors (Gioia and Pole, 1984; Lord 
and Kernan, 1987; Johnson, Smith and Codling, 2000). Human action is based in 
this case on mental scripts that give to the actors the correct (from the social point 
of view) choice for each situation. The idea that mind plays a key role in action 
can also be found in the old institutionalists. For instance, Veblen (1919; p. 239) 
defines  institutions  as  “settled  habits  of  thought”,  which  in  the  end  are  an 
“outgrowth of habit”. The idea that institutions are results of mental states, or at  
least  are  products  of  mental  processes,  has  also  been  used  recently  by  North 
(2005)  under  the  concept  of  “mental  models”.  That  institutions  are  somehow 
embedded in the actors' mind assures certain patterned behaviour. Hodgson (2006; 
p.  6) even argues  that  if  institutions are  not  shaping a  certain behaviour,  they 
cannot  be  considered  institutions.  This  is  what  makes  institutions  to  be 
institutions. There can be a “structure”, there can be “reciprocity rules”, but if all 
these “things” are not in the mind, they do not shape behaviour, and therefore 
cannot  be  called  institutions.  However,  if  we  consider  that  many  institutions, 
particularly when they are secured by fiat and they are legally enforced, like the 
declaration of a Natural Park, the smoking ban in public spaces, or putting speed 
limits on roads (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Bromley, 2006), are almost immediately 
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followed by the  actors,  which  role  is  played by the  beliefs,  mental  scripts  or 
mental  models  in  these  cases?  Taking all  this  into  consideration,  the  question 
becomes, then, do institutional explanations need to rely on the mind to explain 
behaviour?  One  actor  can  have  certain  beliefs  and  does  not  necessarily  act 
according to them (Veblen, 1919), but the other way around is also true. One actor 
can follow a repeated behaviour without having explicit beliefs, mental scripts or 
models that induce that behaviour.
To  sum  up,  for  institutionalists  that  consider  institutions  as  restraints, 
institutions seem to be placed out of individuals and imposed to the individuals 
from  outside.  For  institutionalists  that  consider  institutions  as  created  from 
interactions  among  actors,  institutions  seem  to  be  the  rules  in  which  these 
interactions  materialize.  For  institutionalist  that  understand  behaviour  as 
motivated  by  mental  scripts,  institutions  seem  to  be  located  in  the  mind  of 
individuals. In this way, a holistic definition of institutions seem to be a line that 
links  rules,  mind and behaviour.  Scott  (2001; p.  51) speaks of three pillars  of 
institutions  (regulative,  normative  and  cultural-cognitive  systems).  Scott 
conceives these three pillars form a continuum moving “from the conscious to the 
unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for granted”.  
Although  this  is  a  good  description,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how 
institutions  work  for  several  reasons.  How  are  the  relationship  among  these 
concepts (mind, behaviour and rules)  linked is confusing and problematic. The 
problems with this are mainly two: 1) If there is an institution that is in the mind, 
shapes behaviour and is considered a rule for many actors, but not for all actors, 
how many individuals need to follow the rule to consider it an institution? To say 
there is an institution only for the individuals that follow the rule is misleading. 
Although  many  individuals  do  not  follow  a  rule,  we  do  not  stop  talking  of 
institution in those cases; 2) Many times, and this seems to be the case in land-use 
regulations, actors do not have any mental script, but they follow the rule, even 
more  when they  are  clearly  against  the  rule  because  there  are  substantial  net 
advantages to transgression and to break the rule. To explain why these rules are 
followed, we would need to go back to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein (1954[2001]) 
argues  that  many  behaviours  are  not  based  on reasons  and use  rules  that  are 
obeyed blindly (217). The example of how children learn the rules of language 
argues in favour of this.
The second case above is the most interesting for public policy. Norms that 
restrict behaviour of some  individual in contexts where there are perceived net 
advantages to transgression,  are the ones that require the most policing. Almost 
inconceivable, these norms have been relatively neglected by institutionalists. A 
definition of institution that is interesting from the standpoint of public policy is 
the  Commons'  (1934)  definition:  “Institution  is  collective  action  in  control 
(restrain, liberation and expansion) of individual action”. Bromley (2006) defines 
“collective  action”  as  actions  carried out  by public  bodies  like parliaments  or 
courts to expand and control individual action. This definition of institutions is 
very  useful  for  two  main  reason:  1)  it  represents  the  common  ground  of  all 
definitions of institutions explained above; 2) In this definition institutions are 
basically  an  “action”.  They  are  neither  structures  nor  mental  scripts.  In  this 
dissertation,  therefore,  by  adopting  this  definition,  we  say  that  the  Galician 
regional government undertook a collective action (and therefore created restraints 
to  municipal  goals  as  well  as  expanded  other  municipal  goals)  when  the 
parliament  passed  the  Land-Use  Act  in  2002,  regardless  the  number  of 
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municipalities  that  adopted  it.  In  the  same  way,  municipalities  undertook 
collective action (and therefore created restraints to individuals' goals as well as 
expanded other individuals' goals) when they made a plan according with that act. 
And this is so regardless of the number of individuals that act in compliance with 
the plan.
Notice that in this reasoning we do need not to rely on qualities of mind to 
explain  the  behaviour  of  the  regional  government  or  of  the  municipalities. 
Obviously the land-use Act is enforced in the sense that if behaviour is not in 
compliance with the Act, the court can act. In all law systems, as Redmond (2005) 
points out, detection and punishment of law breaker is costly, so it is in the interest 
of law-maker to promote a “meta-law” of the following sort: “one should obey the 
laws”. However, the meta-law, as Redmond (2005) points out, “is effective only in 
so  far  as  it  is  credible”  and  “credibility  is  a  function  of  perception  of  the 
legitimacy of the process under which the law arose and the rightful authority of 
the lawmaker”. Weber (1924 [1978]; p. 36), suggests that legitimacy is based on 
an authority “which is held to be legitimated and therefore meets compliance”. In 
this way, compliance with the act does not have anything to do with a mental 
internalization of the act, rather it has to do with how powerful or powerless is the 
public body to: 1) become credible when undertaking collective actions; 2) be 
legitimated to enforce the act. Obviously 1) and 2) are interrelated.
4.2. A definition of change
Traditionally,  institutional  theory  has  tended  to  focus  more  on  incremental 
changes (Dacin,  Goodstein and Scott,  2002).  Actually,  a major  contribution of 
recent new institutional work suggests  that the majority of institutional changes 
may occur not as overt and formal changes to existing policies and institutions, 
but as incremental and gradual changes through less visible processes that  may 
nonetheless be transformative over time (North, 1990; Sorensen, 2011a; 2011b; 
Thelen,  2004). North (1990) describes institutional change as ‘overwhelmingly 
incremental’. Radical change can be possible but, according to North, it ignores 
the  deep-seated  inheritance  that  underlies  many informal  constraints.  Informal 
constraints have great tenacity for survival and over time, the result tends to be a 
restructuring of the overall constraints to produce a new equilibrium. 
Yet,  paradigms  like  rational  choice  institutionalism  can  also  be 
instrumentalist, for institutions are designed as an efficient solution to particular 
problems  (Héritier,  2007),  and  hence  change  may  be  abrupt.  The  idea  of 
institutional change as incremental is usually more related to rational choice or 
historical  institutionalism  paradigms  that  are  deeply  rooted  in  evolutionary 
theories. The prevalence of evolutionary theories and the consequent neglection of 
conflict  when  understanding  institutional  change  have  been  attributed  to  the 
influence of Adam Smith and John Locke, who established modern economics on 
the  abundance  and  harmony  of  nature,  rather  than  on  scarcity  and  conflict 
(McLaughlin, 2010).
Institutionalists  who  are  closer  to  the  old  institutionalist  approach  pay 
much  more  attention  to  conflicts  and  scarcity,  and  to  the  importance  of 
institutional  arrangements  when  dealing  with  those  conflicts.  Consequently, 
institutionalists consider institutional change much more abrupt than incremental. 
Commons  (1934;  p.  239)  affirmed  that  the  common  law  is  the  decisions  of 
disputes  according to  prevailing  customs.  Therefore,  common law changes  by 
‘artificial  selection’.  Commons  called  this  process  ‘artificial  selection’  to 
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differentiate  it  from  evolutionary  theories  that  involved  ‘natural  selection’ 
(Commons,  1934;  p.  376).  These  ideas  influenced  authors  like  Bromley,  who 
suggested that property rights and other institutional arrangements are deliberately 
created as a result of collective action with the aim of solving certain problems 
(Bromley, 1991; 2006). 
These  ideas  have  taken  different  names  in  the  institutional  theory: 
endogenous  vs.  exogenous  change,  evolutionary  vs.  artificial  change  or 
incremental vs radical change. Recognising the validity of one type of change 
instead of another is also related to defending one notion of institutions instead of 
other  (Tubío-Sánchez,  Crecente-Maseda  and  Buitelaar,  2012).  We believe  that 
dichotomy of  change does  not  hold (and it  is  therefore  wrong) if  we look at 
changes in a more comprehensive way. One example can be useful to explain this. 
Perrin (2013) explains through a case study the conflict that took place in some 
communities in Toscane (Italy) and Provence (France), well-known in the world 
for  their  agricultural  landscapes.  In the 1960s and 1970s many land-use plans 
were made, which converted huge areas of land into developable land. The reason 
was that the majority of the population in these communities were farmers who 
were very prone to sell their lands to new (and usually wealthy) residents and give 
up their agricultural activity. The new residents dislike new developments because 
they threatened the landscapes. However, because the majority of the population 
were farmers and very often the mayor himself was a farmer, plans went on. The 
new residents reacted to this by buying agricultural land of farmers to prevent the 
conversion.  Over the years, the claims of new residents gained legitimacy and 
political power, to the extent that some of them got involved into local politics and 
started making land-use plans very restrictive with new developments.
This  example  shows  that  at  the  beginning  actors  can  use  incremental 
bargaining mechanisms to achieve their planning goals, and these goals can get 
formalised “abruptly” in land-use plans after a few years. The restrictive land-use 
plans could also be approved radically in the 1970s, and then be watered down 
slowly through several modifications, as North (1990) would suggest. But for our 
definition of institutions, this does not matter at all. In both cases our definition of 
institution holds, and the purpose of them is the same. Thus, this discussion is of 
scarce value for public policy. 
5. Conceptual framework. A model of institutional change
The dilemma of all institutionalist paradigm, as we have seen, relies on the 
difficulties to explain change, since institutions by the definition used by many 
instituionalists have as their main characteristic durability over time. To explain 
institutional change requires to defining the condition under which agency can 
break institutional embeddedness. But this leads us to another paradox: How can 
actors  change  institutions  if  their  actions,  intentions,  and  rationality  are  all 
conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?
This dilemma, as Clemens and Cook (1999) have argued, results from the 
tendency to equate institutions  with stability  and durability.  In this  vain,  other 
authors have argued that, in general,  institutional arguments have shifted away 
from the  old  institutionalism's  focus  on  agency  and  interests  toward  the  new 
institutionalism's  focus  on  structural  embeddeness.  The  result  is  the  current 
overemphasis  on  structural  constrain  within  institutional  theory  (Hirsch  and 
Lounsbury, 1997). 
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Recently several  authors have started to make efforts  to  get  out  of  the 
institutionalism dilemma. It has been pointed out that the analytical dichotomy 
between  rational  choice  institutionalism  and  sociological  institutionalism  is 
flawed, since in the last years both paradigms have influence each other (Burch et 
al., 2003) or it is not an explanatory dichotomy of change (Buitelaar et al., 2007). 
From  a  more  theoretical  point  of  view,  the  structuration  theory  proposes  by 
Giddens (1984) attempting to reconcile theoretical dichotomies such as agency vs. 
structure to  suggest the need to find a solution to this dilemma of institutional 
change. Although each of these contributions are valuable attempts to reconcile 
the  apparent  contradictions  between  embeddedness  and  agency  and  between 
stability and change, all leave important questions at best only partially answered: 
when and how do actors actually revise the institutional arrangements that shape 
their behaviour? What are the real sources of institutional change that are usually 
covered by vague concepts in the institutional literature such  “external societal 
developments”, “critical junctures”, “unsettling circumstances” or “destabilizing 
jolts”? In the end, as Sewell (1992) pointed out, all these concepts remained vague 
because all institutional change models still emphasized the roll of structure over 
agency.  This  makes  dealing  with change awkward,  for  the  metaphor  structure 
implies stability. 
In the last years a more dialectical vision of institutions has emerged as a 
way to break of institutional  embeddedness envisaged by Hegel and Marx. The 
dialectical analysis was introduced by Benson (1977) in the field of organisational 
theory aiming to reach beyond the limits of rational explanations of organisations 
and normative bases of decision within organisations. The dialectical analysis put 
together in a dialectical perspective both the institutional setup and the agency 
part. In this way the production of social structures is itself guided and constrained 
by  the  context  of  the  social  structure  (Benson,  1977;  Sewell,  1992;  Giddens, 
1989).  For  Benson  (1977)  the  dialectical  analysis  involves  a  “search  for 
fundamental  principles  which  account  for  the  emergence  and  dissolution  of 
specific social orders”. According to Benson (1977) there are four principles of 
dialectical  analysis:  social  construction/reproduction;  totality,  contradiction  and 
praxis. Social systems are not stable over time, they are always in a process of 
becoming  and  reproducing  themselves.  Along  this  process  of  becoming, 
contradictions, inconsistencies, incompatibilities, within the social structure can 
arise. For Benson, contradictions grow out of social production in two ways. First, 
there is in any social setting a contradiction between ongoing production and the 
previous established social formation. Second, the production process is carried 
out in different social contexts producing multiple and incompatible social forms. 
Some similar reasons of institutional change have also been pointed out by Sewell 
(1992) in  what  he  calls  “the intersection  of  structures” or  the  “multiplicity  of 
structures”. These two ways of institutional contradiction can be characterized as 
contradiction between past institutional setup and the reproduction of it (in trying 
to  reproduce  old  institutional  structures,  inconsistencies  and  contradiction  can 
emerge) or as contradiction between different current institutional setups. In the 
first way, the reproduction of social structures can shift from old patterns due to 
technological  improvements.  As  Bursch  et  al.(2003)  points  out,  technological 
innovation involves a change in behaviour, and changes in behaviour create new 
problems for the community in the correlation of behaviour. However,  Benson 
(1997) states that the most basic and generic contradiction is that between the 
constructed social world and the ongoing process of social contradiction. 
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Although this  might allow us to  understand institutional change,  it  still 
lacks a theoretical framework that can can systematically explain: 1) what the 
sources  of  contradiction  are;  2)  why,  by  what  mechanism,  and  under  what 
conditions those contradictions lead embedded agents to take collective action for 
institutional change? This is precisely what Seo and Creed (2002) tried to develop. 
Relying on the Benson's work, they tried to go a step forward by identifying a set 
of institutional contradiction that will allow for the explaination of institutional 
change. Seo and Creed (2002) proposed four sources of institutional contradiction. 
From a  dialectical  perspective  the  accumulation   of  these  contradictions  both 
within and between institutions provides the seeds of institutional change. The 
sources are:
1) Legitimacy that undermines functional efficiency. Sometimes the conformity to 
the  institutional  environment  increases  various  rewards,  such  as  reputation, 
resources, and survival changes, at the expenses of efficiency. Using an example 
from the  Galician  context  of  land-use  planning,  we could  consider  that  if  the 
mayor  of  one  municipality  wants  to  respect  citizens'  property  rights,  allowing 
them to build everywhere, a point can be achieved where the costs of providing 
municipal services in an environment of urban sprawl can be too costly for the 
municipality.
2)  Adaptation  that  undermines  adaptability.  Institutionalization  is  an  adaptive 
process.  Once in  place,  institutions are likely to  be locked in and, in a sense, 
isolated  or  unresponsive  to  changes  in  their  external  environments.  This 
unresponsiveness creates a space where contradictions between those institutions 
and their external environments develop and accumulate over time. In Galicia, the 
introduction of full  individualised property rights has been associated with the 
concept  of  freedom, the idea that  strove the introduction of property rights in 
several countries. However, such adaptive moves (too much ownership) can make 
adopters less able to adapt over long run, like to make innovative land policies 
(Heller, 2010). And this is precisely what happened in Galicia with property rights 
individualisation when the highly fragmented ownership of land favoured urban 
sprawl and hampered land policies to deal with it effectively (Tubío-Sánchez et 
al., 2013).
3)  Intrainstitutional  conformity  that  creates inter-institutional  incompatibilities. 
Conformity  to  a  certain  institutional  arrangements  within  a  particular  level  or 
sector may cause conflicts or inconsistencies with the institutional arrangements 
of different levels or sectors. Normally, decentralisation processes create lots of 
inter-institutional incompatibilities (Seo and Creed, 2002). The Galician land-use 
acts of 1985 and 1997, and partially the land-use act of 2002, can be considered a 
consequence of these decentralization processes in Spain (Tubío-Sánchez et al., 
2013).
4)  Isomorphism  that  conflicts  with  divergent  interests.  The  formation  and 
reproduction of  institutional  arrangements  are  unlikely to  satisfy the  divergent 
interests  of all  participants.  Seo and Creed (2002) referred to  this  type of the 
institutional contradiction as the most common. And  this is also the most answer 
given  by academic  planning departments.  Behind divergent  interests  there  are 
externalities, which in the end represent conflicts of interests.  According to Durke 
(2004), conflicts over property rights have little to do with efficiency goals of 
landowners, neither are they about who has property rights, conflicts are about 
who  wants  property  rights,  since  “land-use  conflicts  involve  a  party  in  a 
privileged position competing with a party, who has no correlative right, over an 
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unallocated right in land”. (p. 242). Land-use planning is a way to gain property 
rights.
Although  the  four  sources  of  institutional  contradiction  have  been 
discussed individually, as Seo and Creed (2002) point out, this does not suggest 
that they are separate sources of contradictions. Rather, it is likely that they are 
highly  interconnected.  Although  institutional  contradiction  have  been  analysed 
before by several authors (see Sewell, 1992), the dialectical perspective of Seo 
and Creed (2002) assumes that institutional contradictions are the driving forces 
of institutional change, but not that these contradictions lead deterministically to 
change. In this way the authors try to recast the idea of agents working on the 
reconstructions  of  social  structures.  This  idea  is  formalized  in  the  concept  of 
praxis, that is, as Benson (1977) states, that “people under some circumstances 
can become active agents reconstructing their own social relations and ultimately 
themselves on the basis of rational analysis  and an ethical commitment”.  This 
means that, from a dialectical point of view, human agency is inseparable from 
institutional contradictions (Seo and Creed, 2002). 
Our  model  to  understand  institutional  change  in  land  policies  is 
represented in the following diagram. Each relationship between is the boxes is 
numbered  and  the  number  represents  the  chapter  in  which  the  relationship  is 
studied with more detail. In Chapter 2 the model of institutional, more expanded, 
is applied to understand the passing of the LOUGA by the Galician Parliament. In 
Chapter 3, the adoption of LOUGA and the Dutch Spatial Planning Act (Wro) 
passed in 2008 are compared in terms of diffusion (number of municipalities that 
adopted it), paying particular attention to the enforce mechanisms envisaged in 
both  acts.  In  Chapter  4  is  carried  out  the  quantitative  analysis  in  order  to 
understand  the  main  characteristics  of  adopters  and  non-adopters.  The  main 
hypothesis with regard to planning implementation in the Galician literature are 
mainly  discussed  in  this  chapter.  In  Chapter  5  we discuss,  from a  qualitative 
perspective,  the  sources  of  institutional  change  and  stability  that  explain  the 
implementation pattern. The qualitative findings in Chapter 5 are related to the 
qualitative findings of Chapter 4. In Chapter 6 we discuss with more detail the 
findings  related  in  Chapter  4  from  the  perspective  of  rational  choice 
institutionalism by carrying out  4 case studies.  In this  Chapter we pay mostly 
attention to the concept of externalities.
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Chapter 2: Institutional change in land planning: 
two cases from Galicia
Abstract 
Why do societies implement land policies? A number of arguments have been put 
forward in the literature, ranging from economic conceptions based on market failure 
and  the  problem  of  negative  externalities,  to  a  more  social  conception  based  on 
welfare distribution and collaborative planning. However,  neither all societies with 
similar market failures or negative externalities develop and implement land planning 
nor  implemented  land  planning  always  results  from  collaborative  planning.  The 
arguments found in the literature seem not to fit the reality and, in most cases, cannot  
explain why societies create or undertake innovations in land planning. Within the 
framework of institutional change theory and based on the analysis of the emergence 
of two land planning devices –a land use law and a land banking law– in Galicia, 
Northwest Spain, this paper argues that land planning is developed to tackle negative 
outcomes of former institutional setups. However, the negativity of such outcomes is 
not measured in terms of economic performance, but in terms of social acceptance.  
The search for a workable definition of property within Galician society seems to be 
the main driver of institutional change in land use planning analysed in this paper. 
Key words: Land planning, institutional change, land property
1. Introduction 
This  paper  analyses  the  reasons  behind  the  adoption  of  land  planning, 
which  is  the  first  step  of  the  implementation  process.  A few  authors  in  the 
planning  realm  have  dealt  with  the  problem  of  planning  implementation. 
However, they have focused mainly on how plans can be implemented, giving 
great  attention  to  the  processes  of  collaborative  planning  and  stakeholder 
involvement  (Butler  and  Koontz,  2005;  Burby,  2003;  Moote,  Mcclaran  and 
Chickering, 1997; Joseph, Gunton and Day, 2008; Innes, 1996; Innes and Booher, 
2004; Frame and Gunton, 2004; Carr, Selin and Schuett, 1998). Accordingly, the 
adoption and implementation of land planning would be closely related to a well-
established institutional matrix, and the implementation of land planning would be 
reduced to the formulation of new discourses that can reshape the institutional 
matrix  to  “get  things  done”  (Healey,  1996).  But  this  approach  leaves  several 
things unclear. Why do new discourses appear? Why do some of them fail while 
others succeed? Some authors like Schmidt (2008) have addressed these questions 
but the answers remain still unclear and vague. On the other hand, implementation 
approaches based on the deliberative nature of collaborative planning are very 
normative (Newman, 2008; van der Krabben, 2009a). Some authors have reported 
that  governments  can  recognize  the  need  for  cooperation,  but  policy 
implementation is made top-down (Teisman and Klijn, 2002; Pløger, 2001; Imrie 
and  Raco,  1999)  because  implementation  requires  an  enforcement  power  to 
eliminate unpredictable reasons, which are frequent in stakeholder involvement 
and collaborative planning processes (Pløger, 2001).
Economic  approaches  do  not  pay  so  much  attention  to  the  planning 
process. Rather, they focus on the reasons why societies develop land planning. 
For instance, it has been argued that land use tools such as zoning reduce the level 
of negative externalities (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1990; van der Krabben, 2009b). 
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But even in this case, the reasons given are not explanatory. Negative externalities 
are present everywhere and not every society reacts  to them through land use 
planning.
Getting closer to the right question
It is widely recognized that the implementation of land planning is closely 
related  to  the  political  will.  But  will  (attitudes,  motivation  and  beliefs,  i.e.,  
institutions) is less amenable to policy intervention (McLaughlin, 1987). The will 
to  implement  new  policies  that  change  old  practices  depends  heavily  on 
institutional  setups  and  on  the  ability  or  capacity  of  societies  to  create  new 
institutional  frameworks.  Every  institutional  setup  is  a  socially  constructed 
template  for  action,  generated  and  maintained  through  ongoing  interactions 
(Meyer  and  Rowan,  1977).  From  this  perspective,  actors  create  institutions 
through a history of negotiations that lead to “shared typifications” or generalized 
expectations  and  interpretations  of  behaviour  (Barley  and  Tolbert,  1997). 
Therefore,  the  question  that  answers  why  societies  adopt  and  enforce  land 
planning should lead to the question of why societies create and develop certain 
values and beliefs on land or property,  and why societies are able to agree on 
certain common land-related issues. As suggested above, and argued later in this 
paper, the way in which societies achieve “shared typifications” is far from any 
form of  collaborative  consensus-building  or  any  economic  approach  based  on 
efficiency arguments. 
In  this  paper,  we  review the  main  theories  of  institutional  change  and 
develop a model of institutional change. To test  the validity of the model,  we 
propose  the  adoption  of  two  land  laws  as  case  studies.  Eventually,  the 
implementation of such land planning devices is an institutional change, insofar as 
it tries to change the main working rules of a society in relation to land use. The 
will of a regional government to implement a new land planning act involves the 
will to change institutions. Therefore, the reasons for the adoption of land use acts 
are related to a number of factors that allow for institutional change. Through 
these two examples we offer an explanation of the main sources of institutional 
change  related  to  land  planning.  In  the  next  section,  the  main  theories  of 
institutional change are briefly explained.
2. Theories of institutional change
Since the late 1990s, planning has experienced what has been referred to 
as “institutional turn” (Healey, 1998a; Jessop, 2001; Nielsen, 2007; Healey, 2007), 
following  the  communicative  approach  developed  by  authors  such  as  Healey 
(1996) or Innes (1996). Thus, planning has begun to be understood as a set of 
practices  embedded  in  an  institutional  field.  The  focus  of  the  research  has 
gradually  moved  from  the  communication  and  consensus-building  approach 
towards the main institutions involved in the planning process. For instance, it can 
be argued that land planning can be considered an institutional arrangement in 
itself  (Buitelaar, 2007; Bromley, 2006). Although a number of authors interested 
in  land  planning  implementation  have  investigated  the  reasons  why  societies 
choose  institutional  arrangements  such  as  land  planning,  none  of  them  has 
explained  whether  the  reason behind  this  election  was  the  real  cause  of  land 
planning  implementation.  The  literature  on  implementation  does  not  offer  a 
conclusive answer to this question because it focuses on the implementation of 
public  policies,  which  has  normally  been regarded from a  normative  point  of 
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view.
There is a set of theories of institutional change that can be summarized 
into  two  main  approaches:  institutional  change  by  evolution  and  institutional 
change  by  design.  Such  a  division  could  be  considered  partially  misleading 
because of the ambiguity of some authors in explaining their approach. Yet, all of 
them strive for the development of a theory of institutional change by positioning 
themselves  around  three  basic  concepts:  efficiency,  the  role  of  formal  and 
informal institutions, and the role of government, which is closely related to the 
role of institutions. Some authors have criticised this dichotomy by arguing that 
institutional  change  theories  based  on  evolutionary  approaches  cannot  explain 
why  inefficient  institutions  persist  over  time.  To  solve  this  dilemma  all 
explanations  end  up  relying  on  the  historical  institutionalist  concept  of  “path 
dependence”  (Buitelaar,  Lagendijk  and  Jacobs,  2007).  However,  we  do  not 
believe that this is a factor explaining reluctance to change. As March and Olsen 
(1989)  have  pointed  out,  new  institutions  are  adopted  in  terms  of  social 
appropriateness.  In  this  way,  history  does  not  restrain  the options  available  to 
change institutions, but makes these institutions workable from the social point of 
view, whether they are inefficient or not. On the other hand, institutional change 
by design has been criticised because of its strong emphasis on design,  which 
makes it difficult to explain why particular institutions are chosen, whereas other 
are not (Buitelaar, Lagendijk and Jacobs, 2007). In our opinion, such a criticism 
does not contribute to solving the dichotomy between design and evolution, as it 
relies on the assumptions that institutional change approaches based on design try 
to  deny,  namely  the  assumption  that  a  theory  of  human  choice  cannot  be 
developed, as strongly supported by institutional rational choice paradigms. With 
this sort of criticisms, the dichotomy between design and evolution becomes even 
sharper.  In  addition,  institutional  change  theory  does  not  explain  why  some 
institutional arrangements are preferred over other arrangements; rather, it focuses 
on the reasons of institutional change and how change is formalized.
Under  these  assumptions,  we  believe  that  institutional  change  theories 
based on design have more explanatory power than theories based on evolution. 
In the following section, we present the main characteristics of each approach. In 
addition,  we  define  a  model  of  institutional  change  in  five  steps  based  on 
Bromley's model (2006), which is similar to the model described by Buitelaar, 
Lagendijk and Jacobs (2007). Yet, we did not choose Buitelaar's model for two 
reasons. First, it uses the concept of “critical junctures”, which has been criticised 
by several authors insofar as it is not clear what causes the switch from stability to 
instability  (Immergut,  2006;  Hall  and  Taylor,  1996;  Thelen,  1999).  Second, 
Buitelaar’s model does not focus on agency, at least not as deeply as Bromley's 
model, which includes the types of agents’ roles in institutional changes. Thus, we 
develop the reasons and pressures that can lead to institutional change and the 
main agents involved in the process in more detail. To include these aspects in our 
model,  we have used the concept  of  “multilevel  processes” of Seo and Creed 
(2002).
2.1. Institutional change by evolution
The theory that is most deeply rooted in economic thinking is the theory of 
institutional change by evolution. This theory could have had its origins in the 
interpretation  of  Darwin's  theories  applied  to  economics,  which  consider  the 
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search for  efficiency as  the main  source of  institutional  change.  For  example, 
Hayek (1967) stated  that “the transmission of rules of conduct takes place from 
individual to individual, while what may be called the natural selection of rules 
will operate on the basis of the greater or lesser efficiency of the resulting order of 
the group”. These ideas have spread through economic and sociological studies. In 
organizational theory, which has quite influenced the understanding of governance 
processes, it has often been stated that less efficient modes of organizing are at a  
comparative disadvantage and will not be selected in the long run (Jones, Hesterly 
and Borgatti, 1997). For example, North (1998) has pointed out that one cause of 
institutional  change  is  competition,  which  forces  organizations  to  continually 
invest in skills and knowledge to survive, but he recognised that stable institutions 
do not necessarily rely upon efficiency (North, 1990). In this way, institutional 
improvement takes place where payoffs are maximized. Moreover, institutional 
change is path-dependent, which means that it will be consistent with the previous 
institutional matrix. This paradigm of institutional change has been particularly 
influential in explaining the adoption of land use planning, insofar as it argues that 
changes in land planning instruments are caused by market competition toward a 
more efficient and more productive system (Zhu, 2004; Webster and Lai, 2003). In 
this  paradigm,  the  search  for  efficiency  is  considered  the  main  reason  why 
societies develop and implement land use planning. Because land use planning is 
created  to  manage externalities  (externalities  are  the  raison d'être of  land use 
planning  tools  such  as  zoning  (Pogodzinski  and  Sass,  1990;  Chung,  1994)), 
Lubell,  Feiock  and  de  la  Cruz  (2009) have  predicted  that  land  planning  will 
become  more  restrictive  as  land  becomes  scarce,  population  increases  and 
infrastructure  becomes  strained.  Likewise,  Lai  (2005) has  argued  that  the 
institutions  that  fail  to  reduce costs  in  the  long run will  be replaced by more 
efficient alternatives. 
The most widespread theory behind this paradigm of institutional change 
is  the Transaction Costs  Theory (TCT),  which assumes that  the most  efficient 
institutional forms (those which minimize transaction costs) will emerge, that is, 
that institutions will develop so as to achieve an optimal match with a particular 
transaction  (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). In this way, TCT would match the 
transactions involved and their specific attributes, to determine which offers the 
lowest transaction cost for all  participating actors  (Alexander, 2001).  Although 
some authors have argued that TCT or rational choice approaches do not explain 
institutional  change,  since  they  only  aim  to  explain  why  institutions  survive 
(Kingston and Caballero, 2009; Hall and Taylor, 1996), planning literature, and 
particularly literature related to zoning has found it very useful to explain why 
societies do choose to adopt the institution of government regulation of land uses 
(Lai,  1997;  Chung,  1994).  For  instance,  local  governments  choose  institutions 
such as zoning to solve externality problems by clearly assigning property rights 
or expecting to allocate property rights over land use in a way that best facilitates 
movement to the efficient allocation  (Webster, 1998). Likewise,  Fischel (1978) 
has stated that land use planning tools such as zoning are implemented because, 
when  population  increases,  the  greater  density  leads  to  a  rise  in  costs  in  the 
delivery of local services. Then, municipalities become aware of such a rise and 
use zoning as a development limitation. In both cases it is clear that the search for 
efficiency is the main cause of institutional change in land use planning tools. In 
addition, evolutionary theories tend to neglect the role of collective action and of 
the  political  processes  (Kingston  and  Caballero,  2009).  North  (1990) has 
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emphasised  that  the  predominant  form  of  institutional  change  is  gradual  and 
occurs  through  continuous  marginal  adjustment,  as  an  accumulation  of  many 
small  changes at  the level of informal constraints  rather than as large changes 
designed by authoritative agents at the level of more formal institutions.
2.2. Institutional change by design 
However, the approach explained above has been widely criticized. In their 
seminal paper, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pointed out that institutional change 
in  organizations  seemed  less  and  less  driven  by  competition  or  search  for 
efficiency.  Accordingly,  the  rising  interest  in  institutions  reflects  a  growing 
disenchantment with theories that portray efficiency as the driving force behind 
decision  making  or  that  consider  variations  in  formal  structure  as  rational 
adaptations to technical and environmental conditions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
The  same  was  stated  by  Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977),  who  pointed  out  that 
organizational success depends on factors other than efficient coordination and 
control, to the extent that they are more related to legitimacy issues. In addition, 
these  authors  affirm  that  uncertainties  or  adaptation  to  environmental  change 
cannot be resolved on the basis of efficiency.
In  this  paradigm of  institutional  change,  previous  ongoing,  multi-level 
processes produce a complex array of interrelated but often mutually incompatible 
institutional  arrangements  that  provide  a  continuous  source  of  tension  and 
conflicts within and across existing institutions (Seo and Creed, 2002). Therefore, 
institutional  change  requires,  first,  that  a  critical  number  of  actors  make  a 
collective, conscious choice before they can make a multilateral departure from 
established patterns of social reproduction and, second, that a bigger contextual 
change (e.g. technological or economic shock) occurs before actors can make such 
a  collective  choice  (Barley  and Tolbert,  1997).  Similar  arguments  had already 
been pointed out by March and Olsen (1989), who argued that many institutional 
arrangements are not implemented because they have to wait for new occasions 
on which they might be represented as answers to problems unresolved by current 
practice.
The model  of institutional change depicted by Bromley (2006) is  quite 
similar,  but  focused  on  how the  change  is  made  effective  rather  than  on  the 
reasons that  might  have caused the change.  First,  institutional  change requires 
unsettling  circumstances  that  are  usually  the  products  or  results  of  individual 
behaviours  that  are  themselves  the  inevitable  entailments  of  the  existing 
institutional  arrangements.  This  means  that  the  prevailing  institutions  are  the 
plausible  cause  of  emergent  problems.  Second,  the  authoritative  agents  (the 
legislature  and  the  courts)  produce,  with  a  purpose  in  mind,  the  institutional 
structure that can solve the problem. To this end, there is usually an assessment of 
the existing circumstances, in which warranted beliefs are created. This process 
requires  the  concurrence  of  an epistemic  community  that  is  able  to  make the 
correct cause-problem relations or, more importantly, that provides a relation that 
is  broadly  accepted.  Third,  new  created  imaginings  about  the  future  are 
formulated.  Finally,  new  institutional  arrangements  that  lead  to  the  desired 
imaginings  in  the  future  are  created  and  articulated.  Collective  action  is 
undertaken in parliaments and the courts; this means that collective action takes 
place when the new institutional arrangements are passed. Over time, all of us get 
used to new institutional infrastructure structures in our daily lives. In addition, 
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Bromley's approach points out that the outcomes of available actions (that is, the 
new actions built up in the new institutions) are only imaginable, and that in the 
process  of  imagining  them,  the  outcomes  of  the  action  are  created.  Bromley 
(2006) states: “Outcomes of  available  actions  are  only imaginable,  and in  the 
process of imagining them we do not ascertain those outcomes –rather we create 
those outcomes”.
Unlike institutional change theories based on evolutionary ideas, outcomes 
of policy action are not calculated or estimated. Policy action tries to imagine and 
create an output that can be socially accepted, i.e., workable. The model depicted 
by Bromley tries to explain the origins of public policy by arguing that public 
policy is about institutional change and that public policy is a response to certain 
outcomes that societies evaluate as not reasonable. In keeping with this statement, 
Taylor (1998) has suggested that policy is in reality a response to action rather 
than  the  trigger  that  initiates  action  by being “put  into  effect”.  Policy,  Taylor 
argues, is usually devised in response to some problems, and the problems that 
policies  try  to  solve  result  from  previous  human  actions  guided  by  specific 
institutions, such as norms, values or beliefs.
Planning systems are a set of institutions that try to manage other sets of 
institutions, specially the property rights  (Galey and Booth, 2007). Accordingly, 
planning systems are a response to developed systems of property, to the extent 
that they try to adapt property institutions to the collective goal of the society. In 
this case, the main source of institutional change is the failure of planning systems 
to generate institutions able to adapt to new ways of thinking, new values, or new 
societal norms. As suggested by  Seo and Creed (2002), institutionalization is an 
adaptive  process.  Institutions  are  likely  to  be  both  psychologically  and 
economically locked in and isolated or unresponsive to changes in their external 
environments.  Such  unresponsiveness  creates  a  space  where  contradictions 
between  those  institutions  and  their  external  environments  develop  and 
accumulate over time. 
Based on the  ideas  of  Seo and Creed (2002) and Bromley (2006),  we 
propose a model to explain institutional change in five steps that can be used to 
describe institutional change in land planning. This model describes the required 
elements at the level of institutional design, and emphasizes the importance of 
multi-level processes and big contextual changes that can promote institutional 
changes. The steps of our model are the following:
1.- Multi-level processes that influence the existing institutional matrix. From the 
dialectical  perspective  of  Seo  and  Creed  (2002),  a  set  of  institutions  can  be 
understood as “the multilevel social arrangements that are continually produced 
and  reproduced  by social  interactions”.  The  social  reproduction  of  this  set  of 
institutions  can  produce  an  array  of  interrelated  but  often  incompatible 
institutional arrangements. In this article we analyse the multilevel processes of 
institutions related to property.
2.- Big contextual change (an economic or technological shock).
3.-  Actors.  Two kinds of actors  are  identified.  First,  actors who belong to the 
epistemic community and, in Bromley's (2006) words, link the consequences with 
the  causes  of  the  institutional  setup,  i.e.,  actors  who  create  warranted  belief. 
Second, actors who believe the reasons given by the epistemic community and 
decide to act.
4.- Design of new institutions that can provide imagined futures.
5.- “Solidification” of new institutional arrangements when the laws are passed.
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In explaining  institutional  change it  is  important  to  explain the role  of 
agents.  However,  the agency aspect  of  institutional  change is  often lacking in 
institutional theory (Kjær, 2004; Seo and Creed, 2002) because institutional theory 
has  traditionally  focused  on  how  individuals  are  influenced,  constrained  or 
affected by institutions. Despite that, authors like  Seo and Creed (2002) explain 
that the agents that promote changes are usually organizations or individuals with 
not too much power, and with not too many institutional ties, because they pay 
lower costs for changing the existing order and are less likely to be sanctioned by 
more central and powerful players. If we think about institutional change in terms 
of  organizational  theory,  taking into  account  that  individuals  are  embedded in 
organizations, most new practices, norms, values and behaviours are introduced 
by  less  central  organizations.  Higher  status  organizations  usually  mobilize 
resources to maintain the status quo, rather than to promote changes (Battilana, 
2006), whereas the peripheral agents find their moment of opportunity to induce 
changes when a disruption of the existing social  order occurs (Seo and Creed, 
2002). In such periods, the institutional setup is weakened by events that society 
does not understand very well.  In other words, the agency matters much more 
than the structure (Streek and Thelen, 2009). Finding an explanation and linking 
causes  with  consequences  is  the  main  role  of  those  agents  who try to  push a 
change  forward,  a  process  that  Bromley  (2006)  would  define  as  “warranted 
belief” formation.
In the next two cases, we will examine how the implementation of land 
planning acts in Galicia deals heavily with institutional contradictions related to 
the definition and scope of property. First, we will highlight the main multilevel 
processes  that  are  on the basis  of  the  making of  these two land use planning 
instruments. Then, we will show how new ideas on property introduced in Galicia 
at the beginning of the 20th century, in combination with fertilizers and improved 
agricultural techniques, caused profound changes that eventually undermined the 
functionality of the new institutional structure.  The empirical research has been 
conducted  through  several  means.  First,  eight  in-depth  interviews  with 
stakeholders were held for each case study. Second, a range of relevant documents 
related to law making was reviewed. Typically, the stakeholders serving on our 
case-study partnerships were senior representatives of their organisations at chief 
executive,  second-tier  or elected-member level who were involved in the law-
making process. To better understand how the society perceived and dealt with the 
main issues presented in the case studies, great attention has been paid to how the 
facts were presented in one of the most widely read newspapers of the region.
3. Land property and the instruments to manage property 
in Galicia. The main multi-level processes
3.1. Introduction: the region of Galicia 
The case studies  presented in  this  paper  show how land planning laws 
were created to deal with negative outcomes of a previous institutional setup. As 
discussed later in this paper, the regional government (the authoritative agent in 
this  case)  considered land fragmentation as  the main reason for  such negative 
outcomes. Therefore, land planning in Galicia can be understood as a reaction to 
the  fragmentation  of  property.  Land fragmentation  complicates  the  elaboration 
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and  implementation  of  land  use  plans  and  is  closely  linked  to  urban  sprawl. 
Besides, fragmentation of property is one of the main reasons behind agricultural 
land abandonment. The following section gives a picture of the current property 
and land planning.
Galicia  is  a  region of  Northwest  Spain  with  a  population of  about  2.8 
million,  which  accounts  for  6.5%  of  the  Spanish  population.  Galicia  has  a 
population  density  of  93  people  per  square  kilometre.  The  distribution  of  the 
population  across  the  region  is  highly  irregular:  more  than  one  third  of  the 
Galician area has a population density per parish lower than 20 people per square 
kilometre, and 64% of the population is concentrated in 10% of the territory (on 
the coast), whereas 36% of the population is scattered over the rest of the territory 
(90%). In addition, Galicia has a huge number of settlements in proportion to its 
population: 50% of the Spanish settlements10 are in Galicia, but Galicia, with a 
surface area of 29.575 km2, represents only 6% of the total Spanish area. Land 
uses in Galicia are distributed as follows: 25% agricultural lands, 32% forested 
lands  and  33%  scrublands,  most  of  which  result  from  the  abandonment  of 
agriculture. From the perspective of property, individual private property is highly 
fragmented,  but  accounts  for  80%  of  the  Galician  area,  with  1.6  million 
landowners of rural land, averaging 1.7 ha/owner and 1.22 ha/plot. The rest of the 
area (20%) is private common land. Private common land usually corresponds to 
big parcels managed by local communities. In Galicia, there are a total of 2300 
private common land areas. 
3.2. Evolution of property structures and multi-level 
processes
In the early 20th century, between 2/3 and 3/4 of the region was dedicated 
to common lands (de Juana and Prada Rodríguez, 2005). At that time, only 25% 
of the land was arable land managed on an individual basis. Land was not owned 
freehold by farmers, because the property system in force was the “foral regime”. 
The foral regime was a mode of land tenure that survived in Galicia since the 
middle ages until the 1926 decree of foral redemption came into force less than 90 
years ago. In that land tenure mode, also known as “Law of Emphyteusis” farmers 
owned the right to enjoy the property on condition that they took care of the estate 
(direct dominium) and paid a rent to the person who had the “useful dominium”. 
Local  communities  managed  the  land  without  the  presence  of  a  real 
government.  Common  lands  were  used  collectively  for  grazing  and  for  other 
complementary  but  essential  uses.  At  that  time,  individual  private  lands  were 
already highly fragmented (Villares Paz, 1982), but land fragmentation was not an 
obstacle  to  management  because  there  were  institutions  responsible  for  the 
organization  of  agrarian  areas.  For  instance,  arable  lands  (called  agras)  were 
subjected to a rigorous pattern of cultivation (kind of crop, dates of seeding and 
harvesting, allowed path routes...) established by the community (Cabana Iglesia, 
2008).
Yet, this system, which was stable for centuries, began to change in the late 
19th century for a number of reasons, among which the need to improve yields, 
10 According to the Spanish Institute of Statistics: “A human settlement is any habitable area of the  
municipality, where there are inhabited housing units, and these areas are clearly differentiated and 
known  by  a  specific  name  that  identifies  it  without  confusion”. 
http://www.ine.es/nomen2/Metodologia.do
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associated  with  rapid  population  growth  and  technological  improvements  in 
agriculture. At the time, it was thought that individualized property could enhance 
yield.  But the crisis of communal property was intensified by the confiscation 
processes initiated by the State in 1895  (Balboa López, 1990). During the first 
decades of the 20th century, many common lands were split and individualized 
among the members of the community as a strategy to avoid confiscations. In 
addition, during the Spanish dictatorship, the forestry policy was aimed at turning 
Galicia into the largest regional producer of timber in Spain. Compulsory, top-
down  driven  afforestation  projects  had  their  heyday  in  the  period  1952-1961 
(Corbelle-Rico et al., 2010), and focused mainly on common lands because they 
had  the  best  structure  (large  parcels).  Local  communities  reacted  to  these 
measures by accelerating the partition of common lands. 
The individualization of property was also heavily influenced by the ideas 
of the “Liberal Revolution”, where “liberty” and “property” were key words of 
progress for many intellectuals. In fact, common lands were completely undefined 
from the legal and formal point of view, which led to huge insecurities in local 
communities and, eventually,  to  individualization processes.  The only category 
with a legal definition was individualized private property.
As a result,  almost 80% of the land in rural  areas of Galicia is  now privately 
owned by individual owners and fragmentation is extreme. Indeed, there are more 
than 1.6 million owners (out of a total population of less than 3 million) with less 
than  1.7  ha  in  average.  Besides,  the  previous  institutional  setup,  which  could 
mitigate  extreme  fragmentation  through  the  presence  of  common  lands  and 
manage fragmentation based on community rules,  was not workable any more 
because the government  was not  prepared or was not able  to take the task of 
managing the land. 
To understand the reformulation of the concept of property in Galicia, we 
must  consider  other  processes  observed  at  other  levels  of  society,  such  as 
emigration  (over  2  million  people  emigrated  from Galicia  between  1810  and 
1970) or the European agricultural  policies implemented from the adhesion of 
Spain to the EU in 1986, which contributed to the abandonment of the agricultural 
activity.
As a conclusion, the late access to complete land ownership, the relatively 
recent changes in property conceptions that took place at the beginning of the 20th 
century,  and  the  complex  dynamics  that  guided  land  use  patterns  in  the  last 
decades are key elements that affect every attempt to legislate land use policies in 
Galicia.
This  short  overview of  the history  of  property and land use in  Galicia 
reveals how the institutional arrangements that allowed for land management for 
centuries disappeared and were not replaced by government management.  The 
disappearance of this  institutional  infrastructure cannot be properly understood 
without  explaining  the  coming  of  new  ideas  about  property.  In  the  two  case 
studies  presented  below,  we  explain  the  disappearance  of  former  institutional 
infrastructure  and  its  consequences:  land  abandonment  and  uncontrolled 
urbanization  processes.  Although  they  seem  different,  they  are  rather 
complementary insofar as both are symptoms of land-ownership fragmentation.
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3.3. Land planning
3.3.1. Land use laws
The case studies presented in the next section are interesting for several 
reasons. The Galician region11 has not a long tradition in local land use planning. 
However, several policies have been developed and new institutions created in a 
short period (only 30 years). For this reason, the case studies presented here will 
contribute to our knowledge of the decisive factors that play a role in the adoption 
of land planning. 
The  evolution  of  land  use  planning  and  its  legislation  over  time  is 
explained below. In the last 25 years, three land use laws (1985, 1997, and 2002) 
aimed  at  putting  a  stop  to  the  lack  of  territorial  organization  in  the  315 
municipalities  of  the  region  have  been  enacted  in  Galicia.  The  reflections  on 
property and on excessive fragmentation were on the basis of every land use law. 
For instance, the 1985 land use law pointed out that “land property in Galicia is 
highly  divided,  which  together  with  the  attachment  of  Galicians  to  the  land, 
involves many shortcomings when implementing land use plans”  (BOE October 
26, 1985). After the 1985 land use law, decrees and other land use laws followed 
one another. Decree 450 of 1990, which derogated Decree 242 of 1989, outlined 
the following reasons: “Institutional and social rejection of these rules, and the 
generalized non-fulfilment of the decree, in addition to a set of critical findings in 
relation to the proposed planning criteria and some aspects of its content, raised 
questions about the legality of their decisions”. The rejection of those rules was 
closely related to the gap between the society's perception of property, in which 
fragmentation  belonged  to  the  “mental  models”  of  people,  and  the  legal 
implications of the new land use regulations in terms of unifying land uses and 
reassigning property rights. 
But it was not until the 2002 land use law that fragmentation was really 
tackled. The competencies envisaged in the 2002 law went beyond banning land 
uses  that  did  not  conform to land use  regulations.  For  the  first  time,  the  law 
established that it would be allowed to intervene the splitting of rural land. More 
exactly,  article 206 of the 2002 law stated that “in rural  land uses splitting or 
segregation  shall  not  be  undertaken  or  authorized,  except  when  splitting  or 
segregation arises from the implementation of infrastructure,  land use plans or 
rationalization of agricultural farms”.
3.3.2. Structural measures
Until  the creation of the land bank, the main land planning tool developed in 
Galicia  to  tackle  land  fragmentation  in  rural  areas  was  land  consolidation. 
Although land consolidation has sometimes been effective in retaining farmland 
in agricultural use (Crecente, Alvarez and Fra, 2002), the general outcome has not 
been successful because such policies were not able to clearly improve the ratio of 
11 In Spain, Galicia is considered a region with its own culture and traditions, which are more 
related to the traditions of Northern Portugal than to those of the rest of Spain. During the Spanish  
dictatorship, these differences with the Spanish culture, like the own language, were persecuted 
and abolished. The Galician Statute of Autonomy of 1981, approved after the end of Franco's  
regime, recognised Galicia's  own culture and,  consequently,  specific  powers  and competencies 
such as the organization of the self-government institutions and the development of policies for 
housing, territorial and urban management. The law of 1985 was passed in this context.
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agricultural area per farm, which hindered their economic viability. Although the 
average size of agricultural plots has been growing for the last decades, the total 
area of farms has remained reduced because of low land mobility. This means that 
the land managed by the farms that ceased their activity in the last decades is often 
neither sold nor rented, such that other farmers cannot use the land, even though 
its owners or their heirs no longer live in rural areas. Absent owners have three 
main reasons for not selling or renting the land: 1) afforestation with pine and 
eucalyptus as a land use option has had a strong push in the last few decades. The 
generated income is sometimes more secure and profitable for landowners than 
renting. 2) Owners are reluctant to rent their land because they fear to lose rights 
over their property or because they do not trust the plots will be returned in good 
conditions.  In some cases,  owners  simply let  their  land fall.  3)  Often,  owners 
prefer to keep the property as an asset for the future or use the property as a 
second residence to keep family or cultural bonds with the community (which 
sometimes does not happen). A new sprawl of second residences has taken place 
without control in some areas (e.g., new houses were built instead of restoring the 
old  ones).  Although  some  plots  were  unified  through  marriage,  among  other 
methods, it was not enough to reduce land fragmentation, insofar as the informal 
institution of dividing the land in equal parts among all heirs was predominant in 
Galicia (Ónega-López, Puppim-Oliveira and Crecente-Maseda, 2010).
Previous  governments  tried  to  implement  land-banking  initiatives  to 
overcome  that  situation,  based  on  the  same  justifications  and  with  the  same 
objectives,  i.e.,  to  restructure  the  agriculture  and  forestry  sector  in  order  to 
increase farm competitiveness and retain the productive conditions of agricultural 
land. Indeed, former executives guided by different ideological profiles attempted 
to  develop  new  land  mobility  policies  through  the  creation  of  land  banking 
mechanisms in different periods before 2005. The  first attempt was made in the 
early 1980s, with the first regional democratic government after Franco’s regime, 
led by the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, a social-democratic alternative. The 
latest attempt before the current land banking legislation was in 2004. In 2004, the 
government led by the conservative Popular Party proposed a new law for the 
improvement of land mobility in Galicia that eventually was not approved by the 
Parliament. The proposal envisaged a number of mechanisms that included some 
new  and  quite  interventionist  approaches  to  property  rights,  such  as  the 
introduction of new possibilities for expropriation in certain cases of land misuse, 
which provoked the opposition of the most conservative wing of the government 
party.  Besides, the three main political  parties in Galicia included this kind of 
proposals in their political programs for the 2005 regional elections, as in previous 
political campaigns.
4. Case studies
4.1. The case of the 2002 land use law
To  better  understand  the  case  study  of  the  land  use  law,  the  process  of 
urbanization in Galicia during the last decades must be explained. An analysis of 
urban  and  peri-urban  areas  in  Galicia  reveals  a  delay  in  the  process  of 
urbanization. Particularly, until the 1960s Galicia was predominantly rural,  and 
the urban Galicia began to emerge from that moment. Urban growth processes can 
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be observed only after 1970. Such processes were related to urban sprawl and 
were mostly located on coastal  areas  and in  municipalities  near  the  big  cities 
(Torres  Luna  and  Lois  González,  1995).  Although  Galicia  has  always  had  a 
settlement  typology  that  could  be  considered  as  dispersed,  dispersion  was  in 
equilibrium  with  the  landscape.  However,  between  the  1960s  and  the  1980s, 
Galicia experienced a marked transfer of population from rural to urban areas. In 
the  1980s  and  1990s,  a  process  of  counter-urbanization  began  due  to  the 
improvement of the standard of living, which led to the emergence of settlements 
in peri-urban areas (Aldrey Vázquez, 2002). This was the major socio-economic 
and socio-cultural change in the history of Galicia (Pino Vicente et al., 2010). This 
territorial change led some authors to refer to Galicia as a diffused city (García 
Docampo, Dalda Escudero and González Harguindey,  2005) or as a  “rururban 
weft”,  with  characteristics  both  of  urban  and  rural  landscape  (Oliveira  et  al., 
2009). Therefore, in Galicia it is difficult to separate urban from rural.
The explanation above sheds some light on the goals of land use laws. 
Before the enactment of the 2002 land use law, the law in force was passed in 
1997. From the legal point of view there were two reasons why this land use law 
had to be replaced by a new one. First, the 1997 land use law was in conflict with 
the state law of the central  government and, second, the law did not facilitate 
development for urban land uses. 
However,  the  changes  required  to  accomplish  these  objectives  were 
certainly not as deep as the changes undertaken in the 2002 land use law. The law 
of 1997 focused mainly on urban areas, and rural areas were treated from a stark 
urban point of view. The law of 2002 had a completely different approach. The 
title of the act,  Town Planning and Protection of Rural Areas Act, explains its 
scope very well. As stated at the beginning of the legal text, this land use law drew 
a real territorial policy for rural areas. The new law criticised that rural areas were 
regulated in the previous law by only a few precepts. But the new land use law 
went further in the regulation of rural land uses. For the first time, the law stated 
the prohibition of splitting parcels. Some authors have even argued that the land 
use law might have affected the property law, insofar as it affected not just rights 
of use, but also the transfer of a property and the rights related to it (Hernández 
López, 2002).
How can the change of goals in a land use policy be explained? When did 
this  change  take  place  and  which  were  the  critical  factors  for  enhancing  and 
benefiting from that emerging critical moment? How can we explain that for the 
first time a land use law goes beyond regulating only land uses, affecting also the 
property  law?  Several  elements  occurred  to  cause  changes  able  to  break 
dependency-paths embodied in old institutional infrastructures.
On  May  19,  2001,  the  main  regional  newspaper  placed  the  following 
headline on its  front page: “The agony of the Galician landscape» (La Voz de 
Galicia, 2001-5-19). Three related news on the same issue were peppered with 
statements of a group of three people that claimed that a “territorial pact” was 
required and that the first step was to make society aware of the problem. For the 
first  time,  the  concept  “uglinism”  (feísmo)  was  used  to  explain  the  lack  of 
territorial organization in the Galician landscape. This term was created by the 
chief editor of the regional newspaper and used for the first time in an opinion 
article  (La Voz,  2001-04-14).  With that  word,  the newspaper  intended to give 
shape to the points of view that a group of people had been publishing in the 
newspaper  for  several  years.  Two  key  elements  were  at  the  basis  of  all  the 
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statements of that group of people, and shaped the main goals of the new land use 
law. The first one was how the “popular architecture” experienced a break in the 
traditional architecture because of several waves of emigration from Galicia to 
other  parts  of  the world.  People returning from emigration brought  with them 
architectural  styles  that  were  not  integrated  in  the  popular  architecture.  The 
second  one  was  that  the  countryside  was  at  risk  because  of  the  disordered 
proliferation of villages and single settlements. These elements were particularly 
important because they shaped the main philosophical principles of the new land 
use law.
García Vidal (2002) explained how the regional newspaper congressed that 
group  of  people,  composed  of  three  architects  and  a  geographer,  who  were 
publishing  their  opinions  about  spatial  planning  in  Galicia  to  launch  a  social 
mobilization campaign. This campaign had an important impact on several social 
sectors.  Society  perceived  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  and  the  regional 
government  was  pressured  to  undertake  measures.  The  Regional  Government, 
represented  by  the  Minister  of  Public  Works  and  Urbanism,  said  that  the 
government would try to bring order to chaos and laid the foundations of the new 
land use law for Galicia. In fact, the government decided to create the “Panel on 
Spatial Planning in Galicia” (Mesa polo Urbanismo de Galicia), in which regional 
and administrative technicians, municipal officials and experts were represented 
for the first time. The Galician Minister of Public Works and Spatial Planning 
declared that the creation of this panel was “historic”  (García Vidal, 2002). The 
main agreement in the panel was the legislative reform of the land use law of 
Galicia. The first step was to make the population aware of the need to bring order 
to the growth of settlements. Several resolutions adopted by the panel were later 
the basis for the new land use law. This process was developed in a remarkably 
short time: regional elections took place only a few months later and the land use 
law was passed around a year after the regional elections.
4.2. The case of land banking in Galicia
In the above sections, we have explained how land property structure is highly 
fragmented and rigid and how a number of processes observed in the last decades, 
and particularly in the last 20 years, have strongly influenced a land use pattern 
that had been quite stable in previous periods. Those demographic processes and 
technological changes, in addition to the new political and market context, mainly 
after the adhesion of Spain to the EU and its  implications for the agricultural 
policy, triggered a new land use dynamics characterized by a significant reduction 
of the agricultural area, a great increase of wooded land in former agricultural 
land and a gradual abandonment of farmland in some areas.
Land abandonment has several  consequences,  among which the loss  of 
cultural  landscapes,  but  one  of  the  most  striking  consequences  of  land 
abandonment  in  Galicia  is  the  serious  increase  in  forest  fire  risk,  which  has 
become more dangerous with the spread of forested areas, mainly of pine and 
eucalyptus.  Actually,  the  area  burnt  in  the  period  1996-2007  was  4.220  km2 
(Ministry of Environment, 2005; 2006; 2007), which accounts for almost 15% of 
the Galician area. 
In previous sections, we have shown how the creation of a land bank was 
in  the  agendas  of  several  governments  as  a  way  of  dealing  with  land 
fragmentation. For many years, several agricultural organizations or academic and 
51
political groups supported the creation of a land bank that helped farms enlarge 
their  territorial  basis  through  the  promotion  of  land  mobility,  following  other 
European  examples  that  were  in  place  since  the  mid-20th  century  (van  Dijk, 
2003). For instance, the extensive work of López-Iglesias (1996, 2002) is well 
known in Galicia. Yet, no new actions were developed to cope with that situation 
during the 1990s or at the beginning of the new century. 
In 2005, regional elections were held. A new coalition government came 
into  force  and  the  regional  nationalistic  party  (BNG),  a  party  that  is  in  the 
periphery of the political power in Galicia, became the responsible for the regional 
ministry of rural affairs. BNG, which had always stayed in the opposition, had 
announced the creation of a land bank as an electoral promise. The reasons given 
for the creation of the land bank were the following: “it will be useful to enhance 
land  mobility  and  the  productive  use  of  parcels,  and  to  avoid  the  current 
abandonment of the land” (La Voz de Galicia, 2005-5-31). To gain the support of 
public opinion for the implementation of the land bank, the main discourse before 
and after having won the elections was rooted in the idea of abandonment and 
unproductiveness of an increasing part of the agricultural area (La Voz de Galicia, 
2005-5-31; 2005-9-8; 2006-3-23), and a considerable effort was made on placing 
rural issues in the core of the political debate. 
Besides,  in  2006,  a  disastrous  wave of  forest  fires  hit  Galicia,  burning 
around 92,000 ha. An evaluation of the economic losses caused by the 2006 wave 
of forest fires amounted to 210 million Euro (Barrio et al., 2007). For the first 
time in recent history, forest fires went beyond the environmental and economic 
dimension,  and threatened homes and human lives.  Although forest  fires  have 
been  frequent  in  summers  during  the  last  few  decades,  in  2006  many  fires 
occurred close to inhabited houses. The first 15 days of August were particularly 
dramatic.  From the  4th  to  the  15th,  around  73,000 ha  were  burnt.  Extinction 
services  were  not  able  to  control  the  situation  and  fires  spread  through  the 
territory,  endangering  many human settlements.  Fires  resulted  in  great  tension 
among  citizens.  Several  collectives  and  organizations  criticised  the  lack  of 
resources and effectivity of the regional government in fighting forest fires. The 
mayor of Rianxo, one of the most affected municipalities of Galicia, pointed out: 
“we are in a crucial moment to analyse and reflect on what happened and why” 
(La Voz, 2006-8-14). One of the key points during those two weeks of “unsettling 
circumstances” were the statements of the president of the regional government 
transmitted on TV and radio on August  14,  2006.  The president  declared that 
forest  fires  were  “an  unprecedented  challenge  to  Galician  society  and  its 
institutions” (La Voz, 2006-8-14). The main government message pointed out that 
one of the causes that had led to that situation was the progressive abandonment 
of the land and the land use chaos of many rural areas, and anticipated the need to 
develop new, but already announced initiatives.
Besides the first reactions, forest fires pushed public awareness and made 
society reflect on the possible causes of the vulnerability of the Galician territory. 
The main explanations coming from the government were shared and the public 
support for taking new actions soon became apparent. In this sense, the discourse 
from some academic and technical realms, previously ignored, was assumed as a 
guiding  principle  by  the  new  government.  Moreover,  a  significant  group  of 
scholars who had been studying the problem of land mobility and agricultural 
structures  were  enrolled  in  executive  functions,  such  that  their  ideas  became 
closer to decision making processes. For instance, the new government rescued 
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the work of López Iglesias (see above), as well as the ideas of other members of 
the  regional  academic  and  scientific  community.  Their  main  ideas  about  the 
relationship  between  agricultural  decline  and  forest  fires  and  the  need  for 
increased land mobility to cope with that were recovered and strongly influenced 
the development of the new land banking law. 
August  2006 was a  breakpoint.  Immediately  after  that,  the government 
decided to  implement  new land management  initiatives  that  had  already  been 
promised but were apparently delayed. Once the process began, it was not clear 
which kind of mechanisms or instruments should be put in place.  The idea of 
creating a land bank was there, but it could take different forms. Moreover, land 
property and land use conditions  in Galicia had specific  characteristics,  which 
differed  from the  conditions  of  those  regions  with  experience  in  ruling  land-
banking initiatives. A number of alternatives were proposed by cabinet members 
of  the  ministry  of  rural  affairs.  The  final  design  was  based  on the  following 
principles: the main objective was to promote land mobility in terms of transfer of 
land from owners who did not use it to active or new farmers. The first ideas were 
based on the recommendations made by experts in the last few years. Some of the 
ideas  were  finally  included  but  slightly  modified  such  that  the  approach 
accommodated  smoothly  to  existing  property  institutions.  Strong  public 
intervention  in  that  realm  was  expected  to  be  controversial  even  taking  into 
account the favourable public opinion of the moment. The final solution relied on 
a rental model, the creation of an intermediary public agency that promoted the 
transactions,  and  complementary  measures  that  re-shaped  the  bundle  of  rights 
linked to private property. Pursuant to the new law, abandoning agricultural land 
was not allowed. Rather, agricultural land must be maintained in good agricultural 
and environmental  conditions,  either  directly  by the owner or by renting it  or 
temporarily  transferring  it  to  the  public  intermediary  agency.  This  combined 
approach is new in the European context and is being promoted by FAO in eastern 
and central European countries (Eberlin, 2010).
In  just  four  months,  the  proposal  of  a  new  Law  for  agricultural  land 
conservation and land banking in Galicia  was elaborated and submitted to  the 
Parliament. The new law was passed in the first semester of 2007. This law was 
called  “act  of  administrative  and  tax  measures  for  the conservation  of  the 
agricultural land and the Land Bank of Galicia”, and envisaged not only the land 
bank, but also the penalty system for abandoned parcels, which was applicable to 
the whole region.
5. Discussion 
Institutional change by evolution vs. institutional change by design
In the first sections of this paper, two main theories of institutional change 
were explained. The first theory explained institutional change by evolution by 
applying  principles  of  evolutionary  selection,  according  to  which  the  most 
efficient institutions survive over time. The second theory explained institutional 
change as a design carried out by authoritative agents in dealing with negative 
outcomes of a previous institutional setup that threatened the way of life of the 
community. We developed a framework of institutional change that consisted of 
five steps. All five steps of this theoretical framework have been illustrated in the 
case studies presented in this paper. First, we described the multi-level processes 
that were common to both case studies and that had a decisive influence on the 
53
institutional matrix. Such multi-level processes were identified in each case study. 
Second,  we  observed  that  the  set  of  actors  who  belonged  to  the  epistemic 
community  were  also  involved  in  the  processes  of  institutional  change.  Their 
major role was to provide warranted belief on the causes of the big changes such 
as urban sprawl or forest fires. Third, we identified big contextual changes in both 
case studies, namely a campaign in the media referred to urban sprawl and the 
2006 wave of forest fires. Fourth, we found how new institutions were created to 
provide  imagined  futures,  and  fifth,  we  observed  how  these  institutional 
arrangements were transformed in collective action when the respective laws were 
enacted. 
The  case  studies  show that  the  explanatory  power  of  the  paradigm of 
institutional change by evolution is not sufficient. As North (1990) states, in this 
paradigm institutional change occurs when during “a bargaining process a change 
in relative prices leads one or both parts to an exchange to perceive that either one 
or both could do better with an alternative arrangement”. However, as explained 
above,  when  the  regional  government  adopted  these  two  instruments,  the 
“players”  were  not  looking  for  pay-off  maximizing,  but  for  a  solution  to  a 
situation  that  was  not  acceptable  to  them,  which  does  not  mean  that  the 
institutional  infrastructure  was  inefficient.  The  actions  of  the  government  that 
designed and approved these two policies did not come out because of the high 
costs of putting out the forest fires caused by land abandonment or because of the 
high costs of municipal service delivery caused by settlements sprawl. As shown 
through our case studies, the main reasons were the “unsettling circumstances” 
that allowed the regional government to become aware of an undesired situation 
that  made  the  population  aware  of  these  issues.  This  means  that  the  former 
institutions  that  led  to  the  lack  of  territorial  organization  were  not  replaced 
because of their inefficiency, but because of their negative outcomes. The negative 
outcomes were not measured in terms of economic efficiency and the new land 
policies were not designed to achieve more efficient performance. Apparently, in 
agreement  with  Bromley  (2006),  these  land  policies  were  imaginings  of  a 
desirable solution, and in the process of imagining the solutions, outcomes of the 
own action were created. 
In addition, it is important to highlight the role of what Bromley (2006) 
calls  “warranted  belief”.  In  institutional  change,  it  is  crucial  that  a  epistemic 
community, in Bromley's words, can offer a warranted link between the outcomes 
that one society does not consider any more reasonable and their causes.  Healey 
(2006) provided the example of how scientists framed the discourse about the 
causes and effects of British power station emissions on the acidity of lakes and 
rivers in northwest Europe. The imaginings associated with this discourse became 
institutionalized  in  norms,  practices  and  discourses.  In  the  case  studies  from 
Galicia,  these  discourses  are  observed  in  both  legal  texts.  The  advisors  and 
consultants that helped design the land use law and the land banking law made a 
correlation  between the  high fragmentation of  land in  Galicia,  which  involves 
fragmentation  of  uses  or  interests,  among  others,  and  urban  sprawl  and  land 
abandonment, which is the most important cause of forest fires.
Agency versus structure
In regard to institutional change, and particularly to changes in land use 
policies or instruments, particular attention must be paid to the agents that were 
involved  in  the  change  and  pushed  the  new  institutional  setup  forward.  A 
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considerable  amount  of  literature  is  concerned  with  the  position  of  agents  in 
relation to the institutional structure, i.e., whether they are in a peripheral position 
or in the centre of the institutional matrix. In the case of Galicia, these agents are 
quite peripheral in terms of institutional ties with the former institutional structure. 
In  the  case  of  the  land  use  law,  the  initiators  were  a  group  of  professionals 
(university professors and architects) who were not linked to any organization or 
political party at that moment. The regional newspaper gave them the opportunity 
to use it as a platform to share their ideas with citizens and supported them by 
creating a new discourse that was effective in pushing actions forward. In the case 
of land banking, the initiator was the regional political party BNG, a left-wing 
political party that was only once in the power in the last 30 years, during the 
legislative  period  2004-2009,  when  it  forced  a  coalition  government  with  the 
Galician socialist workers party. These traits quite well represent the peripheral 
position of agents in the Galician institutional setup. 
6. Conclusion
As we have seen, institutional theory can expand implementation studies on land 
use devices by explaining in a more accurate way what kind of factors and reasons 
can lead to effective land use planning implementation. If we better understand 
the  different  categories  of  agents  and  their  roles,  as  well  as  their  dialectical 
relation with the development of the institutional structure, we believe that we can 
shed light on why and how land use planning is implemented.
What have been the sources of change when passing the 2002 land use law 
and the land banking law? The main source of change has been the outcome of a 
set of practices, beliefs and norms related to property introduced at the beginning 
of the 20th century, which the government and society eventually evaluated as 
negative or not workable. In this context, “not workable” means that there is a 
mismatch or contradiction between the outcomes of such practices and beliefs and 
new ideas and values that the Galician society has developed in the last decades. 
As  Veblen (2005) states, “the evolution of society is substantially a process of 
mental  adaptation on the part  of  individuals under  the stress of  circumstances 
which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed under and conforming to a 
different set of circumstances in the past”. This argument fits the main sources of 
institutional change in both laws. 
However, as shown by these two case studies, it still remains questionable 
that this change can occur in a short period at informal institutions.  The public 
campaign dominated the attempt to reform the land use law from the beginning. 
For some authors, this allowed to impose restrictions on the property that were 
never seen before in Galicia and that, in some cases, were in contradiction not just 
with the more formal institutions, like the Spanish Constitution, but also with the 
more informal  institutional  setup of the Galician society (Fernández Carballal, 
2004; Meilán Gil, 2001). Usually, institutional change brings a shift in the status 
and power of many actors (Kingston and Caballero, 2009), who are very reluctant 
to change and accept changes. Consequently, actors will oppose changes and their 
action will continue to be based on the informal institutional setup. But the goals 
of land planning in Galicia remain the same. There is a perception that there is no 
way back. However, Galician society is still looking for the way to accomplish its 
imaginings.
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Chapter 3: Forcing and Avoiding change. Exploring 
change and  continuity in local land-use 
planning in Galicia (Northwest of Spain) and the 
Netherlands
Abstract
This paper compares local adoption of land-use plans under new planning acts in two 
different planning contexts, Galicia (Northwest of Spain) and the Netherlands. Local 
adoption  is  presented  as  a  process  of  institutionalization,  where  adoption  or  not 
adoption by the municipalities depends on two forces –the obligation to adopt a land-
use plan, which relies on a political mandate from the legal point of view, and the  
resistance of the municipalities to adoption. These two forces are explored from an 
institutional perspective. Findings suggest that the literature on institutionalization has 
proven to be weak for understanding the process of diffusion of the new acts among 
the Galician and Dutch municipalities. In addition, the sources of continuity found in 
the literature do not offer satisfactory explanation for reluctance to adopt the new acts  
at  local  level.  As conclusion it  is  argued that  the institutional  literature should be 
broader to include concepts of behavioural economics like individual and economic 
interests.         
Key words: Institutionalization, land-use planning, implementation.
1. Introduction
In 2002, a new Galician land-use act (LOUGA) came into effect, replacing 
the 1997 act. In 2008, the Netherlands passed a new Spatial Planning Act (Wro), 
replacing the 1965 act. The goals of the two acts are quite different. The Galician 
act had as its main goal controlling the processes of urban sprawl in rural areas, 
achieving a high continuity with the management of urban land (Tubío-Sánchez et 
al., 2013), the Dutch Act had as its main goal restating the role of the land-use 
plan  as  the  most  important  legally  binding land-use instrument  (Buitelaar  and 
Sorel,  2010).  The common characteristics  is  that  in  both  cases,  municipalities 
were not dissatisfied with the former legislation, see for the Dutch case Needham 
(2005) and for the Galician one Crecente-Maseda (2009). It was the national  and 
regional government that wanted to change the behaviour of the municipalities.
Both  acts  enacted  a  deadline  for  full  adoption  by  municipalities.  The 
Galician act obligated municipalities to adopt a land-use plan before 2006; the 
Dutch  act  obligated  municipalities  to  adopt  their  land-use  plans  before  2013. 
Under the Galician Act municipalities have to make and adopt a land-use plan that 
covers  the  whole municipal  territory.  In  the Netherlands one municipality  can 
have several plans. Unlike under the former Dutch act, the new act requires all 
plans (the plans that cover built up areas and areas outside of the building-up area) 
have to cover the municipality area. 
Galicia and the Netherlands are compared for several reasons. Galicia is a 
region  that is peripheral not only in Europe,  but is  even considered peripheral 
within Spain. It is a region with hardly any tradition of land-use planning. Since 
1981  the  region  has  own  competences  in  spatial  planning.  By  contrast,  the 
Netherlands is a country in the core of the European Union, and with an old and 
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well-known tradition  of  land-use  planning.  In  Galicia,  the  history  of  land-use 
planning has is practically 30 years old, a period in which several attempts have 
been made to get institutionalized land-use planning. Whereas the Netherlands is 
well-known for the continuity of its planning system (Needham, 2007; 2005). In 
terms of number of land-use acts,  Galicia is  characterized by disruptions.  The 
regional government has passed three planning acts in 25 years (Tubío-Sánchez et 
al, 2013). In contrast, the Netherlands passed two acts during the last 40 years. 
The most recent one, the new Spatial Planning Act, is very similar to the former 
one, at least from an international comparative perspective. This shows the stable 
legal framework of the Dutch planning system  (Needham, 2007). Galicia and the 
Netherlands  are,  therefore,  two  very  different  contexts  in  terms  of  land-use 
planning. 
To understand the adoption of the act by municipalities, several hypothesis 
are developed from an institutional standpoint. A new planning act is a new formal 
institution that has to be inserted and disseminated through the existing planning 
system, which represents and institutional matrix in itself.  This is a process of 
institutionalization, for the act has to be adopted by the municipalities embedded 
into the planning institutional matrix. This paper seeks to understand the process 
of institutionalization and the resistance that these processes create in  planning 
systems. Two different environments in terms of tradition in land-use planning are 
chosen  to reflect on the differences we find. In these two different environments 
many variables could account for differences in the pattern of adoption, like the 
planning quality, governance structure or the style of enforcement. However, these 
variables can be considered endogenous to the planning system itself. Therefore, 
all explanations of the implementation containing these variables would lead to 
tautological explanations, which are so common in the planning literature about 
implementation.  See  for  instance  Dalton  and  Burby  (1994),  or  more  recently 
Berke et al. (2006). The endogeneity of these explanations leads to a vicious circle 
that  does  not explain the reasons of why implementation really  happens. This 
paper tries to go beyond these tautological explanations.
Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, to analyse from the theoretical 
point  of  view  the  process  of  institutionalization.  Institutional  theory  did  not 
develop enough theoretical tools to understand the process of institutionalization 
of certain formal institutions (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999), and in particular land-
use  regulations.  Second,  institutional  literature  seems  to  consider 
institutionalization  as  a  process  without  an  active  resistance.  But  normally 
institutionalization means to replace or to create new institutions, and therefore to 
induce new behaviour in actors. Actors may resist the change for several reasons. 
The main  sources  of  continuity  are  identified,  paying attention  particularly  to 
continuity in land-use regulations. In section 4, we reflect on the different patterns 
of  adoption  in  Galicia  and  in  the  Netherlands,  and  on  the  reasons  the 
institutionalizations process is resisted in two different planning systems. We also 
reflect on the elements that are key to facilitating the institutionalization of land-
use regulations. 
2. The case studies
In this section we present the cases of Galicia and the Netherlands. First, 
the main characteristics of the Galician and Dutch planning systems are explained, 
especially  paying  attention  to  the  main  institutions  at  work  as  well  as  the 
processes that these institutions try to control. Second, the main changes to the 
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planning systems that the acts were supposed to accomplish are clarified. Third, 
the  implementation  pattern  by the  municipalities  is  examined and  sources  of 
resistance to change are explored.
For  Galicia,  several  semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  in  the 
municipalities that did not adopt the land-use act. Our findings are also based on 
the  content  of  the  secondary  literature.  In  the  case  of  the  Netherlands,  the 
empirical material is based on the interviews made with scholars and planners of 
planning agencies, as well as on scientific literature and government reports. The 
evaluation of the implementation of the Dutch act is  already well  documented 
(Buitelaar and Sorel, 2009; VROM-inspectie, 2011). 
2.1 A brief explanation of land-use planning in Galicia
Galicia was predominantly a rural region in the past. However, migrations 
from rural areas to cities in the 1960s and 1980s rapidly transformed the Galician 
landscape. Local governments were not prepared to manage that situation and the 
growth of cities became chaotic (González-Pérez, 2005). The first land-use act of 
the Autonomy of Galicia, passed in 1985, worsened this situation. The act was an 
adaptation  of  Spanish  legislation.  To  adapt  the  Spanish  land-use  act  to  the 
characteristics of Galicia, the dispersed population settlements, the law added a 
new category  of  land-use:  use  of  rural  settlement.  This  was  at  odds  with  the 
Spanish  legislation.  The  Spanish  land-use  act  considered  only  three  land uses 
(urban, non developable and developable land). Some authors (Meilán Gil, 2001; 
Pino Vicente, 2008) even argued that the category of rural settlement was the main 
cause  that  transformed  Galicia  into  what  has  been  defined  as  a  diffused  city 
(García Docampo et al., 2005), or as a “rururban weft” (Oliveira et al., 2009). The 
category of land “rural settlement” has been used indiscriminately in plans during 
the 1980s and particularly at the end of the 1990s to the extent that all settlements 
are considered as a “rural settlement”, with their own needs for development. In 
this way, the concept of rural settlement became the core instrument to understand 
the urban reality of Galicia (Raposo-Arceo, 2009). This had led some authors to 
point out that the Galician planning system has  regarded rural land as a reservoir 
for the future (Crecente-Maseda, 2009). 
The regional government of Galicia passed a new land-use act in 2002 
aimed at controlling urban sprawl in the countryside. The title of the act, Town 
Planning and Protection of Rural Areas Act explains its scope very well. This act 
drew a new territorial policy for rural areas. The 2002 act pointed out that rural 
areas were regulated in the 1997 act by only a few precepts. The 2002 act tries to 
go further in the regulation of rural land-uses by proposing a very detailed zoning 
schema for  rural  areas.  The act  established very  restrictive  conditions  to  new 
developments  in  rural  settlements,  even construction materials  were subject  to 
regulations  (Raposo  Arceo,  2009;  Rodríguez  González,  2004).  Therefore, 
stopping urban sprawl and protecting landscape of the countryside were the main 
goals of the act.  
To  accomplish  these  goals,  the  act  required  each  of  the  region's  315 
municipalities to make one legally binding land-use plan for the whole municipal 
territory before the year 2006. The Galician government even arranged to cover 
the  expenses  for  this  plan-making.  Notwithstanding  this,  until  2011  only  54 
municipalities have adopted a land-use plan. Almost all municipalities (222) that 
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did not adopt the new land-use plan are currently working on a plan12, however 19 
municipalities  have not even started one.  For those municipalities that  did not 
adopt the act before 2006, the land-use act established an enforcement mechanism 
in article 81.2. It states that the Regional government may force the municipality 
to adopt a land-use plan in compliance with the act. If the municipality does not 
fulfil this requirement, the regional government would make and adopt the land-
use plan in the place of the municipality. The “may” indicates that the regional 
government gives itself the right, even establishing the conditions to use this right 
(if municipalities do not adopt and revise their plans within 3 years) to acquire the 
competencies of the municipalities to implement the act. However, it is never said 
that  this  right  will  be  used.  According to  declarations  of  regional  government 
officials involved during the negotiations, both the Regional government and the 
Association of Municipalities assumed that this  right was on paper,  but that it 
would never be used, because if used, it could cause a political turmoil. 
The making of the act  took 1,5 years.  The Association of  the Galician 
Municipalities  was  able  to  obtain  from  the  regional  government  more 
competencies with regard to land-use planning. Under the new act, municipalities 
with more than 30.000 habitants can adopt exemptions to the municipal master 
plan  without  the  regional  government  authorization,  what  shows  the 
decentralization strategy of the act. In order to speed up the procedures of the 
plan-making,  some documents  are  not  necessary  any more.  It  is  important  to 
emphasize that the regional government decided to cover the municipal expenses 
for  the  plan-making  in  order  to  facilitate  adoption  of  the  act  among  the 
municipalities. 
2.1.1 Explaining the pattern and exploring the sources of resistance 
to change
Nine  years  after  having  passed  the  2002  land-use  act,  and  taking  into 
consideration that municipalities were required to adopt a land-use plan before 
2006, only 54 municipalities (April  2011) had adopted a land-use plan. However, 
23 of these municipalities had started plan-making before the 2002 land-use act. 
Before finishing it, they decided to adapt it to the new land-use act. This means 
that only 31 municipalities (10 % of the total of municipalities) were willing to 
adopt a land-use plan 2002 without having undertaken previous work on other 
plans. Around 6% of municipalities never started the plan-making, whereas the 
rest of municipalities are working on it. 
The characteristics of adopters were quite homogeneous. There are only 
three urban municipalities that adopted plans under the new act. The rest (90%) 
are mostly rural or suburban  municipalities, most part characterized by economic 
and  population  decline,  with  low  densities  of  population  and  where  the 
agricultural sector is more prominent than in other municipalities. This is partially 
explained on the fact that half of municipalities that have adopted a land-use plan 
had obsolete plans (the average was 15 years old). The other half did not have any 
land-use plan at all.
To understand the reasons of non-adopters, municipalities that did not start 
the plan making were interviewed, 19 in total. Most of these municipalities had 
12Around the half of the municipalities that are currently working on their land-use plans have 
been doing it for at least 6 years. Many of these municipalities did not contact again the regional  
government to complete the administrative procedures. This shows that despite having started the 
plan-making, municipalities seem not to have interest in adopting it.
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already adopted a land-use plan as recently as in the end of the 1990s, a few years 
before the new act came into force. The reasons they gave for the continuity of 
their land-use plan range from the costs of making a new one13, the political costs 
of adopting a new land-use plan (to rearrange the property rights of land-owners is 
regarded  as  negative  to  fulfil  electoral  expectations),  or  a  previous  negative 
administrative experience with plan making (too long periods of administrative 
procedures).  However,  most  municipalities  (63  %)  pointed  out  that  the  main 
reason for continuity of their land-use plans (or lack of them) is that they do not 
see any benefit  from adapting the plans to the new act,  and in addition it  has 
political costs for almost 40% of the interviewers. They argue that they are not 
restricted or hindered at all in their daily planning activities by not having made a 
land-use plan in compliance with the new act. In this sense, three municipalities 
mentioned explicitly that to adopt a plan according with the new act would be 
counter-productive for municipal and citizens' interests, since it would cut heavily 
into the developable land. Since the financial crisis started and consequently the 
activity of the building sector decreased, municipalities seem more prone to adopt 
the act. For instance, in 2012 around 10 municipalities adopted the act, which is 
the highest rate since the act was passed. However, a explanation for this may not 
only be the relaxation of urban pressure, but also on the desire of the regional 
government to pass a new act in the current legislature. The  unwanted effect of 
this is that municipalities that are currently working on their plans should start 
again a procedure to adapt to the new act.
To  sum  up,  municipalities  explained  the  continuity  of  their  plans  and 
planning activities based on two reasons: first, the lack of an evident advantage or 
benefits in adopting the act, and second, the political costs in terms of restriction 
of land-owers's property rights and the complexity of administrative procedures 
for  plan-making.  Apart  from  these  reasons,  it  is  important  to  consider  that 
municipalities  usually  lack  of  interest  in  strictly  controlling  development  and 
obtaining benefits from it. Municipalities used to consider their land-use plans as 
administrative  documents,  not  as  a  comprehensive  guide  for  the  use  of  land 
(Crecente Maseda, 2009). For instance, in the last years, the issuance of building 
permit used to be via a “direct permit” (one permit for one single landowner for 
one single development) in 80-85% of building permits granted, whereas only 15-
20  %  of  the  building  permits  have  been  granted  for  bigger  and  integrated 
developments that were already considered and zoned in the land-use plans. This 
implies  that  municipalities  are  not  interested  in  recouping  the  costs  of 
developments processes, since when issuing single building permits (one permit 
for one owner), neither the developer nor the landowner are obliged  to finance 
the costs of servicing the land (Crecente Maseda and Tubío Sánchez, 2012). Some 
working documents of the regional government argue that municipalities do not 
know what  is  the  essence  of  land-use  planning  (Xunta  de  Galicia,  2006),  for 
municipalities  are  almost  non active  or  at  least  very  loose in  controlling land 
development.
2.2 A brief explanation of land-use planning in the Netherlands
Similar to the role that land use plans play in the Galician context, the 
bestemmingsplan (local  land-use  plan)  is  the  most  important  legally-binding 
instrument for granting building permits in the Dutch planning system (Needham, 
13 Surprisingly, municipalities continuously obviate the fact that the expenditures of plan-making 
are covered by the regional government.
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2007). Building permits are tested against the plan. In article 10 of the former 
Spatial  Planning  Act  it  is  required  that  a  municipality  must  make  a 
bestemmingsplan for  the  territory  outside  the  built-up  areas.  For  the  territory 
inside a built-up area the municipality has discretion over the adoption of land-use 
plans. The plans were to be revised at least once every 10 years, however, even 
when it was not revised after 10 years, it did not lose its legal validity (European 
Commission, 1999). The new act introduced a few changes with respect to all this. 
First, the land-use plan is now mandatory for the entire municipal territory, not 
just for land outside the built-up area. Second, under the new act, a municipality 
which gives planning permits based on a land-use plan which is more than 10 
years old, is not allowed to charge building fees for  granting the permit. In the 
following, it is sought to understand why these changes were introduced. 
Under the old act, municipalities could modify their plans to accommodate 
new  developments,  instead  of  using  land-use  plan  to  guide  development.  The 
Dutch  planning systems,  though  a  planning-led  systems in  theory  (Nadin  and 
Stead, 2008), has proven to be under the old act a “development-led” planning 
systems  in  practice  (Buitelaar  and  Sorel,  2010).  This  behaviour  of  the 
municipalities was allowed by articles 19.1 and 19.2, which regulated the use of 
exemptions to the land-use plan. The 1965 Act also obligated the municipalities to 
adapt their land-use plans every 10 years. However,  municipalities, instead of 
making a new land-use plan when it  became outdated, declared, after the ten year 
period for which their plan was legally valid, that it would be valid for another 10 
years, and then for a further 10 years. This resulted in many obsolete land-use 
plans. Plans older than 40 years old were no exception (Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel, 
2011).  Although the municipalities had obsolete  land-use plans,  which did not 
allow many developments initiatives to be carried out, they used article 19.1 and 
19.2  to  accommodate  new  developments  (Buitelaar  and  Sorel,  2010).  This 
practice led to many small plans – sometimes the size of individual development 
sites  –  that  do not  fully  cover  the territory of  the  municipality  (Buitelaar  and 
Sorel,  2010).  The new act  removed these articles  and restated the central  and 
steering role of the land-use plan. To give the municipalities better options to steer 
development when municipalities do not own the land, land-use plans under the 
new act may include social or affordable housing. This means that the plan may 
force private developers to include affordable housing in their development plans 
(van der  Krabben and Jacobs,  2013).  In  this  new context,  developers  become 
more  independent  and  municipalities  do  not  need  to  negotiate  with  them  to 
achieve the desired developments.
Due to municipal opposition of the municipalities (see VNG, 2008) the 
aim of  removing the paragraph article  19.1 and 19.2 watered down and these 
articles turned later in what has been called “a project decision” (projectbesluit). 
However, to avoid misuse like in the case of the article 19.1, municipalities were 
obliged to  make a  land-use  plan  after  having applied  for  the  project  decision 
(Buitelaar and Sorel, 2010). In addition, the procedure for the project decision was 
equal  to  the  land-use  plan.  Moreover,  against  the  project  decision  two appeal 
options were created, while against  the land-use plan there is appeal in only one 
instance. In other words, the project decision was made relatively unattractive.
2.2.2 The pattern of adoption
The new Dutch spatial planning act came into force in 2008. The act states 
that a municipality that gives planning permits based on a land-use plan which is 
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more than 10 years old, is not allowed to charge fees for granting the permit. This 
holds for those plans that have been adopted before the 01 July 2003. This means 
that 49 % of land-use plans that have been adopted before July 2003 have to be 
revised within a period of 5 years. At the end of 2011 50 % of the land-use plans 
(in terms of the area size this is 53 %) have revised their plans. Data show that the 
adoption of the act by the Dutch municipalities is much more heterogeneous than 
in  the Galician case,  although the revision of land-use plans for rural  areas is 
lagging behind. Of all the land-use plans that have not been revised yet but should 
be revised before 2013, around 67% are “buitengebied”, that is areas outside the 
built-up area. However, by 2013, if the rate of adoption is the same that until now, 
almost 100 % of land-use plans that have to be revised will be updated.
 One year after having passed the new act, the number of land-use plans is 
nearly triple the exemptions issued under the article 19.1 (PBL, 2010). This shows 
that sanctions can be be very effective in the adoption of the land-use acts. In 12 
interviews  carried  out  in  Dutch  municipalities  (one  in  each  province),  the 
financial sanction has been identified as the main reason for adapting their plans 
(Buitelaar,  Galle  and  Sorel,  2011).  In  addition,  it  has  been  shown  that 
municipalities  are  not  using  the  article  19.1  so  often  to  accommodate  new 
developments. 
However, recent research has shown that municipalities are using land-use 
plans  under  the  new  act  strategically,  as  if  they  were  exemptions,  aiming  at 
accommodating new development initiatives rather than at steering development 
(Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel, 2011). This indicates that, despite all the changes that 
the  new act  tried  to  impose,  municipalities  informally  stuck  to  the  exemption 
procedure. In the following the sources of such resistance are explored.  To sum 
up, a table with different characteristics of the planning systems and planning acts 
in both cases:
            
Characteristics of the 
planning systems and the 
planning acts
Galicia The Netherlands
Tradition in land-use 
planning
Little tradition  and many 
disruptions in planning goals 
(three planning acts in 25 years)
Long tradition and continuity in 
planning goals (two acts in the 
last 40 years)
Planning system model Planning-led system Planning-led system in theory but 
Development-led system in 
practice
Adoption of the last 
planning act
2002 2008
Planning trend Decentralization Centralization/decentralization
Main goal of the act To reduce urban sprawl in rural 
areas
Avoid planning exemptions the 
land-use plans and restate its 
legally importance
Adoption deadline for the 
municipalities
2006 2013
Enforcement mechanism If municipalities do not adopt 
their plans by 2006, the regional 
government has the right to do it 
in their place
Municipalities are not allowed to 
charge building fees if they do not 
adopt their plans
Government stimulus Positive (to bear the costs of Negative (a sanction)
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plan-making)
Implementation rate of the 
act
10 % of the plans have been 
adopted after 9 years
50 % of the plans have been 
revised and adopted after 3 years
Table 5: Main characteristics of the Galician and Dutch planning systems and the 
planning acts
Why is it so different the implementation rate of the acts? It seems that the 
different  pattern  of  implementation  could  be  reduced  to  a  simple  cultural 
characteristic:  Dutch  municipalities  are  rule-followers,  and  Galician 
municipalities  are  not.  However,  this  answer  leads  to  another  one:   Why are 
Galician municipalities not following the rule and why Dutch municipalities do 
follow the rule? The sanction that the Dutch Act established for the municipalities 
that do not follow the rule seems to be an explanation, as it was pointed out above. 
But to establish a sanction (or not) in a planning act is not arbitrary and it depends 
on  many  other  factors  that  the  government's  will  to  enforce  the  act.  In  the 
following  it  is  explained  why.  Both  Dutch  and  Galician  municipalities  have 
reasons for  non adoption of  the  acts  or,  at  least,  for  not  behaving completely 
according to them. These reasons are also explored in the sections 3.2 and 4.
3. Explaining the different degree of adoption in Galicia 
and The Netherlands: Adoption as an 
institutionalization process
Designing the formal institutions of the planning systems seems to finish 
when planning laws are passed. However, as Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel (2011: 
931) point out, “planning law is the end of an institutionalization process in which 
law  makers  and  others  are  involved,  and  potentially,  is  the  beginning  of  an 
institutionalization process at the local level where it is supposed to be applied”. 
In the case of the Galician and Dutch acts, this process of institutionalization has 
to be carried out by the municipalities. Institutionalization is a process that when it 
is completed results in the effective implementation of land-use plans. 
How  can  institutionalization  be  defined?  Cardoso  and  Breda-Vázquez 
(2009)  understand  institutionalization  as  a  generative  process  through  which 
social  norms  and  practices  become  sufficiently  regular  and  continuous  to  be 
described as institutions.  But, what does “sufficiently regular” mean? When can 
we  say  that  social  norms  and  practices  are  institutionalised?  How  can  it  be 
measured? These questions are difficult to answer for two main reasons. The first 
is  that  most  part  of  institutional  literature  does  not  pay  much  attention  to 
understanding the process of institutionalisation  (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). The 
second is that the notions developed around institutionalization are insufficient to 
understand  formal  institutions  explicitly  designed  to  constraint  behaviour  of 
actors. This is explained below.
 The construction of social reality, by Berger and Luckmann (1966), is one 
of the few works that addresses the concept of institutionalization. The authors 
define institutionalization as a  “reciprocal typification of habitualized action by 
types of actors”. Moreover, they tried to gain deeper insights in the process of 
institutionalization by dividing it into three steps: habitualization, objectification 
and  sedimentation.  Habitualisation  is  the  first  step  and  supports  the  idea  that 
practices, norms and behaviours are acquired by individuals because they entail a 
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psychological  advantage  by  restraining  the  need to  think  of  available  options. 
Objectification is a second stage of institutionalisation. At this stage, institutions 
acquire an external reality, this means that they become a reality that does not 
create  doubts  about  their  validity.  Finally,  the  last  step  of  institutionalisation 
involves  sedimentation,  which  means  that  the  already  objectified  institutions 
survive across generations. In each institutionalization step, the normative power 
of institutions differ (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  Tolbert and Zucker (1999) also 
recognise the three steps of institutionalisation.
This process of institutionalization could allow us to understand the way 
certain  actions  that  become  internalized.  However,  in  many  cases,  from  the 
perspective of actors' behaviour, the institutionalization is fulfilled after a short 
period  of  time,  after  which  all  actors  seem  to  “follow  the  rule”  because  of 
incentives  and/or  enforcement  mechanisms  like  sanctions.  The  triggers  of 
diffusion can be considered neither imitative nor normative, because actors are not 
imitating  early  adopters  of  institutions  nor  are  they  acting  because  the  new 
institutions are internalized and shared by the community. Adopters do not reflect 
(as Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue) on what is the psychological advantage of 
restraining  certain  options.  However,  institutionalists  use  to  rely  on  mental 
qualities  and  attributes  to  explain  behaviour.  Veblen  (1919;  p.  239)  defines 
institutions as “settled habits of thought”, which in the end are an “outgrowth of 
habit”. Habit frees the mind to deal with what is unexpected (Commons, 1934). 
The idea that action rely on the mind has also been used by new institutionalists, 
like North (2005) under the idea of “mental models”, and it has been particularly 
widely  used  by  sociological  institutionalists  that  identify,  in  a  similar  way  to 
Veblen,  institutions with mental scripts (Gioia and Poole, 1984; Lord and Kernan, 
1987; Johnson, Smith and Codling, 2000). For most institutionalists, institutions 
seem to  be  institutions  only  if  they  shape  behaviour,  and to  shape  behaviour 
institutions seem to become the line that binds knowledge, beliefs and actions. In 
this  way,  if  formal  institutions  (laws)  are  ignored,  they  are  not  institutions 
(Hodgson, 2006; p. 6). 
However,  if  we  consider  that  many  changes  in  formal  institutions, 
particularly when they are secured by fiat and they are legally enforced, like the 
declaration of a Natural Park, the smoking ban in public spaces, or putting speed 
limits on roads (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Bromley, 2006), are almost immediately 
followed by the actors, what role is played by the beliefs, mental scripts or mental 
models in these cases? Taking all this into consideration, the question becomes, 
then, do institutional explanations need to rely on the mind to explain behaviour? 
One actor can have certain beliefs and does not necessarily to act according to 
them (Veblen, 1919), but the other way around is also true. One actor can follow a 
repeated behaviour without having explicit beliefs, mental scripts or models that 
induce that behaviour. Many times, the only reason to follow formal institutions 
are incentives or sanctions, and this is the context where the greatest part of land-
use regulations are developed14. This is a significant gap of institutional literature 
and it has to do with they way institutional literature defines institutions as the 
result of a self-organization process (Hodgson, 2006). 
3.1. Explaining diffusion 
In  the  implementation  of  land-use  acts,  enforcement  mechanisms  are 
14 To follow a repetitive behaviour requires, however, certain predisposition of the mind. This 
predisposition will be explained in the discussion. 
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widely used to diffuse the act. Enforcement can be defined as a “act of compelling 
observance or  compliance with  a  law,  rule  or  obligation”  (Oxford dictionary). 
Therefore,  a  law  mandate  can  be  an  enforcement  mechanism  if  it  provides 
mechanisms to adjust compliance of the behaviour with the law.  In other cases, 
when these mechanisms are not provided, knowledge of existence of laws does not 
automatically  signal  them  as  institutions  unless  there  are  additional  enforcement 
mechanisms, like sanctions. Sanctions are defined by Commons (1934; p. 701) as 
“the collective inducements that require individual to conform their behaviour to 
that of others”.
Berger and Luckmann (1966) point out that sanctions are only required 
when  the  institutionalization  process  is  not  completely  fulfilled.  Once  full 
institutionalization takes place, sanctions, although they can keep existing, loosen 
their control capacity,  and are only used to punish those who deviate from the 
norm,  but  not  to  force  the  actors  to  follow  the  norm.  At  this  stage,  a  full 
institutionalized stage, no external motivation for conformity is necessary because 
norms  are  full  internalized  (Zucker,  1977).  However,  rent  seeking  can  be  a 
continuous challenge to those formal institutions, so that they may never become 
an  habit  and  much  less,  in  Commmon's  terms,  a  custom,   which  can  have 
continuity over time without an enforcement mechanism. Land-use regulations are 
being continuously challenged by rent-seeking interests,  and that  is  the reason 
why these regulations have to be enforced even in countries with a long tradition 
in land-use planning. In addition, it can be the case that certain institutions are 
maintained over time only if they serve rent seeking interests rather than if they 
are shared by the community (Hall and Thelen, 2009). Although institutionalists 
provide  very  useful  insights  to  understand  behaviour  from a  social  and  even 
philosophical point of view, as planners we need to understand specifically by 
which mechanisms and under which conditions behaviour is shaped. 
To explain the different adoption rates in the two regions-countries it is 
necessary to pay attention to the enforcement mechanisms. In the case of Galicia 
there was no sanction for those municipalities that did not adopt the plan before 
2006. The regional  government, however, provided a positive stimulus (to bear 
the expenses of municipal plan-making) to facilitate the implementation of the act. 
Unlike Galicia, the Dutch  government set up negative stimulus (a sanction) to 
force the municipalities to adopt the Act. There is enough evidence that shows that 
the high implementation rate of the Dutch act can be attributed to this enforcement 
mechanism  (Buitelaar,  Galle  and  Sorel,  2011).  To  explain  why  the  Dutch 
government was able to force municipalities to comply with the act whereas the 
Galician  government was unable to do it, the arguments relying on  government 
willingness  seem  not  to  have  enough  explanatory  power.  To  find  another 
explanation the following hypothesis is developed. 
In Gidden's (1984) model of structuration, only legitimated and encoded 
institutions in an actors'  stock of practical knowledge can be sanctioned in the 
realm of action. This is also pointed out by Berger and Luckmann (1966) when 
explaining  the  process  of  institutionalization.  Redmond  (2005)  affirms  that 
detection and punishment of law breaker is costly, so it is in the interest of law-
maker to promote a “meta-law” of the following sort: “one should obey the laws”. 
However, the meta-law, as Redmond (2005) points out, “is effective only in so far 
as it is credible” and “credibility is a function of perception of the legitimacy of 
the process under which the law arose and the rightful authority of the lawmaker”. 
Weber  (1924 [1978]; p.  36),  suggests that  legitimacy is  based on an authority 
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“which is held to be legitimated and therefore meets compliance”. Drawing on 
this  reasoning, we suggest that Dutch municipalities do not adopt the land act 
solely  because  the  sanction.  Although  the  Association  of  the  Netherlands 
Municipalities regarded the act as an inflexible system that reduces the quality and 
practicability  of  spatial  planning  (Roodbol-Mekkes  et  al.,  2012),  the 
municipalities accepted the legitimacy that the government had to change the act 
and to force them to behave in compliance with that act. This is not the case of the 
Galician municipalities. Regional government knew in advance that the political 
cost of enforcing a land-use act with a sanction would be very high, to the extent 
that a new government would be probably chosen for the following legislature. 
This shows that Galician land-use planning is not yet, in Guidden's (1984) words, 
a “legitimated and encoded institution” among the municipalities.
3.2.  Resistance to the institutionalization processes. Sources of continuity
All institutionalization processes face always some kind of resistance, not 
only  because  an  institutionalization  process  implies  a  change  of  an  acquired 
behaviour in the past, but also because institutionalization may be at odds with 
current interests of many actors. Behaviour and interests are guided and shaped by 
institutions.  The  definition  of  institution  can  vary  according  to  the  theoretical 
approach used to study them. The three institutionalisms, rational, historical and 
sociological  institutionalisms  defined  by  Hall  and  Taylor  (1996)  understand 
institutions in different ways, particularly when considering two characteristics of 
institutions: 1) the origin of institutions, why they emerge and how, and 2) the 
reasons for their survival over time, or why they are so resistant to change. This 
section seeks to understand the main sources of resistance to change within the 
institutional literature, and therefore why institutionalization processes of formal 
institutions  created  to  regulate  land-uses  can  be  held  back.  The  sources  of 
resistance to change are discussed for each institutional paradigm.
3.2.1. Rational institutionalism 
Rational institutionalism explains the resistance to change of institutions 
due to the economic benefits provided, that is, because certain institutions make 
socio-economic systems more efficient. These benefits are measured in economic 
terms. Institutions resist change because they are more efficient when they are 
used (what has been called institutional efficiency) and/or when they improve the 
resource-use efficiency (what has been called allocative efficiency). For instance, 
Demsetz (1967) explained the emergence of property rights as a “response to the 
desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities”. 
Based  on  the  works  of  Coase,  transaction  costs  theorists  have  explained  the 
persistence of land-use planning (zoning) as an institutional form that minimizes 
transaction costs,  i.e.,  it  is  more efficient  than other  institutional  arrangements 
assigning land-uses (Lai, 2005; Webster, 1998). Institutions that are restricting the 
behaviour of agents are very resistant to change because they provide an optimal 
and  more  efficient  mode  of  organization.  Other  alternatives,  if  they  are  less 
efficient, are at comparative disadvantage and will not be selected in the long run 
(Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997). 
3.2.2. Historical institutionalism 
However, as North (1990) has pointed out, many of the institutions that 
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shape our socio-economic activity are inefficient. For instance, land-use planning 
is considered by many authors as very inefficient in terms of allocating efficiently 
land-uses (Sheppard and Cheshire, 2002). If this is true, some authors ask why is 
it  so  prevalent?  (Chung,  1994).  To  explain  this,  historical  institutionalists 
developed the concept of path dependence. This term means that available choices 
in the future are restricted by the choices made in the past.
For historical institutionalism the concept of path dependence plays a key 
role  (Peters,  1999;  Hall  and Taylor,  1996)  in  explaining the  survival  of  many 
institutions.  Thelen  (1999)  differentiates  two  ways  of  thinking  about  path 
dependence  within  historical  institutionalism.  The  first  one  understands  path 
dependence from an economic point  of  view and is  quite  deterministic  in  the 
sense that when a path is taken, it becomes “locked in”. The relevant actors adjust 
their  strategies  to  meet  the  prevailing  pattern.  It  is  difficult  to  change  initial 
elections  because  the  costs  (learning  costs  in  the  case  of  technologies  or 
transformation in the case of political changes) are too high, see for example the 
explanation  of  David  (1985) about  the origin  of  the keyboard;  although more 
efficient layouts have been designed, they are not diffused because of the high 
learning costs. When changing institutions, the costs may be high enough to the 
extent that actors will keep using institutional arrangements even if more efficient 
alternatives in the long term are available.
Thelen  (1999)  argues  that  the  second  way to  look  at  path  dependence 
within  historical  institutionalism  is  from  the  point  of  view  of  sociological 
institutionalism.  In  this  line,  Zucker  (1977)  states  that  to  arrive  at  shared 
definitions of reality, individual actors transmit an exterior and objective reality, 
while at  the same time this  reality defines what  is  real  for these same actors. 
Generational  transmission  provides  the  clearest  example  of  this  process.  The 
young are enculturated by the previous generation and so on. Cultural persistence 
can  be  explained,  therefore,  trough a  process  of  institutionalization.  Ikenberry 
(1994) argues that once the path is set, it tends not to change, but not because it is 
costly to change, but because interests and behaviour get defined by the political 
culture.
3.2.3. Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological  institutionalism  understands  institutions  may  not  differ 
greatly  from some of  the  historical  institutionalist  views  on path  dependency, 
however,  there are some differences.  First,  sociological institutionalists  usually 
take a normative approach to the study of institutions, tending to blur the line 
between institutions and culture (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2010; Hall and Taylor, 
1998). With normative it is meant that norms persists because they are shared. 
Actors do what they have to do, and this means that they do what other members 
of the community expect them to do (Zucker, 1977, Berger and Luckman, 1967). 
This  ideas  have  been  translated  into  the  planning  realm.  Decision  making  in 
planning does not rely on a consequentialist logic; to get things done, the basic 
action has to be based on legitimacy (Healey, 2006; Innes, 1996).
However,  in  the  realm  of  land-use  planning  there  may  be  reasons  for 
continuity that are not explicitly related to the reasons provided in the institutional 
literature.  For  instance,  Jacobs  (2011)  argues  that  many  American  (rural) 
municipalities are very reluctant to adopt land-use regulations because the goal of 
municipalities is growth aimed at increasing their budgets through building fees 
and taxes. On the other hand, Jacobs (2011) points out that land-owners are also 
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reluctant to adopt land-use regulation because this can imply a reduction of the 
value of their properties when the plan  does not allow to develop them. In this 
context,  both  municipalities  as  well  as  land  owners  can  adopt  a  rent-seeking 
behaviour in order to manipulate the political environment to obtain benefits. This 
source of resistance to change concerning individual interests and power has not 
been  considered  explicitly  by  institutionalist.  One  explanation  for  this  is  that 
institutions are created to solve social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990), or to improve 
economic  transactions  (North,  1990).  However,  rent-seeking  behaviours  are 
indicators  of  the  opposite  phenomena.  Institutional  literature  has  not  paid  too 
much  attention  to  studying  this  (Georg  et  al.,  2006),  since  institutionalists  in 
general are more concerned with the influence of institutions in decision-making, 
and less interested in decision-making itself. As it will be shown, the explanation 
of not-adoption may rely, in the absence of legitimated enforcement mechanism, 
on cognitive limitations rather than on institutional explanations. Some insights of 
behavioural economics, like the prospect theory, can be more useful to explain 
non adoption.
4. Explaining non adoption
4.1. Non adoption in Galicia
Rational  institutionalism  seem  not  to  be  the  reason  why  Galician 
municipalities are reluctant to land-use planning. The current land management is 
not improving the efficiency of the use of land. On the contrary, the current urban 
sprawl is causing high costs for the Galician society (Prada Blanco, 2007; 2008). 
The historical institutionalism does not seem to be explanatory either. The current 
land management practices were established a few decades ago and are not the 
result of institutionally locked-in arrangements. All the contrary, the situation is 
caused  rather  by  the  disappearance  of  informal  institutions  that  enable  land 
management until the second half of the 20th century (Tubío-Sánchez et al., 2013). 
Sociological  institutionalism is  not  explanatory  either,  because  as  it  has  been 
pointed above, there is not a well-established practice of land-use planning among 
Galician municipalities to the extent that it can be considered shared by the main 
actors15.
What explains the resistance to adopting land-use plans in compliance with 
the new act? In the Galician literature,  there are a few explanations about the 
reasons that municipalities have to reject land-use planning. They appear to be 
about the individual interests of both land-owners and municipalities, in the same 
line that Jacobs (2011) explained the reluctance to adopt land-use regulations in 
the USA. In Galicia the idea exists that land-owners will reject land-use planning 
because restrictions on the development of plots would reduce the value of the 
property. This argument (the lack of land-use planning) has been used by scholars 
to  explain  why  in  Galicia  rural  land  is  so  expensive  (López  Iglesias,  1996). 
However, the results of empirical research do not  support this hypothesis. A study 
on the rural  land prices transactions during the last  three years shows that the 
prices of rural land are higher in municipalities with a plan adapted to the act than 
in  municipalities  without  adapted  plans  or  even  without  any  kind  of  plan 
(Crecente-Maseda and Tubío-Sánchez, 2012). Land prices can depend on other 
factors apart from a land-use plan, like for instance on proximity to urban centres. 
15 In Galicia there are a few municipalities with a long tradition of land-use planning. However, 
these municipalities are the exception rather than the rule.
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In this sense, this argument is not conclusive.
A few scholars also suggest the idea it is not only land-owners who press, 
more or less directly, upon municipalities to prevent the adoption of plans that 
take away their development rights. Municipalities, it is pointed out, have  several 
economic reasons to avoid restrictions in land-use planning. One of them is that 
taxes  related  to  building  activity  have  become  their  largest  income  source 
(Rodríguez  González,  2008;  Lois-González  and  Aldrey-Vázquez,  2011). 
However,  this  seems to  be somehow contradictory  with  other  findings  on the 
financial  behaviour  of  the  municipalities,  which  suggests  that  Galician 
municipalities have very low property taxes compared with other regions of Spain 
(Álvarez  Corbacho,  2008).  Empirical  data  shows that,  for  the  years  2009,  the 
number of building permits in municipalities with an adopted land-use plan is 
higher  than  in  municipalities  without  a  land-use  plan  adapted  to  the  new act 
(Crecente-Maseda and Tubío-Sánchez, 2012). Furthermore, according to data of 
the  Ministry  of  Public  Administration16,  revenues  from  land  development 
accounted for around 4% of their total income for the period 2005-2012, when the 
average  in  Spain  is  around  11%  (Solé-Ollé  and  Viladecans-Marsal,  2011). 
However, it is necessary to be cautious about this conclusion; in the section 4.3 we 
return to it.
4.2. Non adoption in the Netherlands
Many practices in the Dutch planning activity, like the use of exemptions 
to the plan, can be considered an informal institution, completely institutionalized 
and  therefore  very  resistant  to  changes.  However,  the  practice  of  making 
exemption to plan cannot be explained through rational choice institutionalism 
because it has been shown that other ways of land development could be more 
efficient, and nevertheless municipalities were reluctant to carry them out (van der 
Krabben  and Needham, 2008; Buitelaar, 2010). Although it could be considered 
that land management and in particular the use of exemptions was an election 
made  in  the  past  and  became  locked  in,  as  historical  institutionalism  would 
suggest,  some  authors  suggests  that  this  practice  works  under  a  logic  of 
appropriateness  (Buitelaar,  Lagendijk  and Jacobs,  2007).  In  terms  of  land-use 
planning,  Dutch  municipalities  do  what  other  actors  expect  them  to  do. 
Developers are somehow forced to negotiate with municipalities, because, first, 
when plans are outdated there is no other possibility to initiate new developments, 
and second, municipalities like negotiations because in this way they can impose 
several conditions on the development to improve the quality of plans and to fulfil 
citizens' needs (Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel, 2011; Needham, 2007). In this way the 
behaviour of municipalities seems to be legitimated insofar it is “encapsulated in a 
role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group” (March and 
Olsen,  2009).  Municipalities  carry  out  active  land  policy  and  citizens  and 
developers are happy with that. 
The new act passed in 2008 introduces the possibility of defining specific 
uses  (like  housing  types)  in  a  plan,  making  it  no  longer  necessary  for 
municipalities to own land to achieve their  goals (van der Krabben and Jacos, 
2013). But,  after  changing the act,  why do municipalities did not change their 
practice  as  it  has  been shown in  section  2.2.2?  As  it  has  been shown above, 
municipalities were reluctant to change their behaviour. Apart from the traditional 
quest  to  control  land development,  municipalities  had  also important  financial 
16 http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/EntidadesLocales/BDatosPL.aspx
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reasons to avoid changing their practices related to exemptions and keep sticking 
to  the  use  of  exemptions.  In  a  context  where  plans  are  outdated  and  new 
development  initiatives  emerge,  the  privileged  position  of  municipalities  in 
negotiations  with  developers  (since  developers  do  not  have  other  choice  than 
negotiate with the municipalities to initiate developments) allow them to pass the 
cost  of  revising the land-use plans to  the applicants (through legal  fees or  by 
drawing up agreements) (Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel, 2011). This will not longer be 
possible when in 2013 all municipalities have adopted the act.
The municipalities' quest of control of development process relies on their 
financial interests. Some authors even argue that one of the informal objectives of 
this way of managing land  is the generation of income stream for local authorities 
(Overwater, 2011). Between 1999 and 2007, Dutch municipalities made profits 
from land development of around of 1848 million Euros  (Korthals Altes, 2010). 
These earnings are comparable to all local government earnings from taxes and 
charges in the same yeas. For instance, in 2005, almost at the peak of the housing 
market,  around  12%  of  the  total  income  of  municipalities  was  from  land 
development; that is three times higher than the revenues obtained from property 
taxes (Korthals Altes, 2008).
Despite of (or maybe due to) the principle of prudence in the accounting of 
land-developmentprojects  of  Dutch  land-development  agencies,  these  profits 
made out of land development formed the main source for the financial flexibility 
of the municipalities. Although strong evidence is lacking, as van der Krabben and 
van Dinteren (2010) point out, it is notunthinkable that financial driving forces 
play a role in municipalities’ development decisions. Therefore, it is not (or not 
only)  the  ”logic  of  appropriateness”  in  the  decision-making  that  justifies  the 
existence of these planning practices, but also to serve the economic interests of 
the municipalities. 
Today,  the  change  of  the  municipal  behaviour  with  regard  to  land 
management may be due more to the economic crisis than to the willingness to be 
in compliance with the act, for municipalities are now very reluctant to buy land, 
what markedly reduces their bargaining capacity. Nowadays many municipalities 
will  not be able to  earn back the investments made in  the past (Deloitte  Real 
Estate Advisory, 2011). In this new context the new act contains more options for 
public cost recovery and for provision of public goods when municipalities do not 
own the  land (Buitelaar,  2010;  van  der  Krabben and Jacobs,  2013).  This  will 
significantly induce municipalities to  adapt  the new act  and change their  land 
management practices.
4.3. Comparing not-adoption adoption sources
The sources that the three institutionalism envisage as sources of continuity are 
not  completely  explanatory  for  continuity,  if  we  do  not  include  terms  like 
economic interests.  As Hall  and Thelen (2009) point out, “the durability of an 
institution can rest substantially on how well it serves the interests of the relevant 
actors” (Hall and Thelen, 2009; pp. 11). Economic interests play a key role. Even 
when more efficient alternatives are available, the sources of continuity depend 
more on the uncertainty regarding the distribution of gain and losses that a new 
policy reform brings (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Hall and Thelen, 2009). Under 
a  change (which  on the  ground is  a  risky  environment),  like  for  instance  the 
adoption  of  a  land-use  plan,  actors  are  much  more  averse  to  losses  of  some 
magnitude than they are to gains of the same magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky, 
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1979). In the Netherlands, municipalities always wanted to control development 
and tried to achieve societal  goals,  like promoting affordable housing. But the 
municipalities  had also economic interests  in  doing so.  Again,  institutions  can 
survive  over  time  if  they  serve  the  interests  of  relevant  actors.  In  this  case, 
institutions are not at odds with self-interests positions, they are, rather, aligned 
with them.
In  Galicia,  neither  the  institutional  sources  of  resistance  nor  the  self-
interests of land-owners seem to be completely explanatory of the low degree of 
adoption of the act. However, the fact that the consequences of that self-interest 
and rent seeking in agricultural land-prices are not demonstrable, it does not imply 
that they do not exist. Like in the Dutch case, it is difficult in Galicia to separate 
between what is economic and self-insterest and what is no interest in planning. 
As  it  has  been  said  in  the  section  4.1,  Galician  municipalities  are  not  very 
interested in recouping the developments costs. More than the half of them do not 
see any benefit from adapting the plans to the new act. In a context where the 
regional  government  does  not  have  enough legitimacy to enforce  the  act,  and 
where the municipalities do not consider it  useful,  it  is difficult to say if self-
interest is the main element of resistance, or if self-interest is what arises when 
there is not a strong  government at work.
5. Conclusions 
This article shows that to enforce planning acts at local level, one of the 
crucial  element  is  the  legitimacy  that  upper  governmental  levels  (national  or 
regional) have. In Galicia, where land planning has not had a long tradition, the 
regional government has difficulties to legitimate its decisions. In the Netherlands 
it is the other way around. National government is legitimated, and legitimation 
could  be  considered  a  cultural  characteristic.  In  this  way,  the  Dutch  national 
government can enforce a new Spatial Planning Act through a sanction. It should 
be noted that municipalities accepted that they would be sanctioned, even if they 
were happy with the former act.  To enforce laws, and particularly planning acts, 
governments have to become credible.
With regard to the sources of continuity, the institutional literature does not 
fully  cover  all  sources  of  continuity  that  may  appear  during  the  process  of 
adoption of an act. This is so because almost all institutional literature, ranging 
from more positivist position to the more constructivist one, is quite reluctant to 
include in its analysis concepts like economic interests. In both cases, economic 
interests play a role to understand resistance to change. In the Dutch case, self-
interest of the municipalities is aligned with the achievement of public goals. In 
the Galician case, economic interest of both municipalities and landowners are 
aligned with rent seeking. However, it is difficult to know if this occurs because 
rent seeking is hampering planning implementation or if it is because there is not a 
strong and legitimated government. This conclusion may be somehow striking for 
specially for neo-institutional economists. For scholars like Coase or Williamson, 
institutions are devices of the economic interest in reducing transaction costs and 
create  more  efficient  markets.  For  Galician  and  Dutch  municipalities,  either 
institutions represent ways of maintaining certain levels of revenues and control, 
or they represent an attack to selfish land-owners and a political cost for  local 
governments.  In  both  cases  there  is  an  economic  interest  at  stake,  but  this 
economic  interest  does  differs  from  economic  interest  that  according  neo-
institutional theory economic agents should have.
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Chapter 4: Understanding local land use planning 
in Galicia: The case of the Local Planning and 
Protection of Rural Areas Act of Galicia - LOUGA
Abstract
Local  land  use  planning  is  one  of  the  most  complex  tasks  carried  out  by  local  
governments.  However,  there  is  a  lack  of  research  on  the  factors  related  to  the 
adoption or rejection of land use planning by local governments. This paper aims to 
contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the  behaviour  of  local  authorities  in  Galicia  in 
adopting the Local Planning and Protection of Rural Areas Act of 2002 (LOUGA) 
from an  empirical  and  theoretical  approach.  Particular  attention  is  directed  to  the 
factors that led local governments to adopt or reject the act. Results show that most of 
the arguments proposed in Galicia to justify the reluctance of local governments to 
adopt land use plans do not fully explain the implementation pattern of the LOUGA.
Key words: local government, urbanism, local financing, land uses, property rights 
1. Introduction 
Local planning has become one of the most complex tasks carried out by 
local governments, since takes into consideration legal, cadastral, mortgage and 
register implications of local land use classification. Indeed, local planning has 
become key to effective governance. Yet, in Galicia land use planning in general 
and local planning in particular have been usually referred to as ‘chaos’ (García 
Vidal, 2003), as a mixture of ‘impunity and uglinism’ (Mosqueira Lourenzo and 
Silva Méndez, 2005) or, more straightforward, as ‘a problem’ (Lois González and 
Aldrey Vázquez, 2011; Pino Vicente, 1995; 2010). Although there is a Galician 
way of thinking about the land, there also is a sense of collective frustration about 
land use planning, as suggested by Precedo Ledo (2006) and apparently confirmed 
by the passing of three land use acts in the last 25 years. Such a situation has 
direct  effects  on  local  government  in  terms  of  functioning,  legitimacy  among 
citizens, financing and guaranteed achievement of the public good. 
Despite the widespread negative perception of land use planning in Galicia, there 
are great differences between municipalities due to the diversity that characterizes 
the region. 
The current land-use act  called Local Planning and Protection of Rural 
Areas  Act  (LOUGA)  introduces  a  dramatic  change  in  the  objectives  of  the 
regional  government  in  terms  of  the  function  of  land use  planning.  However, 
many  questions  remain  unanswered  about  the  real  impact  of  this  shift  in  the 
government  objectives,  some of  which  are  essential.  For  instance,  how many 
municipalities have adopted the LOUGA? What are the characteristics of those 
municipalities? Why have they adopted the Act? How many municipalities have 
not adopted the LOUGA and why not? 
Strikingly,  despite  the  importance  of  local  land  use  planning  to  local 
governments, only a few authors in Galicia have tried to rigorously answer these 
essential  questions,  which  reveals  a  lack  of  interest  on  the  part  of  Galician 
university researchers in the land in general, as some authors have pointed out 
(Dalda Escudero, 2008; Crecente Maseda, 2009).
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This paper analyses the adoption of the current land use act and provides a 
deeper insight into land use planning in Galicia to overcome the interpretative 
problems faced by researchers when trying to understand land planning practices 
in the region. The paper is organized into two main sections. The first section 
focuses on the characterization of the municipalities that have conformed to the 
current  land  use  act,  passed  in  2002,  and  on  the  characterization  of  the 
municipalities that have not started drafting their plans to comply with the goals 
of the act. The second section explores the reasons that scholars have proposed to 
explain the reluctance of Galician local governments to adopt land use plans. The 
reasons  proposed  by authors  from different  disciplines  are  contrasted  with  an 
empirical analysis and with theoretical contributions from international literature 
on planning. The conclusions provide a brief explanation of the behaviour of local 
governments with respect to land use planning in general and the adoption of the 
current land use act in particular.
2. The adoption of the LOUGA by Galician local 
governments
The enactment of the Local Planning and Protection of Rural Areas Act of 
2002 was encouraged by three judgements of the Constitutional Court of Spain of 
5 July 2001, 11 July 2001 and 27 February 2002. They were aimed at clarifying 
the competences of the State and Regional governments in the definition of land 
use classes. However, the enactment of the LOUGA went far beyond what was 
needed to adapt the 1997 land use act of Galicia to the new national framework. 
Actually, the LOUGA imposed much more restrictions on building in rural areas 
than the previous  acts.  Such a  dramatic  change cannot  be understood without 
considering the prevailing climate during the drafting of the act. As an example of 
the atmosphere that contributed to trigger the passing of the planning act, one may 
cite the main regional newspaper La Voz de Galicia that on May 19, 2001, started 
a  campaign  against  uglinism,  a  concept  created  to  explain  the  lack  of  spatial 
organization  in  Galicia,  by  placing  the  following title  on  its  front  page:  “The 
agony of the Galician Landscape”. The impact of the campaign was essential to 
understanding  the  goals  of  the  new land  use  act  (García  Vidal,  2002;  Tubío-
Sánchez et al., 2013).
Despite  that  atmosphere at  that  time,  a decade after  the passing of the 
LOUGA, the outcomes of implementation are uneven. The act compelled local 
governments to adapt their plans or draft new ones before 2006. However, until 
2011 only 53 local governments had made a land use plan that complied with the 
goals of the LOUGA. Among these, only 31 did so on their own initiative, insofar 
as  20  of  them  had  already  started  drafting  their  land  use  plans  before  the 
enactment of the LOUGA and 2 of them were forced to adapt to the LOUGA after 
suspension of their plans by the Regional Government. This means that only 10% 
of the municipalities adapted their  land-use plans to the LOUGA in ten years, 
which can be interpreted as a low degree of compliance with the law. However, 
most municipalities are currently drafting their land use plans. Actually, only 6% 
of the Galician municipalities have not contacted the regional government to start 
drafting their plans. Table 11 shows data of number of municipalities and their 
situation with regard to the LOUGA.
What are the characteristics of the municipalities that have approved a land 
use plan and what are the characteristics of the municipalities that have not started 
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the  procedure  for  drafting  the  plan?  To  answer  to  this  question  we  need  to 
consider a number of factors that may be relevant to understanding why local 
governments decide to adapt or not to the LOUGA, namely:
1) Type and age of land-use plans
2) Political colour of the administration in office and its continuity over time.
3) Physical, economic and social characteristics of the municipalities.
In this paper these 3 factors are analysed both for the municipalities that 
have adapted their land-use plans to LOUGA and for the municipalities that have 
not  started  the  process.  The 221  municipalities  that  are  currently  (in  2011) 
working on their plans were not analysed because of the lack of available data on 
planning  implementation  and  because  the  quantitative  analysis  that  would  be 
required goes beyond the scope of this paper, even though such an analysis might 
help determine the causes of delay in approval.  
The analysis of the municipalities that adapted land-use plan to comply 
with the goals of the LOUGA is presented below.
2.1. Influence of type and age of planning policy tools at 
the time of plan approval
Type  and  age  of  land-use  plans  seem  key  to  understanding  the 
unwillingness of municipalities to adopt or refrain from adopting the act. Table 7 
divides municipalities into three large groups: municipalities that have approved a 
land use plan adapted to the LOUGA, municipalities that have started drafting a 
plan adapted to the LOUGA and municipalities that have not started drafting yet. 
As shown in table 11, the group of municipalities that have started drafting is the 
largest group, with 221 municipalities. Two factors were analysed: 1) the age of 
the plan implemented in the municipality when the LOUGA was enacted, and 2) 
the  planning  policy  tool  applicable  in  the  municipalities  that  adapted  to  the 
LOUGA (for the municipalities  that  have not  adapted to  the LOUGA or have 
started working on their plans, the policy tool available in 2002 is still applicable). 
Table 7 summarizes two relevant findings: the first finding suggests that 
the  municipalities  with  previous  land-use  plans  were  much  more  reluctant  to 
adopt the LOUGA. Data show that 50% of the municipalities that have adapted 
planning to comply with the goals of the LOUGA did not have any land-use plan, 
whereas 30% of the municipalities that are working on the drafting of the plan 
currently do not  have any land-use plan.  In  contrast,  almost  all  municipalities 
(78%)  that  have  not  started  drafting  a  plan  adapted  to  the  LOUGA have  an 
applicable general land-use plan. The second finding refers to the average age of 
the  plans  that  were  applicable  when  the  LOUGA was  enacted  in  2002.  The 
average age of the plans applied in the municipalities that adapted their plans to 
the LOUGA was 15 years. For the municipalities that are currently working on 
adaptation,  the  average  age  of  their  plans  applicable  in  2002  was  10  years, 
whereas for the municipalities that have not started drafting, the average age of 
their  plans  available  in  2002  was  four  years.  This  finding  suggests  that  the 
willingness of local governments to adapt plans to LOUGA increases with the 
increase in the age of their previous plans.
Therefore, we have verified that the municipalities that have adapted their 
plans to the LOUGA share the following characteristics: a) a trend to not having 
currently applicable land use plans, or b) a trend to having applicable land use 
plans amongst the most obsolete planning policy tools in Galicia. 
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2.2. Political colour of the administration in office and 
continuity over time
The political colour of the administration in office can be highly relevant 
for making  decisions on whether to draft  a land-use plan insofar  as different 
political parties have different views on the degree of government intervention on 
markets or on citizen participation in decision making. A study about the influence 
of political parties in the conversion of rural land into urban in Spain has revealed 
that left-wing local governments allow 65% less land to be developed than right-
wing governments  in  similar  municipalities  (Solé-Ollé  and  Viladecans-Marsal, 
2012).  In  the  case  of  Galicia,  given  the  increasingly  long  implementation 
processes,  stability,  that  is  continuity  of  local  government over  time,  must  be 
added to political colour as a relevant factor, for it facilitates plan implementation 
without  the  interruptions  caused  by  changes  in  local  administration.  Table  8 
summarizes data of political colour of local administration and its stability over 
time. The first column includes the percentage of municipalities that adopted a 
plan in compliance with the LOUGA and of political parties that stayed in the 
local government for two terms (from 2003 to 2011) as well as the percent change 
of party during the two terms considered. 
Table 8 reveals two characteristics of the analysed municipalities that are 
relevant to understanding the influence of political parties on making decisions on 
whether  to  approve a  plan.  First,  the  conservative  party  “People's  Party” (PP) 
prevails both in the municipalities that have approved a plan as well as in the 
municipalities that have not contacted the regional government to start drafting 
the plan (in both cases, the PP was incumbent in about 50% of municipalities). It 
is therefore observed that  municipalities governed by the conservative party PP 
were  equally  prone  to  adopt  the  act,  they  account  for  about  50%  of  the 
municipalities. Second, the presence of the liberal party “Socialist Party” (PSdeG) 
is almost three times higher in the municipalities that have approved a plan in 
compliance  with  the  LOUGA than  in  the  municipalities  that  have  not  started 
adaptation to the LOUGA. 
The  table  13  presents  the  developable  area  in  the  plans  of  the  non-
adopters, the municipalities that are currently making it and the adopters of the act 
in relation to the political  parties  that obtained the majority  of seats17.  Results 
suggest that the adopters governed by the conservative party PP during the two 
terms in office (from 2003 to 2011) have made plans that convert 0,04% more 
land from rural to urban uses. This represents around 34 ha of more developable 
land  in  municipalities  governed  by  the  PP.  In  the  case  of  non-adopters  and 
municipalities  working  on  the  plan,  it  is  not  possible  to  make  a  relationship 
between the developable area of the plans and the political colour of the local 
government, for their current plans have been approved in the past, in some cases 
many years ago. This means that the political parties that adopted these plans may 
be quite different from the parties that have been governing in the municipalities 
between 2003-2011. Beside this, there is however a clear relationship between a 
17 Notice that when the conservative party PP has the majority of seats it becomes the governing  
party. The left-wing political parties (PSOE and BNG) may form coalitions when they obtain 
more seats than the PP. However this is not always the case. Only in the case of adopters, the  
political coalitions have been checked to assure the political  colour of the local authorities 
during the terms in office 2003-2007,  2007-2011. In the rest of the cases, it was assumed that a  
majority of seats of left-wing leads to a left-wing coalition. This uses to be so – at least in the  
case of adopters – but only if the parties agree to form a coalition.
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dominant  proportion  of  left-wing  seats  (PP)  and  the  convertion  of  rural  to 
developable land,  in particular  when the proportion of seats  is  above 40%, as 
showed in the figure 2 shows. 
With regard to the relationship between continuity of the administration in 
office  and  reluctance  to  undertake  planning,  the  percent  change  of  local 
administration during  the two terms considered  was substantially  lower in  the 
municipalities  that  adopted  a  land-use  plan  that  complied  with  the  LOUGA 
(19.3%) than in the municipalities that have not started the plan-making (31.6 %). 
Compared  with  the  group  of  non-adopters  or  the  group  of  the  municipalities 
working on the plan-making, the group of adopters has had the lowest variation of 
seats between the local elections of 2003 and 2007, as  shown in figure 2. This 
finding points to a relationship between the continuity of the administration in 
office and the decision to approve a general plan. 
According to these findings, PP is the political party that has approved the 
highest  number  of  land  use  plans  adapted  to  the  LOUGA,  but  also  the  most 
represented party in the municipalities that have not started the adaptation to the 
LOUGA. Yet, the presence of PSdG in the municipalities that have adapted to 
LOUGA is three times higher than the presence of PSdG in the municipalities that 
have not started implementation. In addition, results reveal a relationship between 
the  continuity  of  the  administration in  office between 2007 and 2011 and the 
approval of a general plan that complies with the goals of the LOUGA.
2.3.  Physical,  economic and social  characteristics of  the 
municipalities  that  adopted  the  LOUGA  and  of  the 
municipalities that have not started plan-making
The above sections focused on some political  and planning factors that 
could affect the adoption or rejection by local governments of a land-use plan that 
complies with the goals of the LOUGA. But what are the physical, economic and 
social characteristics of municipalities that may be related to the willingness or 
reluctance to adopt the act? The municipal willingness to adopt the act should be 
aligned with the act's goals, in the way that the greater is the willingness to adopt 
the act.  Taking into consideration that the goals of local planning,  particularly 
since  the  middle  of  the  20th  Century,  are  mostly  to  manage  urban  growth 
processes and to protect agricultural land (OECD, 2001; Pallagst, 2007), variables 
related to urbanization processes and rural characteristics of the territory can be 
relevant  to  understand  willingness  to  adopt  the  LOUGA.  Therefore,  to 
characterize the municipalities ten physical, economic and social variables, which 
are listed here along with the data sources for all the variables were used: 1) Total 
number of building permits in 2000 and 2009 (Galician Institute of Statistics – 
IGE),  2) rural  land prices between 2008 and 2011 (Land Bank of Galicia);  3) 
agricultural labour force in 2001 (IGE); 4) 2010 population density (IGE); 5) crop 
areas (Spanish Land Use Information System - SIOSE); 6) forest areas (SIOSE); 
7) artificial land area (SIOSE); 8) population centres (INE); 9) human settlements 
(INE)  and  10)  proportion  of  labour  force  engaged  in  services  (IGE).  When 
applicable, the variables were referred to the area of the municipality to make 
comparison between municipalities of different size possible. These variables help 
us to group municipalities with similar characteristics in order to determine the 
relationship  between  such  characteristics  and  the  adoption  or  rejection  of  the 
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LOUGA. Municipalities were grouped into five large groups or clusters, each of 
which  had  members  with  great  similarities  with  respect  to  the  ten  variables 
mentioned in  the  above  paragraph.  Ward’s  hierarchical  clustering  method  was 
used  to  group  municipalities  with  similar  characteristics.  Figure  3  shows  the 
spatial distribution of the five clusters.
Clusters  are  arranged  from  most  to  least  urban,  such  that  cluster  1 
corresponds to the most urban municipalities and cluster 5 corresponds to the least 
urban municipalities. Table 9 shows the number of municipalities that made a plan 
compliant  with  the  LOUGA by cluster  and  the  number  of  municipalities  that 
already had a land-use plan when adapted it to the LOUGA. 
As  shown  in  table  9,  cluster  4  includes  the  highest  percentage  of 
municipalities that have adopted the LOUGA. According to figure 3, cluster 4 
municipalities are located in the rural areas with the highest levels of agricultural 
and  farming  activity  in  Galicia,  as  suggested  by  Corbelle  Rico  and  Crecente 
Maseda  (2012).  At  the  same  time,  cluster  4  municipalities  had  the  lowest 
percentage  of  plans  before  adapting  to  the  LOUGA,  even  lower  than  the 
percentage obtained for municipalities located in mountain areas. 
According  to  Table  9,  cluster  2  includes  the  lowest  percentage  of 
municipalities that have adapted their plans to the LOUGA, with only 6.2% of 65 
municipalities.  Based  on  figure  3,  cluster  2  municipalities  are  geographically 
located in metropolitan and coastal areas of the Rías Baixas, in southeast Galicia. 
In addition, it is important to mention that both cluster 1 and 2 municipalities that 
have adapted to the LOUGA had already land-use plans. Many municipalities in 
cluster 4 did not have land-use plans or they were very obsolete.
Table 10 shows: 1) the municipalities that have not started the process to 
adapt  to  the  LOUGA, 2)  the  clusters  in  which  they  are  included,  and  3)  the 
percentage  of  municipalities  that  had  previous  plans  before  adapting  to  the 
LOUGA.
All the municipalities in cluster 1 have initiated the process to implement a 
plan, whereas cluster 3 includes the lowest percentage of municipalities that have 
not started the drafting of a plan. This result is in agreement with the results for 
cluster 3 municipalities that have not adapted their  land-use plans. Apparently, 
having a previous plan is strongly correlated with low willingness to adapt the 
LOUGA. However, this is not strongly correlated with the cluster in which the 
municipality is included. Yet,  the proportion of variance is not as large as the 
proportion of variance found for the municipalities that have adopted a plan in 
compliance with the goals of the LOUGA.
To sum up, the cluster analysis suggests that the highest level of adoption 
of LOUGA correspond to cluster 3 municipalities, which are located in areas of 
Galicia where the economic activity is mostly agriculture and farming (figure 3). 
Accordingly, cluster 3 includes the lowest percentage of municipalities that have 
not initiated the adoption of a plan that complies with the goals of the LOUGA. 
Adoption of LOUGA is strongly related to the cluster in which the municipalities 
are included as well as to the lack of applicable plans when the act was passed. 
The reasons for not adaptation to the LOUGA appear to be related to the existence 
of a previous municipal plans that was very recent when the LOUGA was enacted 
in 2002 rather than to the inclusion of the municipality in a given cluster.
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3. Explanatory hypotheses of adoption or not adoption of 
the LOUGA
After  having  explored  the  main  characteristics  of  the  process  for  the 
adoption  or  rejection  of  the  LOUGA by  Galician  local  governments,  some 
questions remain unanswered: How can this pattern of adoption be explained? 
Why were Galician local governments so reluctant to adopt the LOUGA? A few 
scholars in Galicia have attempted to explain the reluctance of local governments 
to undertake land use planning from different perspectives. The contributions of 
these authors can be assigned to four large disciplines that have traditionally been 
related to land planning in Galicia: Architecture, Economy, Law and Sociology. In 
addition,  cross-cutting  disciplines  like  geography  usually  bring  together 
contributions  from  various  areas.  In  the  following  sections,  we  assess  the 
contributions of each discipline to the understanding of the implementation of the 
LOUGA.  Table  11  summarizes  the  types  of  plans  applicable  in  Galician 
municipalities  and the number of  municipalities  that  have land-use plan.  Each 
type of plan is coded by a letter that is later used in various boxplots.
3.1. The Architecture perspective
Architects  usually  point  to  vague  and  non-specific  land-use  plan 
preparation as a reason for explaining the implementation gap of land-use plans in 
Galicia. They argue that technically deficient plans are less likely to be adopted 
(Portela  Fernández  and  Estévez  Fernández,  2008;  Dalda  Escudero,  2008).  In 
international literature, some authors considered the technical quality of plans as a 
factor in the analysis of effective implementation of land use plans and found a 
positive  correlation  between  technical  quality  and  effective  implementation 
(Joseph, Gunton and Day, 2008). These ideas have led some architects to claim 
that the difficulties in land-use plan approval and management in Galicia result 
from assigning  the  preparation  of  plans  to  teams  that  are  not  linked  to  local 
governments. This means that these teams do not understand the local dynamics. 
Accordingly, Galician architects support the ideas of ‘direct management’ of local 
land use planning by municipal architects and affirm that such management would 
improve the quality of plans (Cebrián Tello, 1980).
However,  there  is  no  evidence  for  a  causal  relationship  between 
technically appropriate plans and plan implementation. Most probably, technically 
good plans are good because of a great  willingness of local authorities to adopt 
them. When local  authorities really want to adopt a plan they are much more 
concerned about the quality of the plan. Therefore, the technical quality of the 
adopted plans would be a consequence rather than a cause of implementation. 
Here, the direction of causes and consequences becomes essential.
In addition, a number of authors concerned with plan implementation have 
demonstrated  that  assuming  that  a  technically  good  land-use  plan  will  be 
implemented directly is wrong for many reasons (Alexander, Alterman and Law-
Yone, 1983; de Oliveira, 2002). Yet, all these reasons relate to the fact that a land 
use plan is a social construct rather than a design produced by an expert (Graham 
and Healey,  1999). In this way, it  is not longer possible to assume that in the 
current society, experts have the capacity to design and implement land use plans 
based on the technical excellence of their work is no longer reasonable.
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3.2. The Economy perspective
Economists  point  to  rent  seeking  behaviour  of  landowners  and 
municipalities  as  a  reason  for  reluctance  to  land-use  planning.  Jacobs  (2011) 
proposed  two economic  hypotheses  to  explain  why local  governments  can  be 
reluctant to approve a land-use plan. The first hypothesis refers to owners and 
their  search for income. If  a municipality lacks a land-use plan that envisages 
conversion of rural land to urban, the loss of owners’ rights over land property 
may result  in  a  loss  of  property  value.  The second  hypothesis  refers  to  local 
governments  and  their  search  for  profit.  Local  governments  are  paying 
increasingly more for the services they provide,  and construction and property 
taxes are an important source of financing. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to 
think that local governments are inclined to encourage urban growth processes 
without a land-use plan that constrains the area available for urban development. 
The first hypothesis was used by López Iglesias (1996) to explain how the 
lack of land use regulation creates an expectation among landowners for future 
urban land uses. In that case, the prices of rural property tend to increase as a 
result of expectations that new development will be allowed in the future. Many 
authors have analysed the effects of land use constraints on land prices. According 
to theoretical economic models enacting zoning plans that classify the land into 
urban or  rural  eventually  increases  the prices  of  urban land and decreases the 
prices  of  rural  land  (Cheshire  and  Sheppard,  2002). However,  the  results  of 
empirical  analyses  are  more  inconsistent.  Some  authors  have  suggested  that 
zoning does not affect land prices (Maser et al., 1977), whereas other authors have 
suggested  that  land  use  planning  does  affect  land  prices  (Pollakowski  and 
Wachter, 1990). Such inconsistencies occur partially because the methods used in 
this type of analyses are poorly defined (Needham, 2006), and partially because 
the  relationship  between  land  use  restrictions  and  land  value  is  not  well 
understood (Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005).
To verify the hypothesis proposed by Jacobs (2011) and López Iglesias 
(1996),  we analysed  the  effects  of  the  different  land-use  plans  on land prices 
between 2008-2010 using data from land transactions collected by the Land Bank 
of Galicia. The dataset used in the analysis includes sufficient data of rural land 
sale and purchase prices to suggest trends for rural land price in municipalities in 
relationship to having a plan or not having a plan. 
Data shows that the land prices are lower in municipalities without land-
use plans and higher in municipalities with land-use plans. As shown in Graph 1, 
the median for group D, which includes the eight municipalities with an approved 
land-use plan compliant with the LASGA (the first land-use act of Galicia, passed 
in 1985)18, is higher than the median for the rest of the municipalities. In contrast, 
the municipalities with no land-use plans (-) showed the lowest prices of rural 
land, even lower than the prices observed for the municipalities that adapted to the 
LOUGA, the most restrictive act. If the hypothesis proposed by Jacobs (2011) and 
López  Iglesias  (1996)  were  true,  the  results  shown in  figure  5  should  be  the 
opposite. 
How can we explain such a strange relationship between plans and land 
prices in Galicia? It could be argued that in a context with little tradition in land 
use regulation like the Galician context, the implementation of a land use plan will 
not have any effects on prices because landowners know or interpret that the land 
18 According to housing census data, the municipalities with this land use planning policy tool  
correspond to the municipalities with the highest levels of new development during 1981-2001.
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uses envisaged in the plan will not have a determining effect on the future use of 
their property, because landowners do not fully assimilate the implication of the 
land-use plans  or  because landowners believe the plan can be easily  changed. 
However, this theory does not account for the higher land prices observed in the 
municipalities with a general plan as compared to the municipalities with no land-
use plans. 
Although it is important to be cautious with regard to these results. Land 
prices  can  depend on many other  factors  apart  from a land-use  plan,  like  for 
instance on proximity to  urban centres,  and in this  sense these results  are not 
conclusive.  Nevertheless,  a  number  of  contributions  from  the  international 
literature can help to shed more light on this situation. Often, the difficulties in 
finding an explanation different from the traditional one (López Iglesias, 1996; 
Jacobs, 2011) stem from approaching the relationship between land use regulation 
and land prices from simple models of supply and demand. Such an approach is 
based on the implicit axiom that the prices of goods (e.g. the land) are fixed by the 
quantity  supplied  and  the  demand  for  those  goods.  However,  the  relationship 
between land-use regulations and land price determination is far more complex. 
For some authors, land use regulation can be considered an ex post tool used to 
avoid  variations  in  the  prices  established.  Based  on  this  approach,  land  use 
regulations are encouraged to avoid unwanted land uses, such as industrial uses 
eventually reduce the property value or the environmental values of an area. In 
this sense, planning can be seen as the consolidation of the value placed by the 
community on some public goods or amenities (Lubell, Feiock and de la Cruz, 
2009). 
Based on the above discussion, the assumption that planning affects land 
prices is reversed, i.e. planning must be considered a consequence of the different 
values given by the community to private property and public goods. As stated by 
Quigley and Raphael (2005:17), “the degree of regulation may in and of itself be a 
function of early growth pressures and house price increases”. These assumptions 
provide  a  more  plausible  explanation  for  figure  5.  Because  the  availability  of 
land-use  plans  in  the  municipalities  with  high  land  prices  is  actually  a 
consequence  of  such  high  values,  the  municipalities  with  low prices  of  rural 
property  have  not  seen  the  need  to  undertake  planning.  For  this  reason, 
implementing a land use plan in municipalities with no planning will hardly vary 
the  price  of  the  land.  Similarly,  the  theory  that  the  price  of  land  in  the 
municipalities with high land prices would be even higher if there was not a land 
use plan available is difficult to support because, as suggested above, land use 
plans only formalize the ‘valuation’ that a community makes of their territory.
The second hypothesis proposed by Jacobs (2011) explained above argues 
that  local  governments  are  reluctant  to  regulate  residential  capacity  because  a 
large part of their revenue is generated by construction related activities such as 
building permits or property taxes. In the Galician context, some authors have 
considered  this  hypothesis  as  a  kind  of  ‘fiscal  cynicism’ insofar  as  building 
activity  is  made  responsible  for  the  generation  of  revenue for  financing local 
services (Rodríguez González, 2008; Lois González and Aldrey Vázquez, 2011). 
In  the  Spanish  context,  some  authors  have  argued  that  urban  development 
activities account for about 30% of local revenue (Teré Pérez, 2010).
The relationship between public finances and planning in Galicia has not 
been explored, except for the case of the municipalities in the Deza district, which 
was analysed by Rodríguez González (2004b). Yet, the analysis of the available 
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data provides some indications about the relationship between public finances and 
planning in Galicia. 
Galician  municipalities  are  very  loose  in  collecting  taxes.  In  general, 
property tax rates are rather outdated. Tax effort in 2006 amounted to only 17% of 
maximum taxation (1.1%), which accounts for half the average tax effort in Spain 
(Álvarez Corbacho, 2008). In a context characterized by the lack of interest of 
local governments in updating property tax rates, the highest rates correspond to 
the municipalities with a land-use plan approved before the LASGA, with an on 
average value property tax rate of 0.60, whereas the municipalities with a land use 
plan adapted to the LOUGA have average property tax rates of 0,57. In contrast, 
the average property tax rate for municipalities with no land-use plans or with 
planning tools ruled by subsidiary regulations is 0.48. These results suggest that 
the  municipalities  with  land-use  plans  tend  to  have  higher  tax  rates  than  the 
municipalities without land-use plans, and as showed above, municipalities seem 
to use the adoption of LOUGA to convert land from rural to developable. The 
LOUGA seem therefore a tool to foster development, not to hamper it.
Not only are municipalities very loose in collecting property taxes, but thy 
also seem to be loose in collecting fees related to building activity. According to a 
report on an audit of land planning in five municipalities between 1998 and 2001 
released by the Galician Financial and Audit Committee (Consello de Contas), 
other taxes related to urban development activities such as building permits or 
occupancy permits are not being properly used by Galician local governments. 
Actually, the audit revealed significant deficiencies in administration and payment 
of taxes, which resulted in the loss of economic resources by local governments. 
For instance,  the audit  revealed that  the administration had not confirmed full 
payment of the building tax according to real building costs (Consello de Contas, 
2003). Such a passive attitude of local governments toward land-use planning is 
evidenced by poor management of the land owned by the municipality19, which in 
many Galician municipalities has not been well established (Consello de Contas, 
2006). The strongest evidence for the lack of interest of local governments in the 
revenue  that  should  be  generated  by  urban  development  activities  is  the 
government passive attitude toward the low level of execution of the development 
plans,  which  would  allow  Galician  local  governments  to  obtain  10%  of  the 
generated revenue (Consello de Contas, 2003). In figure 8 is clear that there is not 
a  relationship  between  the  increase  of  developable  land  and  the  increase  of 
property  tax  revenues  between  06-12.  Neither  the  municipalities  that  adopted 
LOUGA nor  the  municipalities  working  on  the  adoption  collected  all  fiscal 
benefits that the classification of developable land could provide them, and this is 
regardless of the political colour of local authorities, as shown in figure 7. 
A survey  (see  results  in  Chapter  5)  revealed  that  none  of  the  local 
governments  that  adapted  their  plans  to  the  LOUGA requested  an  assessed 
valuation  following  the  approval  of  the  new land  use  plan.  Article  28  of  the 
Legislative Royal Decree 1/2004, which ratifies the text of the Law of Real State 
Cadastre,  envisages  the  possibility  that  local  governments  request  assessed 
valuation if a land-use plan that changes cadastral values is approved. An assessed 
evaluation would increase the cadastral value of the plots. This would allow the 
muninicipalities  to  increase  property  tax  revenues.  This  information  is  key  to 
understanding the lack of interest  of local  governments in  obtaining resources 
19 Municipalities are allowed to create a municipal land asset. This asset can be dedicated to 
achieve municipal goals, like building of affordable housing.
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through land management.
The laxity of Galician municipalities in collecting the revenues from the 
development  activity  is  somehow  contradictory  with  the  evidence  that  many 
studies provide about the behaviour of the Spanish municipalities. In these studies 
there is a strong evidence that municipalities engaged in over-planning aiming at 
increase the revenue sources coming from the building activity (Solé-Ollé and 
Viladecans-Marsal, 2011; Cabasés Hita et al., 2011). In addition, as the table 13 
shows, it seems that the variable influencing the municipal decision of adopting or 
not the act is the endowment of developable land that municipal land-use plans 
have. In fact, the adopters end up making land-use plans with larger developable 
areas than in their previous plans. Those municipalities that are currently working 
in  their  plans,  have  a  similar  percentage  of  developable  land  that  adopters, 
therefore  they  do  not  feel  the  pressure  to  adopt  the  act.  In  the  case  of  non-
adopters,  the  developable  area  in  their  plans  in  considerable  larger  that  in 
municipalities  that  adopted  the  act.  As  it  will  be  shown  in  Chapter  5, 
municipalities that adopted the act mention as the main reason the possibility to 
convert more land from rural to urban use. The non-adopters, however, suggested 
that a reason for non adoption in their  cases was the reduction of developable 
areas  under  a  new  land-use  plan  in  compliance  with  LOUGA.  Since 
municipalities seem to be very loose in collecting taxes from the building activity, 
then the explanation of why they are prone to convert more land to urban uses 
may rely on the rent  seeking behaviour  of landowners.  Municipalities may be 
willing to avoid conflicts –and the associated political costs –with landowners that 
have expectations to maintain or to obtain development rights. The cultural aspect 
of property is discussed in the section 3.4.
It  can  be  concluded  that  local  governments  may  show ‘willingness  to 
grow’. However, Galician local governments are too relaxed in tax collection, to 
the extent that it seems difficult to find a relationship between the interest of local 
governments in tax collection and their lack of willingness to undertake land use 
planning. An alternative explanation to understand the behaviour of municipalities 
is that they want to avoid conflicts with landowners and therefore the political 
costs that may reduce their electoral expectations. 
A few scholars  consider  that  such  a  relaxation  in  tax  collection  could 
attract greater urban development activity. However, if municipalities with land-
use plans (whatever it is) are compared with municipalities without land-use plan, 
the analysis reveals that the municipalities that have already implemented a plan 
correspond to the municipalities that: 1) collect more properly property taxes, 2) 
have built the highest number of dwellings in the period 1980-2000 and 3) have 
received the highest number of applications for new developments from 2000 (see 
Table 7; municipalities with a plan are in bold text). On this account, the claim 
that  the  relaxation  or  laissez-faire of  local  governments  is  associated  with 
avoidance of land use planning regulations is not valid in this context, insofar as 
the  municipalities  with  the  highest  revenue  from  planned  urban  development 
activities and the greatest interest in tax collection are most likely to adopt land-
use plans.
3.3. The Law perspective
In general, lawyers claim that land use planning regulation in Galicia is too 
diffuse and complex,  which results  in  inefficiencies in  the achievement  of the 
main goals of land use planning legislation (Meilán Gil, 2001). The latest attempts 
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to regulate land use planning in Galicia, like the LOUGA, do not escape these 
adjectives (the act is ‘confused, complex and too diffuse’) . When we refer to the 
complexity of land use planning legislation we are not referring exclusively to 
land  planning acts, but to a variety of sector-specific regulations,  like national 
regulations  and  European  regulations  and  their  continual  modifications 
(Mosqueira Lourenzo and Silva Méndez, 2005), as  well as to the difficulties in 
applying a  vast  body of  laws and regulations  in a  highly complex and varied 
territory with 30,000 human settlements (INE, 2012). Such a complexity may turn 
land use planning into a too strenuous task to manage.
 Yet,  some  data  point  to  the  opposite  trend  when  dealing  with  the 
complexity of municipalities in terms of human settlements. The municipalities 
with the highest density of urban human settlements,  i.e. the municipalities in 
which  the  application  of  a  vast  number  of  varying  sector-specific  regulations 
would theoretically be more complex, correspond to the municipalities with land 
use  plans.  Conversely,  the  municipalities  with  the  lowest  number  of  human 
settlements lack a land-use plan (see Table 12. To allow for comparison between 
municipalities, the number of human settlements is referred to the total area of the 
municipality).  Considering  only  the  implementation  of  the  LOUGA,  we  have 
found  that  the  municipalities  that  have  adapted  their  plans  are  slightly  more 
complex  than  the  municipalities  with  a  general  plan  that  complies  with  the 
LASGA20.  This  suggests  that  despite  all  difficulties  in  very  complex 
municipalities, they are not reluctant to adopt plans.
3.4. The social perspective
The  implementation  of  land  use  planning  at  the  local  level  entails  the 
allocation and/or  reallocation of property rights (Jacobs and Paulsen, 2009). As 
already  suggested,  reluctance  to  change  property  rights  can  be  caused  by 
economic  factors.  Reluctance  to  land  use  planning  be  may  be  attributed   to 
cultural  factors.  Jacobs  (2011)  claims  that  one  of  the  factors  that  makes  the 
implementation of land use regulations difficult in rural areas is a strong ideology 
of property rights. This claim provides a cultural rather than economic explanation 
for the reluctance of Galician citizens to adopt changes in property rights. Indeed, 
access to full landownership in Galicia occurred much later than in other regions 
of Spain and citizens had to invest considerable economic resources to gain access 
to landownership. A large proportion of migrants’ remittances were invested in 
gaining access to property during the first decades of the 21st Century (Rodríguez 
González, 2004; Villares Paz, 1982). In keeping with Jacobs (2011), some authors 
in Galicia have argued that this culture of property can explain the reluctance to 
undertake  planning  (Rodríguez  González,  2004).  Ramón  Villares  (1982) 
maintains that the  concept of property introduced in Galicia through the liberal 
revolution was eventually understood by citizens as an extension of the body, such 
that  landowners  consider  public  actions  on  property  from  an  individual 
perspective.  Internationally,  some  authors  have  explained  the  differences  in 
planning  implementation  from the  perspective  of  the  culture  of  property.  For 
example, Halleux, Marcinczak and van der Krabben (2012) explained land use 
planning differences between the Netherlands and Belgium based on the analysis 
20 Yet, the group of municipalities that adapted planning to the LOUGA includes large 
municipalities like Vigo that distort the general characteristics of the municipalities that 
adapted planning because of their size.
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of factors related to the culture of property. Yet, as shown in the section devoted to 
the  implementation  of  the  LOUGA,  the  most  rural  municipalities  were  the 
municipalities with the highest levels of adoption of an act that imposed much 
more restrictions on building land uses in rural areas than the previous acts. This 
means that ideology on property seems not to be an explanation of the adoption 
pattern.
To explain the reluctance of local governments to approve land use plans 
that comply with the goals of the LOUGA, we analysed the number of citizen's 
plan  amendments  recorded  in  the  municipalities  that  adapted  their  planning 
policies to the LOUGA. The aim of such an analysis was to check whether there 
were differences in the number of amendments according to the type of area in 
which municipalities were located, urban or rural. Our initial hypothesis was that 
land use plans approved in urban areas should have more amendments than land 
use plans  approved in rural  areas,  insofar  as  tensions between landowners are 
apparently much greater in urban areas. Unexpectedly, results suggests that the 
average of amendments is similar in all municipalities. Figure 6 shows the results 
of the analysis. 
To facilitate comparison, the number of amendments was divided by the 
population of each municipality. The results did not reveal marked differences, 
except for the municipalities included in cluster 5, which correspond to the most 
peripheral municipalities, in which growth pressures are insignificant. However, 
the results  for the rest of the municipalities are very similar.  For example,  the 
general land use plan of a very rural municipality like Castroverde recorded as 
many amendments  as  the plan of  the one of  the most  urban municipalities  of 
Galicia  like  Vigo,  in  terms relative  to  the  population of  the  municipality.  The 
municipalities  that  belong to  the  first  and second peri-urban rings  (cluster  2), 
recorded less amendments than the most rural municipalities, included in clusters 
3 and 4. Therefore, apparently, the reluctance of local governments to adopt the 
LOUGA, as measured by the number of amendments to their land use plans, is not 
an explanatory variable for the low level of adoption of the act. 
Like  other  approaches  to  understanding  the  implementation  of  the 
LOUGA,  the  social  perspective  has  not  contributed  a  sufficiently  plausible 
explanation for the situation of land use planning in Galicia. 
4. Discussion and conclusions
The findings of the analysis presented in this paper point to the need to 
rethink the social and economic implications of local land use planning. Actually, 
our analysis has revealed sufficient indicators that suggest that some approaches 
cannot fully explain the behaviour of local governments with respect to land use 
planning. Yet, further research is needed to understand why land planning is still a 
residual activity for local governments in Galicia.
The data presented and the considerations made in this paper call for an 
explanation  that  goes  beyond  the  contributions  traditionally  made  in  Galicia. 
Particularly,  the  most  simple  and  plausible  explanation  for  the  low  level  of 
adoption of the LOUGA by local governments is that local governments have not 
found this act useful. In other words, the LOUGA did not solve any problems that 
were  seen  as  actual  problems  by  local  governments.  This  explains  why  the 
municipalities  with  no  land-use  plans,  i.e.  the  municipalities  with  the  greatest 
difficulties in issuing permits because of long processing times, etc., correspond to 
the municipalities that were most willing to adopt the LOUGA. The adopters of 
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LOUGA have zoned, on average, more developable land than the rest of Galician 
municipalities,  except  the  group  of  non-adopters.  This  shows  that  these 
municipalities wanted to growth, though it is not clear they wanted to increase the 
revenue sources or because they wanted to avoid conflicts –and the associated 
political costs with landowners if they had taken away more development rights. 
The growth rate departs however from the population trend, for the municipalities 
that adopted the LOUGA lost on average around 13% of their population in the 
last decade, more than the municipalities that did not start the plan making or that 
are still working on it. 
The municipalities that have not initiated the drafting of a land use plan 
adapted to the LOUGA already had a plan that is still in place and that was not 
obsolete  in  2002,  when  the  LOUGA was  enacted.  These  plans  zone  a  larger 
endowment  of  developable  land  than  a  plan  in  compliance  with  the  LOUGA 
would  probably  zone.  This  is  probably  preventing  these  municipalities  from 
adoption, due to the fiscal and social impact that adoption to LOUGA might have 
for  the  municipality.  A large  group of  municipalities  have  some type  of  plan, 
either a general plan or a set of simple local land use planning regulations that 
allow them to manage the permits. The other large group of municipalities that do 
not have a land use plan does not need one because they do not manage permits or 
other types of land uses, for they are very isolated municipalities. This explains 
why clusters 1 and 2, the most urban groups, include only 6 municipalities with no 
land-use plans, whereas clusters 3, 4 and 5 include 62 municipalities without land-
use plans. In addition, clusters 1, 2 and 3 include over 2/3 of the master plans of  
Galicia.  This data cannot be explained with the current hypotheses about land 
planning in Galicia. 
Most probably, the fourth land use act in the last three decades will be 
passed during the current term. Which factors should be considered when drafting 
the new act? If the goal is to achieve diffusion of the act, the most important issue 
is to convince local governments that land use planning is a useful tool that solves 
problems and has benefits, insofar as land use planning is a complex task that 
requires compensation (Alexander, Alterman and Law-Yone, 1983). On the other 
hand,  enforcement  mechanisms  must  not  be  forgotten.  Paradoxically,  for 
enforcement mechanisms to be effective, such mechanisms must be legitimated by 
the community (Tubío-Sánchez et al., 2013). Because the LOUGA has legitimated 
the duties of land use planning during a decade of implementation, the regional 
government  should  now  be  able  to  establish  more  dramatic  enforcement 
mechanisms for the new act.
Still, the most important issue for the future is the need to ask ourselves, as 
Dalda  Escudero  (2009)  did:  What  can  land  use  planning  be  used  for?  What 
problems does land use planning solve? As claimed by Buitelaar  et al. (2007), 
local land use planning requires much more action than the action envisaged in a 
plan  that  only  allows  or  forbids  some land  uses.  The  effective  planning  of  a 
municipality goes far beyond having approved a plan that is used exclusively to 
manage building or cultivation permits. Local land use plans must to a certain 
extent force local governments to ask themselves what goals they want to achieve 
with such permits. If the answer given by the new act is based exclusively on 
appearance and the main goal of the act is to fight uglinism, the next land use act 
will probably be as ignored as the LOUGA.
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Tables and figures
         
      
The different estates of municipalities with regard to LOUGA Number  of 
municipalities
CMLUP-
2002
Municipalities with land use planning based on the LOUGA that 
started implementing planning after enactment of the LOUGA.
31
Municipalities with land use planning based on the LOUGA that 
started implementing planning based on previous acts.
19
Municipalities that resorted to the 3rd transitional provision  of 
the LOUGA
24
Municipalities with suspended plans. 2
Municipalities currently working on a CMLUP-2002 221
Municipalities  that  did  not  have  started  the  making  of  a 
CMLUP-2002
19
Table 6: Number of municipalities and situation in relation to land use act 9/2002 (LOUGA)
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Mean age of planning 
policy tools (years)
Previous planning 
policy tools *
LOUGA-adopters 15 35% SRLP
15% CMLUP
51% no plan
Working on the plan-
making
10 50% SRLP
20% CMLUP
30% no plan
Non-adopters
4
15% SRLP
63 % CMLUP
21% no plan
Table 7: Age of planning policy tools in municipalities in 2002
*For municipalities that have not adapted to the LOUGA, the current land use planning policy 
tools are the same as in 2002.
             
Governing 
Political Party 
Adopters (%) Non-adopters (%)
PP 48.4 52.6
PSdG 28.8 10.5
BNG-PSdG 3.2 -
Other 3.2 5.3
Change of party 19.3 31.6
Table 8: Political parties governing during the terms 2003-2007 and 2007-2011
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Figure 2: Mean of the variation of seats in the 
local elections of 2003 and 2007
Figure 3: Map of municipal clusters
Cluster No. 
municipalities by 
cluster
 LOUGA adopters 
by cluster by 
cluster (%)
Adopters with previous 
planning tools (%)
1 16 12.5 100
2 65 6.2 100
3 102 11.8 58
4 62 12.9 12
5 70 7.1 20
Table 9: Adopters of LOUGA by cluster and adopters with previous planning policy tools 
Cluster No. 
municipalities by 
cluster
Non-adopters (%) Non-adopters with 
previous planning 
tools (%)
1 16 - -
2 65 7.7 100
3 102 6.9 85%
4 62 3.2 100
5 70 7.1 60
Table 10: Percent municipalities by cluster that did not adapt to the LOUGA and percent 
municipalities with non-adapted land use planning that had previous planning policy tools
Type of planning policy tools No. of 
municip
alities
- No planning tool or DUGB 68
A SRMP before the LASGA 15
B CMLUP before the LASGA 4
C SRMP, LASGA between Act 7/1995 and Act 1/1997, or 
SRLP, LASGA until Act 7/1995 
94
D CMLUP, LASGA until Act 7/1995 8
G CMLUP Act 1/1997, PXOM, 3rd transitional provision  
of the LOUGA
64
H RPRA, 3rd transitional provision of the LOUGA, or 
POMR Act 1/1997 
9
K CMLUP LOUGA, not adapted to Act 2/2010 53
Table 11: Types of land use planning policy tool applicable in municipalities in April 2011
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Figure 4:  Increase of developable areas between 06-12 and 
percentage of seats by political party
Figure 5: Prices of rural land between 2008 and 2010. 
Source: Land Bank of Galicia
             
Type of planning tool Property 
tax rate
No. of 
dwellings built 
1990-2001
Applications for new 
development 2000 
Population 
centres and 
designated 
places
No planning tool 0.48 247.4 9.11 1.2
 SRMP before LASGA 0.49 364 24.4 1.5
CMLUP before the LASGA 0.60 681.5 25.5 1.5
SRMP 1985-1997 0.46 512.7 26.5 1.7
 CMLUP 1985-1995 0.49 2873.2 85.1 2.5
CMLUP 1997, 3rd 
Transitional Provision
0.46 1012.5 34.1 2
RPRA 0.46 72.7 2.4 1.3
CMLUP LOUGA 0.47 996.2 26.3 1.6
Table 12: Relationship between four variables (data of statistical medians) and type of planning
Number of non-adopters Number of municipalities working 
on the plan-making
Number of 
adopters
Currently 
without a 
plan
Currently 
with a plan
Currently without a 
plan
Currently 
with a plan
LOUGA-
Plan
Variation of 
population between 
2001-2010>0
0 6 [21,2] 7 [11] 57 [10,2] 4 [13]
Variation of 
population between 
2001-2010<0
3 [-16] 9 [-11] 57 [-14,8] 99 [-10,8] 27 [-13,5]
Total of 
municipalities
3 15 64 156 31
Developable 
municipal area in 
their current plan (%)
0,027% 3,4% 1,9% 2,4% 2,6%
In conservative 
municipalities
0,035 2,8 0,11 1,6 3,0
In progressive 
municipalities
- 5 0,94 3,8 2,6
Table 13: Number of municipalities into the three categories and in relation to variation of 
population, developable area in their plans and colour of political party 
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Figure 6: No. of amendments to plans adapted to the 
LOUGA by cluster
Figure 7: Relationship between variation of developable areas and 
increase of property tax revenue
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Figure 8: Relationship between property tax 
revenue and seats of political parties
Chapter 5: Aversion and attachment to rules. An 
institutional approach to understanding why 
localities adopt (or reject) land-use planning
Abstract
In 2002, the region of Galicia in north-west Spain adopted a new land-use act which 
mandated that each of 315 municipalities adopt a legally binding land-use plan by 
the  year  2006.  The  Galician  regional  government  even  arranged  to  cover  the 
expenses  for  the  plan-making.  Notwithstanding  this,  to  date  (2011)  only  31 
municipalities have adopted such a plan. These municipalities are largely rural (only 
two of them are urban) and are characterized by population and economic decline. 
One-half  of  these  municipalities  did  not  have  any  land-use  regulation  before 
adopting their new land-use plans, and the other half had very old land-use plans (in 
2002,  the  average  age  of  existing  plans  was  15  years).  The  majority  of  the 
municipalities (222) in the region are,  at  this moment,  working on plans,  though 
some municipalities (19) have not started at all,  even though the act has been in 
force for 10 years.
In this paper we seek to explain why some municipalities adopted a land-use plan in  
compliance with the new land-use act, whereas others seem to be reluctant to start 
the plan-making process. By adopting and institutional approach, this paper provides 
insights  about  the  sources  of  institutional  change  and  continuity  that  led  the 
municipalities to adopt or to reject of the act. 
Key words: adoption, institutionalism, non-adoption
1. Introduction
In 2002 Galicia adopted a new land-use act which required each of 315 
municipalities to make one legally binding land-use plan for the whole municipal 
territory before the year 2006. The Galician government even arranged to cover 
the expenses for the plan-making. Notwithstanding this, to date (2011) only 31 
municipalities have adopted a land-use plan against  285 that did not. Almost all 
municipalities that did not adopt the new land-use plan are working on adapting 
their  plans,  only  19 municipalities  of  them did  not  start  the  process  of  plan-
making. In Galicia not adopting a land-use plan within the alloted time seems to 
be the rule rather than the exception. The purpose of this paper is to understand 
why 19 municipalities did not started yet, after almost 10 years, the plan-making, 
whereas 31 municipalities completed and approved it. The paper focused therefore 
on  the  extreme  behaviour  of  the  municipalities,  adoption  of  the  act  and  not 
starting the plan-making. The big group of the municipalities currently working 
on adapting their plans are not analyzed because the time variable is not included 
in the analysis. In this way, the paper exclusively analyses the variables adoption 
and non-adoption.
2. A short overview of land-use planning in Galicia
The land-use act of 2002 is the third land-use act in 30 years. To better 
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understand why this land-use act came into force it is important to explain the 
process of  urbanization in  Galicia  during the last  decades.  Compared to  other 
regions, urbanization in Galicia started much latter. We cannot speak of an urban 
Galicia until the 1960s, for until that decade Galicia could be considered a rural 
region. After 1970 processes of urban growth and in particular processes of urban 
sprawl, mostly located in coastal areas and in municipalities near big cities, started 
to take place (Torres Luna and Lois González, 1995). Although Galicia has always 
had a scattered settlement pattern, this dispersion of settlements was in balance 
with the landscape. However, between the sixties and eighties Galicia experienced 
a marked transfer of population from the rural to the urban areas. In the eighties 
and nineties, and due to the improvement of the standard of living, the urban areas 
began a process of counter-urbanization, which led to the rise of settlements in 
peri-urban areas (Aldrey Vázquez, 2002). Some authors argued that this was the 
main socio-economic and socio-cultural  change in the history of Galicia (Pino 
Vicente  et  al.,  2010).  This  territorial  change had led  some authors  to  refer  to 
Galicia  as  a  diffused  city  (Docampo,  Dalda  and  Harguindey,  2005)  or  as  a 
«rururban weft», with characteristics both of urban and rural landscape (Oliveira 
et al., 2009). The dividing line between rural and urban has become blurred.
In the eighties and nineties Galicia passed two land-use acts (1985 and 
1997) that did not really address the problem that was causing the urban sprawl. 
The land-use act of 2002, which substitutes all previous acts, focuses for the first 
time on rural areas, as the name of the act clearly illustrate: ‘Act of urban planning 
and rural areas protection’ (LOUGA, the Galician acronym). The articles of the 
act that refer to urban planning are similar to articles in the previous land-use act 
of 1997. In this way, the act shows a high continuity of urban land management 
when compared with previous acts. The new act is larger in explicitly addressing 
the management  of  the rural  land by protecting more strictly  rural  areas  from 
urban sprawl. 
LOUGA introduces the comprehensive municipal land-use plan (CMLP), 
which regulates  all  uses to which land may be put in the whole municipality. 
Today 222 municipalities are working on land-use plans. The plans have to be 
detailed by prescribing all land-uses in the municipal area (forestry and agrarian 
land uses, developable land and urban land). The room for discretion is, therefore, 
limited.  Plans  are  normally  made  by  a  private  planning  bureau  hired  by  the 
municipal local authority. The administrative procedure consists of 6 phases. In 
two of them the plan has to be presented to regional government officials in order 
to  confirm that  the plan is  in  compliance with  LOUGA’s legal  requirements. 
Many  municipalities  deliberately  produce  plans  that  do  not  meet  the  legal 
requirements  of  LOUGA, and that,  therefore,  will  be  rejected  by  the  regional 
government. In this way municipalities can work on the land-use plans for years. 
Not  only  are  the  administrative  procedures  difficult,  there  is  also  legislative 
instability: LOUGA has undergone 5 modifications in 8 years. This means that if 
one municipality is making the plan,  it  is forced to readjust the content to the 
modification of the law. There may be therefore several explanations about why 
these municipalities are still working on their plans. But all these setbacks in the 
plan-making phase and during its approval by the local authorities do not explain 
why  31  municipalities  have  overcome  all  these  difficulties  and  adopted  the 
LOUGA whereas 19 municipalities did not start yet the plan-making. This paper 
aims  at  understanding  this  by  developing  a  theoretical  framework  and  a 
methodology. The aim is to explore explanations can be found in the literature 
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about  the  willingness  to  adopt  land-use  planning  as  well  as  the  grounds  of 
rejection. In the next section an approach based on institutional theory has been 
developed. A land-use plan is defined as a set of institutions assigning property 
rights and the adoption of a plan is defined as institutional change. The resistance 
to adopt a land-use plan is resistance to institutional change.  As several authors 
have argued, a theory of institutional change has to explain not only why changes 
do occur, but also why changes can be blocked (Olsen, 2009; Immergut, 2006).
The paper is divided into four main sections. The first section critically 
examines sources of institutional  change found in the literature.  In the second 
sections, a methodology to test the validity of these sources is developed. The 
second  section  develops  a  questionnaire  for  semi-structured  interviews.  Third 
section presents the results of the interviews. Finally, the fourth section presents a 
discussion about the results and the final conclusions.
3. An institutional approach to understanding adoption and 
rejection of land-use planning
Since the late 1990s, planning has experienced what has been called the 
‘institutional turn’ (Jessop, 2001; Nielsen, 2007; Healey, 2007). Land planning has 
started to be considered as an institutional arrangement (Buitelaar, 2007; Bromley, 
2006),  and  institutional  analysis  has  been  applied  to  understand  planning 
processes  in  various  ways  (Buitelaar,  Lagendijk  and Jacobs,  2007;  Alexander, 
2001; 2005; Healey, 2007; González and Healey, 2005; Schmidt, 2009).
Traditionally, institutional theory has tended to focus more on incremental 
changes (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002). Indeed, major contributions of recent 
new institutional  work  suggest  that  the  majority  of  institutional  changes  may 
occur not as overt and formal changes to existing policies and institutions, but as 
incremental  and  gradual  changes  through  less  visible  processes  that  may 
nonetheless be transformative over time  (North, 1990; Sorensen, 2011a; 2011b; 
Thelen,  2004).  North (1990) describes institutional change as ‘overwhelmingly 
incremental’.  Following  the  differentiation  made  by  Aoki  (2007)  we  call  this 
approach  to  institutional  change  “endogenous  institutional  change”.  In  this 
approach,  institutions  are  considered  as  something  spontaneously  and 
endogenously shaped and sustained in the repeated operational societal life. If this 
were  the  case,  in  the  case  of  Galicia,  municipalities  should  adopt  the  act  not 
because they  are  following a political  mandate,  but  because  the  plan  in  itself 
emerge spontaneously and in a very incremental way. This means that adaptation 
to the LOUGA would not represent for the municipalities any radical change or 
departure from their daily planning activities.
On  the  contrary,  and  according  again  according  to  Aoki  (2007),  an 
approach to exogenous institutional change suggests that institutions are designed 
to achieve desirable goals for the main societal actors. More radical changes can 
be possible but, according to North (1990), ignore the deep-seated inheritance that 
underlies many informal constraints. Informal constraints have great tenacity for 
survival over time. In the exogenous approach to institutional change, institutions 
are designed by, in words of Commons, an authoritative agent like parliaments or 
courts, to achieve desired societal goals. In this approach, municipalities may be 
adopting the LOUGA because they either share the act's goals or the act, passed in 
the Galician parliament, forces them in a way or other to adopt the act.
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3.1. Sources of institutional change
In order to understand institutional change change it is important to pay 
attention  to  the  possible  triggers  for  change.  Recently  developed  models  to 
explain  institutional  change  use  the  same  ill-defined  concepts  when  trying  to 
identify  the  sources  of  institutional  change.  Concepts  such  as  ‘unsettling 
circumstances’  (Bromley,  2006),  ‘critical  joints’  (Greenwood,  Suddaby  and 
Hinings, 2002), ‘external societal developments’ (Buitelaar, Lagendijk and Jacobs, 
2007) or ‘precipitating events’ (Parkhe, 2003) are very imprecise in addressing the 
central  question  of  institutional  change.  For  instance,  the  concept  of  ‘critical 
junctures’ has been criticized in the literature for being incomplete, insofar as it is 
not clear what causes the switch from stability to instability (Immergut, 2006; Hall 
and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999). Moreover, scholars have been less explicit in 
specifying the mechanism that translates critical junctures into lasting institutional 
arrangements, i.e., in explaining the mechanism of reproduction (Thelen, 1999).
All these concepts remain rather imprecise because they do not address the 
kind of events or sources that trigger institutional change. They seem to suggest 
that  things  change  because  they  change.  Alternatively  a  ‘dialectical  view”  on 
change  can  provide  a  more  nuanced  explanation  of  how  institutions  change, 
insofar as it tries to study the relationship between agency and structure and how 
they  influence  each  other.  For  Benson  (1977),  dialectical  analysis  involves  a 
“search  for  fundamental  principles  which  account  for  the  emergence  and 
dissolution of specific social orders”. According to Benson (1977), contradictions 
grow out of social production in two ways. First, in any social setting there is a 
contradiction between ongoing production and the previously established social 
formation.  This  means  that  in  trying  to  reproduce  old  institutional  structures, 
inconsistencies and contradictions can emerge. Second, the production process is 
carried out in different social contexts producing multiple and incompatible social 
forms. In this case, institutional change occurs to solve contradictions between 
different current institutional setups. Some similar reasons for institutional change 
have  been pointed  out  by  Sewell  (1992) in  what  he  calls  “the  intersection  of 
structures” or the “multiplicity of structures”. 
The  idea  of  a  dialectical  view  on  institutional  change  may  lead  to 
reformulate  some ideas  about  change in  regulations.  For  instance,  it  has  been 
argued  that  technological  developments  can  apparently  trigger  processes  of 
institutional change (like the invention of the airplane and its effects on air rights 
(Jacobs,  1998)).  However,  Bush  (1987)  affirms  that  technological  innovation 
creates  new patterns  of  behavior,  which  in  turn  create  new problems  for  the 
community. In this case, the source of change is a contradiction between gradually 
evolved informal institutions (patterns of behavior) and the (formal) institutional 
context. New technological developments lead to institutional change if they make 
possible a behaviour that can create a conflict with the existing social order. If this 
contradiction does not occur, the effects of new technological developments can 
go unnoticed.
Although this perspective shows a way to understand institutional change, 
it still lacks a theoretical framework that can systematically explain: 1) what the 
sources of contradiction are;  and 2) why, by what mechanism and under what 
conditions those contradictions lead embedded agents to take collective action for 
institutional change. Such a framework is precisely what Seo and Creed (2002) 
tried  to  develop.  Relying  on  Benson's  work,  they  took  a  step  forward  and 
identified a set of sources that led to institutional change. Seo and Creed (2002) 
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proposed  the  following  four  sources  of  institutional  change.  Each  paragraph 
includes examples of sources of institutional change in Galicia.
1) Legitimacy that undermines functional efficiency. Many institutions with a high 
level of legitimacy can be very resistant to change. Institutional change occurs 
when generating enough resources to keep these institutions running smoothly is 
no longer possible. In strict terms, this source of change could not be considered 
an institutional contradiction. 
For instance, certain legitimated behaviours and practices, such as the idea 
of  living  in  very  low-density  areas,  can  create  –under  a  context  of  growing 
population – processes of urban sprawl. Urban sprawl generates extra costs related 
to the service of sewerage, water or electricity. These costs may seriously affect 
the local budgets over time. This means that urban sprawl would undermine the 
fiscal capacity of the municipality. A reaction of the municipality to this context 
may be to restrict  growth through zoning (Fischel,  1978),  that  is  to undertake 
institutional change of the land-use rules.
2) Adaptation that undermines adaptability. 
Institutionalization is an adaptive process. Once in place, institutions are likely to 
be locked in and, in a sense, isolated or unresponsive to changes in their external 
environments.  Such  an  unresponsiveness  creates  a  space  where  contradictions 
between the institutions and their external environments develop and accumulate 
over time. 
For  instance,  land-use  planning in  Spain  is  said  to  be  hierarchical  and 
rigid.  This  was  an  adaptation  made  in  the  past,  when  societies  were  more 
homogeneous  that  may  undermine  the  adaptability  to  current  times,  when 
societies are much more diverse and with many more conflicting interests. Thus, 
under these circumstances other forms of planning and new modes of governance 
would be more suitable (Graham and Healey, 1999). In this sense, institutional 
change would occur to make land-use planning systems more flexible.
3)  Intra-institutional conformity that creates inter-institutional incompatibilities. 
Conformity to certain institutional arrangements within a particular level or sector 
may cause conflicts  or inconsistencies within the institutional  arrangements  of 
different levels or sectors. Usually, decentralization processes create many inter-
institutional incompatibilities (Seo and Creed, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 
2008) that trigger institutional changes.
Many  times,  conflicts  among  different  government  levels  can  lead  to 
reformulate  institutions.  For  instance,  the  making  of  LOUGA  was  due  to 
contradictions between the Galician legislation and the Spanish one.
4)  Conflicts  with  divergent  interests.  The  formation  and  reproduction  of 
institutional arrangements are unlikely to satisfy the interests of all participants. 
Seo and Creed (2002) referred to conflicts with divergent interests as the most 
common type of institutional contradiction. 
It is widely recognized that land-use planning has been frequently used to 
solve disputes or conflicts over land (Duke, 2004). These conflicts may be divided 
intro two types: 1) Conflicts among landowners due to incompatible land uses; 2) 
conflicts  between municipal goals and citizens'  use of land, which can lead to 
increase natural hazards risk or to unintended consequences, 3) Municipal goals. 
In  this  sense  attention  is  particularly  paid  to  the  taxation  objectives  of  the 
municipalities, since it has been shown that municipalities in Spain and Galicia 
use  land-use  planning  to  obtain  financial  resources  (Teré  Pérez,  2010;  Hita 
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Carbasés, 2011; Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2011), or to the goal of zoning 
industrial land, for most of the municipalities that adopted LOUGA did not have 
industrial land. The other important goal of municipalities when adopting a land-
use  plan  compliant  with  the  current  act  may  be  to  provide  legal  security  to 
investments (Needham, 2007).
It  is  important  to  mention,  however,  that  these  sources  of  institutional 
change do not operate separately. Rather, as Seo and Creed (2002) suggest, they 
are intertwined among themselves.  Yet,  some of these sources seem to trigger 
endogenous, while other sources seem to trigger exogenous institutional change. 
For instance, the first two sources use to lead to incremental endogenous change 
in  the  sense  of  North  (1990),  whereas  the  last  two  ones  are  more  related  to 
exogenous and radical  change,  in  the  sense  of  Commons  (1934).  Considering 
these  four  sources  of  institutional  contradictions,  a  set  of  questions,  was 
developed to understand if these sources play a significant role in adopting the act.
3.2. Resistance to change. Sources of continuity
Institutional  change  may  not  only  occur  because  there  is  not  need  for 
change. In the case there is a need for change, all institutional change processes 
face always some kind of resistance, because an institutional change implies a 
change  of  an  acquired  behaviour,  interests,  power  etc.  This  section  seeks  to 
understand  the  main  sources  of  resistance  to  change  within  the  institutional 
literature, and therefore why institutional change of formal institutions created to 
regulate land-uses can be held back. The international literature on institutions 
used to refer to three major institutional paradigms, the rational, the historical and 
the  sociological  paradigm (Hall  and Taylor,  1996).  We discuss  the  sources  of 
resistance to change within each institutional paradigm.
Rational institutionalism 
Rational institutionalism explains the resistance to change of institutions 
based  on  the  economic  benefits  provided  by  institutions  as  they  are.  These 
benefits  are  measured  in  economic  terms.  Institutions  resist  change  because 
change  may  make  that  social  systems  work  less  efficiently.  There  is  a  wide 
literature in the interface of property rights and planning that suggests that land-
use regulations minimize transaction costs (Lai, 2005; Webster, 1998), being this 
what explains why  zoning is so prevalent and immune from criticism (Chung, 
1994). This idea is, however, only applicable to explain why localities would be 
reluctant  to  abolish  land-use  regulations.  It  does  not  seem  very  useful  to 
understand the hehaviour of the Galician municipalities with regard to LOUGA. 
And this is so for two reasons. First, Galician municipalities that do not have a 
plan are reluctant to adapt their land-use plans to LOUGA or to make a land-use 
plan in compliance with the act; this means that they are reluctant to an institution 
that could – following the line of argument – reduce transaction costs. Second, 
even if  transaction  costs  were  reduced,  this  would  not  be  sufficient  to  insure 
institutional change in land use regulations, for new land-use regulations mean 
new distributional effect in assigning property rights. There may be citizens or 
powerful  groups  that  dislike  the  new assignment  of  property  rights  (Libecap, 
1999), for it may reduce the value of their properties.
It  has  also  frequently  been  pointed  out  that  the  instable  and  complex 
legislation  with  regard  to  land-use  planning  is  preventing  municipalities  from 
adopting  land-use  plans  (Meilán  Gil,  2001;  Raposo  Arceo,  2009).  Usually, 
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planners  refer  to  the  increasing  complexity  of  land-use  planning  as  the 
“judicialization” of the planning activity (Dalda Escudero, 2008). For instance, 
LOUGA has undergone 5 major changes in 8 years. The consequence of this is 
that municipalities working on the adaptation of their plans have to reformulate 
them to adapt them to the new changes. This may lead to municipalities to avoid 
the adoption of the act, for it would take too much time, and at the same time 
would be too politically costly.
The third reason why municipalities may be reluctant to adopt the LOUGA 
is  related  to,  according  to  some  authors,  the  lack  of  municipal  human  and 
economic  resources  to  make  and  manage  land-use  plans.  Municipalities,  it  is 
argued, do not have enough resources to make a plan and afterwards, once the 
plan has been adopted,  to manage it  (Gonzáles-Crebrián y Tello,  1980).  Many 
Galician municipalities (28%) do not have a local planner and around of the half 
of  municipalities  that  does  have  a  local  planner,  the  planner  works  part-time 
(COAG, 2011). However, it is frequently argued that even in those municipalities 
that have a local planner, there are not enough human resources to manage the 
plan. This, therefore, may prevent municipalities from adopting the LOUGA.
Historical institutionalism 
For historical institutionalism the concept of path dependence plays a key 
role (Peters, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996) in explaining the resistance to change of 
many  institutions.  Path  dependency  make  difficult  to  change  initial  elections 
because the costs (learning costs in the case of technologies or transformation in 
the case of political changes) are too high. The costs are high enough to the extent 
that actors will keep using extant institutional arrangements even if more efficient 
alternatives in the long term are available. In addition, the returns to scale, this is 
the  benefits  from  using  a  customary  system,  increase  as  the  use  of  a  given 
technology  or  institutions  increase  (North,  1990).  However,  it  is  difficult  to 
empirically  test  these  hypothesis.  One  of  the  reasons  is  that  historical 
institutionalism finds itself in between rational and sociological institutionalism, 
so the reasons of resistance are also shared by other institutionalisms.
Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological  institutionalists  usually  take  a  normative  approach  to  the 
study  of  institutions,  tending  to  blur  the  line  between  institutions  and  culture 
(Ishiyama and Breuning, 2010; Hall and Taylor, 1998). Normativity means that 
institutions – or lack of them – persist because they are shared by a community 
(Zucker,  1977,  Berger  and  Luckman,  1967).  In  Galicia,  landownership  has  a 
strong cultural aspect.
Due to historical reasons, the access to full landownership took place much 
later than in other European regions (see for more detail Tubío-Sánchez et al., 
2013). These historical reasons encouraged the creation of what some authors call 
a strong culture of property. This culture makes people in Galicia very sensitive to 
government  intervention –through planning or  other  means  – in  landowneship 
(Villares Paz, 1982; Rodríguez González, 2004). Of course there is a relationship 
between a culture of property and the negative economic implications of changing 
property rights. The economic implications of changing property rights can be 
solved by compensation.  However,  in  a  context  of  strong culture  of  property, 
compensation  may  be  ineffective  as  well,  because  the  value  of  land  is  not 
restricted to its economic value, it has a sentimental value as well.
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To sum up, we identify as sources for resistance to change the following 
reasons: 1.- Changes in property rights may lead to a reduction of property values, 
2.- Instable legislation may prevent municipalities from adopting the LOUGA, 3.- 
Lack of  human and economic  resources  to  make and to  manage the plan,  4.- 
Cultural resistance by citizens to government intervention on their landownership. 
Thee annex includes questions that were made to the municipalities.
The  next  section  contains  the  methodology  used  to  carry  out  the 
interviews. It also indicates the number of interviews and the person interviewed.
4. Methodology
We used the caste-study research. Case-study methods offer the possibility 
of gaining in depth knowledge about the relationship between reason of change 
(independent variable) and adoption or not adoption (dependent variable). A total 
of 50 phone interviews were carried out aiming at interviewing the local planner 
in the 31 municipalities that adopted the act as well as in the 19 municipalities that 
did  not  start  the  plan-making.  Due  to  changes  in  local  authorities  it  was  not 
always possible to contact the planners that were present during the adoption of 
the act, or who  have enough knowledge about the process to give an accurate 
answer. Therefore, the percentages given in the results are not referred to the total 
amount of municipalities, but to the number of answers obtained.
Two slightly different semi-structured interviews were designed for both 
cases. The one that was carried out in municipalities that adopted the act focused 
more  on the  reasons  for  change,  whereas  the  one  that  was carried  out  in  the 
municipalities  that  did  not  adopt  the  act  focused  more  on  the  reasons  for 
continuity. 
5. Results of interviews and analysis
The reasons for the behaviour of the municipalities may heavily depend on 
many variables. In previous research (see Chapter 4) it has been shown that the 
behaviour of the municipalities when deciding if adopting a plan in compliance 
with the LOUGA or not depends on two basic characteristics,  the variation of 
population between 2001 and 2010 and the current land-use plan before adopting. 
Thus, the following table shows the adopters and non-adopters according with 
each  of  the  two  characteristics.  Brackets  indicate  the  mean  of  the  population 
change between 2001 and 2010.
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Non-adopters Adopters
Currently without 
a plan
Currently with a plan LOUGA-Plan
Variation of 
population between
2001-2010>0
0 6 [21,2] 4 [13]
Variation of 
population between
2001-2010<0
3 [-16] 9 [-11] 27 [-13,5]
Total of 
municipalities
3 15 31
Table 14: Non adopters and adopters that gained and lost population between 
2001 and 2011
All  adopters  were  asked  what  was  the  main  reason  that  led  the 
municipality to adopt the LOUGA. The answers are related to the enlargement of 
the developable area,  be it  the endowment of residential  or  industrial  land.  In 
some cases because the plans they had had run out the developable land and in 
other causes because municipalities did not have a legally binding land-use plan to 
issue building permits. Although only 13% of the municipalities answered that to 
zone  industrial  land  was  one  of  the  main  triggers  of  the  plan,  around  60% 
answered later that to zone residential land was one of the main goals of the plan.
All  non-adopters were asked why they did not adopt the LOUGA. The 
answers are related to the simply “no need” of plan (around 55 %), because some 
of the municipalities do have already a quite modern plan or because they are very 
remote  municipalities  that  do  not  issue  building  permits.  Around  20  %  of 
municipalities mentioned as the main reason that to make a plan is too costly (they 
curiously omitted the fact that the regional government paid the expenditures of 
plan-making).  Around  20 % of  the  municipalities  suggested  that  to  adapt  the 
LOUGA would mean to reduce the endowment of developable land that  their 
current plans zone as developable, something that these municipalities seem to be 
unwilling to accept. 
The  detailed  sources  of  change  and  continuity  for  all  municipalities 
according with the typology of sources explained in the introduction are presented 
below.
5.1 Sources of change
5.1.1. Sources of endogenous change
Legitimacy that undermines functional efficiency. Are the cost of urban sprawl a  
reason for change?
The problems of costs associated to over-planning and urban sprawl have 
been  recently  studied  in  Spain  (Hortas-Rico  and  Solé-Ollé,  2010),  as  well  in 
Galicia (Prada Blanco, 2008). In both cases, urban sprawl increases the the costs 
of municipal service delivery. It has been pointed out by a few economists that 
localities may adopt land regulations,  in particular regulations related to urban 
containment  when  the  costs  for  municipal  delivery  begin  to  rise,  aiming  at 
preserving open spaces  (Fischel,  1978).  Therefore,  the question made to  local 
planners was the following: Did the municipality adopt the plan to contain the 
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costs of providing municipal services like sewerage, water, public light, etc.? The 
results indicate that there is not a single municipality that adopted the LOUGA 
aiming at containing these costs. Several local planners suggested that the major 
of the municipality is far away of having a such idea in mind when (s)he came up 
with the idea of making a plan. In the case of non-adopters, all local planners 
suggested that a new land-use plan adapted to the LOUGA would not contain the 
costs of municipal services. Even more, most of the municipalities did not think 
that they have a problem with municipal costs, though many of them complain 
due to lack of resources to pay them. Municipalities consider rather they have a 
problem  with  revenues  rather  than  with  costs.  In  the  answers  there  are  not 
differences between those municipalities that loose population and those that are 
gaining population.
Adaptation that undermines adaptability. Is the need of new mode of governance  
the reasons of change?
A new mode of governance based on negotiations, collaboration, citizens' 
participation and partnerships are regarded  as a factor enhancing the adoption of 
plans  in  general  and  of  land-use  planning  in  particular  in  a  world  where 
conflicting interests  emerge and the government seems unable to satisfy all  of 
them (Healey, 1996; 1997). This hypothesis was checked in the municipalities that 
adopted a land-use plan according to the LOUGA. The local planners of these 
municipalities were asked if the the municipality had carried out negotiations or 
participatory processes with the citizens. Concretely, the question was: Did the 
municipality negotiate with the citizens about certain areas of the municipality 
should be protected or developed in the plan? Most of the municipalities answered 
negatively to this question. A few of them suggested, however, that the plan was 
explained to the citizens in order to, on one hand, make it more clear and gain 
support for it and, and on the other hand, to make aware the citizens that the they 
could  appeal  to  the  plan  if  the  did  not  agree  with  proposal.  This  form  of 
participation, that we call consultation, is the dominant form of participation in the 
municipalities,  and as it  has been suggested by Arstein (1969), it  is the fourth 
degree of participation in a scale with 8 degrees. At this level of participation 
citizens,  although heard,  lack  the  power  to  insure  that  their  views  will  be  he 
heeded  by  the  municipality.  The  standard  practice  in  Galicia  with  regard  to 
participation in planning is not very different from other places. Plans are made by 
a  team of  planners  hired  by  the  municipality,  being  the  local  authorities  who 
proposed this team the desired land-uses.
However, four municipalities municipalities were much more involved in a 
participatory process with the citizens when they wanted to zone industrial land 
uses. In these cases municipalities used to talk with the land-owners, or there are 
the landowners by themselves who started the negotiation to zone industrial land-
uses.  As we will  see later,  this  is  one of the main reasons why municipalities 
decided  to  adopt  the  LOUGA.  In  these  cases,  participations  resembles  a 
partnership  (the  sixth  level  of  participation  in  the  Arnstein  (1969)  ladder  of 
participation) between the municipality and the land-owners that enables them to 
negotiate end engage in trade-offs. These negotiation cannot be avoided since to 
zone land for industrial uses (unlike for residential uses) involves a change in the 
landownership in the case that landowners are not the entrepreneurs.21
21 Notice that landowner of land zoned as residential have the option (actually, it is what the land-
use act expects) that they become developers of their plots of land. In the case of industrial  
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In general, it can be said that in the municipalities that did adopt LOUGA 
there  is  a  participation  level  of  consultation.  However,  in  a  few  cases, 
municipalities are forced to engage in a higher level of participation— partnership
— when it comes to zone land for industrial land-uses.
5.1.2. Sources of exogenous change
Intra-institutional conformity that creates inter-institutional. Are conflicts among 
different administration levels a source for change?
All local planners were asked if there were conflicts among the municipality and 
other  political  levels  (province,  regional  government)  that  triggered  the  the 
adoption of LOUGA in the case of adopter, or that might trigger the adoption of 
LOUGA in the case of non-adopters. Local planners did not remember that any of 
these events occurred, and therefore they said that they did not have anything to 
do with the plan-making.
In the case  of  non-adopters,  the  pattern is  the  same.  All  municipalities 
answered  that  they  do  not  observe  any  ongoing  conflict  that  makes  the 
municipality  considering  an  adoption  of  the  LOUGA.  Only  one  municipality 
mentioned a conflict (a claim on the municipal boundaries with the neighbouring 
municipality), but it was not regarded as a reason for making a land-use plan.
Divergent interests 
Is the municipal aim of collecting more taxes a reason for change?
As  said  in  the  introduction,  municipalities  may  be  very  interested  in 
making a new land-use plan since plans basically divide the municipal territory 
between non developable and developable areas by taking from some land-owners 
development rights and by giving to other landowners development rights. This 
division has a considerable fiscal implication –even if landowners do no exercise 
their  development  rights  by  developing  their  plots—,  since  landowners  that 
receive development rights pay more taxes for two main reasons: 1) Tax rates are 
higher  for  developable  plots  (between  0,4  and  1,30%,  whereas  for  non 
developable areas the tax rate should be among 0,3 and 0,9%. It is important to 
mention that municipalities have discretionary power to set up a tax rate, but only 
between these limits);  2) The cadastral  value (property value) of plots  located 
within developable areas is considerable higher than the cadastral values of plots 
located in non developable areas. 
We  will  call  to  the  revenue  coming  from  property  taxes  “ordinary 
revenue”, since each landowner pays it every year, and rates and cadastral values 
do not change very often, so it is a high constant revenue. Other taxes are more 
related to the process of urbanization than the classification of land itself  (see 
Cabasés Hita et al., (2011; p.18) for a more detailed explanation of the types of 
taxes),  like  for  instance  building  permit  tax,  cash-in-lie  of  land,  fees  on 
developers,  fees on residents,  land-transaction tax,  etc.  We call  these revenues 
“extraordinary  revenues”  since  they  occur  only  when  one  development  takes 
place.
In Spain two thirds of municipality's own revenues are derived from taxes, 
both  extraordinary  and  ordinary  (the  rest  are  grants  from  the  Spanish  state). 
Traditionally,  the most important tax was the property tax,  which accounts for 
land, this is not the case, and that is the reason why municipalities have to become much more  
active in negotiating the acquisition of land with the landowners.
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around 15% of the total of revenues. However, urban development resulting from 
the  real  estate  boom has  provided municipal  governments  with  large  sums of 
extraordinary revenues (those related only to the building activity in itself) that 
have been increasing to sum around 15% of the municipal budget (see Teré Perez, 
2010). In total, municipalities during the years of high urban growth could collect 
(ordinary  and  extraordinary  revenues  together)  around  30%  of  the  municipal 
budget. 
However,  recent  research  has  shown  that  municipalities  increased 
dramatically the extraordinary revenues related to building activity, whereas the 
ordinary revenues remained quite stable over the last years. In addition it has been 
shown that municipalities did not save these revenues, they have been used it as 
an “extra” source of money to  finance more municipal services (Solé-Ollé and 
Viladecans-Marsal,  2011).  Municipalities  in  Galicia,  it  was  argued,  were  not 
different from the rest of Spain and trying to capture these revenues, engaged very 
often in urban over-planning by being very loose in restricting urban development 
(Rodríguez González, 2008). Yet the results may play down the importance of this 
variable when a municipality decides to adopt or not the act. The next section 
shows the results of the interviews both for adopters and non adopters.
Adopters
The  LOUGA passed  in  2002  is  an  act  that  considerably  restricts  land 
development.  It  is  however  important  to mention that  municipalities that  have 
adopted  the  LOUGA did not  have a  land-use plan or  this  was very outdated. 
Under  these  circumstances,  to  issue  building  permits  became  much  more 
complicated, for it is the regional government who has to approve each building 
permit application, lasting the process several months. In this way, an incentive to 
adopt the LOUGA might have been the possibility to enjoy new revenue sources.
The 31 municipalities that adopted the LOUGA were asked about this. The 
questions  was:  “do  you  think  that  the  land-use  plan  was  approved  to  mainly 
increase the amount of revenue via taxes, building permits, etc.?”. Around 68 % 
of the municipalities answered that to increase the revenue sources was not the 
main reason to adopt the adopt the act. A few of them recognized that that it was 
maybe a reason, but not at all one of the most important reasons to adopt the act. 
The  rest  of  municipalities  (32%)  answered  positively  to  the  question. 
Although they considered  the  growth that  the  plan  might  bring  as  positive  to 
increase the revenues associated to building activity. Indeed, some of them realize 
that after approved the plan more building permits were issued. It is important to 
mention  that  that  the  higher  number  of  municipalities  that  considerer  the 
possibility to increase the revenues associated to building activity as a reason for 
adopting the act find themselves in the the most urban municipalities. Most part of 
municipalities of the cluster 3, the cluster where the number of municipalities that 
are  adopters  of  LOUGA is  higher,  consider  that  that  to  increase  the  revenue 
sources  was  not  a  reasons  to  adopt  the  act  (around  70% of  municipalities  of 
cluster 3 answered this). 
It  is  important to mention that most municipalities that adopted the act 
(those belonging to the cluster 3) are quite rural and did not have a previous land-
use plan or this was very obsolete. It could be argued that they do not see in the 
building  activity  a  growing  sector  that  can  create  a  revenue  source  for  the 
municipality. In fact, 87% of the municipalities that adopted the LOUGA lost on 
average 13% of inhabitants between 2001 and 2010 (see table 14). However, the 
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two big cities that adopted the act did maintain their populations levels during 
2000-2010. Population increased mostly in peripheral municipalities near to big 
cities and embedded in metropolitan areas.
There are only two peripheral municipality that adopted the LOUGA. In 
both of them  the population increased around 24 % respectively (only 3% of the 
Galician  municipalities  experienced  a  higher  increased  than  this).  In  these 
municipalities developable land run out (in one of them the residential and in the 
other one the industrial  land) and a new plan adapted to the act was made to 
convert more rural land to urban. In one of these municipalities, the answer to the 
questions given by the local planner was: “the plan is like the goose that laid the 
golden egg, since it  makes possible to develop more land and consequently it 
provided the municipality with more financial resources to pay for all services that 
the municipality offers to the citizens”. 
Non-adopters
Most  of  municipalities  that  did  not  adopt  the  LOUGA had  already  a 
previous land use plan in compliance with the previous land-use act of 1997. Only 
four of them do not have any land-use plan at all. 
Under  the  land-use  act  of  1997,  the  criteria  to  convert  urban  land  to 
developable land were more flexible. In this way, municipalities with these plans 
use to have large endowments of developable land. To adopt a new act would 
mean reducing the amount of developable land. The question made was however 
the same that for the municipalities that adopted the act, that is, if they consider 
that  a  new land-use  plan  adopted  the  new act  could  provide  them with  more 
revenue sources. All of them answered no. Some of them argued that under the 
new act or under the current land-use plan, the amount of issued building permits 
would  be  similar.  However,  one  municipality  that  experienced  the  most 
remarkably urban growth in the last years answered that the adoption of LOUGA 
would  imply  reducing  the  availability  of  developable  land,  for  the  new  act 
restricts much more urban land uses. This could cause,  the local planner argued, 
controversies among people that have been paying high property taxes (the extant 
plan classifies their properties as developable). Municipalities consider that these 
landowners could be very upset if, after have being paying high property taxes 
during several years, a new plan takes away their development rights. Another 
municipality answered the same, but instead of considering that a more restrictive 
land-use plan would upset people, the reason relied rather on the reduction of the 
revenues  coming  from  property  taxes.  A more  restrictive  land-use  plan,  the 
planner argued, would reduce the amount of plots with development rights and 
therefore the municipality would collect less property taxes.
In  previous  research  it  has  been  shown  that  municipalities  that  have 
adopted LOUGA, which are quite rural, have on average low property tax rates 
compared with  other  more  urban municipalities  (Tubío-Sánchez and Crecente-
Maseda, 2012). In general, Galician municipalities have lower property tax rates 
compared with the rest of Spanish municipalities (Corbacho, 2008). This seems to 
indicate  that  municipalities  are  not  interested  in  collecting  taxes.  To  better 
understand  the  reasons  behind  this  municipal  behaviour,  the  each  municipal 
planner was asked: 1) if the municipality had adopted the plan to increase the land 
values and in this way to increase the ordinary revenues; 2) if they have carried 
out  a  cadastral  evaluation  of  land  values  after  having  approved  the  plan22. 
22 Article 28 of the Legislative Royal Decree 1/2004, which ratifies the text of the Law of Real  
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Surprisingly, most of local planners answered that they do not see any relationship 
between the land-use plan and the change of cadastral values. Apparently, they did 
not know that the municipality could request an evaluation of cadastral values 
after having approved the plan, and that this of course would affect land values 
and  therefore  the  revenues  coming  from  property  taxes.  The  common  belief 
among local planners was that this evaluation is made by the General Directorate 
of Cadastre every ten years, and that the municipality cannot start the cadastral 
evaluation  motu propio. Therefore, the planners do not believe that reasons for 
adopting the act rely on the the search for more property tax revenues. The answer 
to the second questions tells us that 16% of the municipalities started a cadastral 
evaluation  some  time  later  after  having  approved  the  plan.  However,  in 
accordance with the answers to  the first question, municipalities did it in most 
cases at  the request of the General Directorate of Cadastre.  It  is interesting to 
mention here that one  municipality said explicitly that the cadastral  evaluation 
was not carried out because “the [current] major wants to win the next municipal 
elections”. If we combine these two answers (several municipalities that do not 
know the fiscal consequences of a plan and some municipalities saying explicitly 
that to avoid to upset people due to an increase in property taxes was the main 
reason  for  not  having  done  the  cadastral  evaluation),  we  could  conclude  that 
municipalities are not interested in the ordinary revenues coming from property 
taxes  because  to  set  up  these  taxes  has  a  high  political  costs  for  the  local 
authorities. However, this does not mean that they are not interested in collecting 
non-ordinary revenues coming from the building activity.
Four municipalities that did not adopt the act do not have any land-use 
plan.  These  municipalities  are  located  in  very  remote  and mountainous  areas. 
They do not issue almost any building permit, and in two cases they do not have 
the  infrastructure  to  collect  taxes.  Taxes  are  collected  by  an  organization  at 
provincial  level,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year  this  revenue  is  sent  to  the 
municipality). They do not hire a municipal planner and simple consider that they 
do not need a plan because there is not growth at all and they do not expect that it 
in the future.
As conclusion, we have observed that most of the municipalities that have 
adopted the plan and were not growing answered that the main reason to approve 
the plan was not related to  the search of extraordinary revenues  coming from 
building activity. However, research has shown that these municipalities use to 
propose plans with more developable land than they growth rates can fulfill. How 
can this paradox be understood? There are two possibilities to explain this. The 
first one would assume that these municipalities do not actually consider a real 
possibility that they can enjoy extraordinary revenues from the building activity 
(with a declining population, building permits are rarely issued. However, they do 
not want to eliminate this possibility by promoting a generous plan in terms of 
developable land.  The other  possibility  that  could  explain  their  “development-
oriented” plans is that local authorities do not want to take development rights of 
landowners due to political costs that this could cause. Probably (as we will see 
later when we examine the reasons for resistance to adopt the plans) municipal 
behaviour is due to a combination of both.
In the few municipalities that have adopted LOUGA and that experienced 
a rapid urban growth, one of the reasons for adoption the LOUGA has been the 
State Cadastre,  envisages the possibility that  local  governments request  assessed evaluation of  
property values if a land-use plan that changes cadastral values is approved.
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possibility  to  obtain  ordinary  and  non-ordinary  revenues  from  the  building 
activity. The plan was used not to restrict development, but rather to promote it.
In both cases the interviews suggest that the low interest in increasing the 
ordinary revenues (property taxes) is due mostly to the political costs that this 
increase  may  mean  when  going  for  the  next  municipal  elections.  Spanish 
municipalities in general, and Galician municipalities in particular, used to have 
an endemic budgetary shortfall. Between two options to improve their budgets (to 
increase  ordinary  revenues  or  to  allow  for  more  development  to  increase 
extraordinary revenues), municipalities have chosen the one that had less political 
costs for them.
With regard to the municipalities that did not adopt the act, we clearly can 
suggest that their current land-use plan provides them with more extraordinary 
and ordinary revenues than a plan made in compliance with the new act. In some 
of these municipalities the urban growth has been so high that the municipality 
actually would like to restrict it. But again, the potential political costs of taking 
away development rights from landowners who have been paying high property 
taxes for several years, prevent them from starting the plan-making.
Are  conflicts  among  landowners  due  to  incompatible  land  uses  a  reason  for  
change?
With  regard  to  conflicts,  no  municipality  that  adopted  the  LOUGA 
considered that there was any conflict that triggered the making of the plan. Local 
planners were asked if there were conflicts  among citizens due to conflicting land 
uses, or if  natural hazards occurred and if  any of these cases the municipality 
though that a land-use plan was a way to solve conflicts or to prevent them to 
occur. Local planners did not remember that any of these events occurred, and 
therefore they said that they did not have anything to do with the plan-making. In 
the case of non-adopters, they do not experience any conflict that could trigger the 
adoption of LOUGA
As conclusion it can be said that conflicts did not play a main role in the 
adoption of LOUGA. However, we should not minimize the role of conflicts. In 
one of the case studies it was found that conflicts emerging from incompatible 
land-uses were one of the reasons that led the major to adopt a plan. Probably, it 
was not the most important reason, but it should not be underestimated.
Is it the goal of providing legal security a reason for change?
A land-use  plan  gives  land  use  rights  to  citizens  or  takes  from them. 
Knowing the exact land rights that everyone has enhances investments, since it 
reduces  uncertainty  about  conflicting  uses  that  can  emerge  in  the  future 
(Needham,  2007).  Therefore,  a  land-use  plan  adapted  to  the  extant  act  may 
facilitate  that  citizens  decide  to  buy  a  house  or  to  install  factories  in  given 
locations, because they are sure that certain incompatible uses with that activity 
will not be implemented. 
To know if  this  was  a  reason  for  the  Galician  municipalities  to  adopt 
LOUGA (remember that the half of the municipalities did not have a land-use 
plan, and the other half had a very obsolete land-use plan), the question made to 
them was:  was one of the reasons to adopt the plan the willingness to offer a 
greater legal security?
When  answering  this  question,  four  municipalities  suggested  that  to 
provide legal security was not the reason for adopting the plan. Aside from  the 
fact that some of there considered that it is a positive consequence of adopting it, 
it was not a reason for adopting it. However, the rest of municipalities considered 
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that  providing  legal  security,  although  not  explicitly  mentioned,  implicitly 
triggered the adoption of the plan. Nevertheless, it is important to say that most of 
local  planners  interpreted  the  concept  of  legal  security  as  legal  security  with 
regard to their decisions about building permit issuing, rather than with regard to 
providing legal security to certain citizens' investment. In addition, local planners 
were asked if citizens were demanding a plan to have more legal security in their 
properties.  All  planners  answered that  none demanded this.  This  suggests  that 
legal security was not a citizens' demand, and that it its contribution to adopting 
the LOUGA was more related to securing the decision-making of planners when 
issuing building permits.
Was the zoning of industrial uses a reasons for change?
Since LOUGA prohibits industrial land uses if there is not plan that zones 
land with that use, one of the reasons to adopt the act could have been to zone 
industrial land. As said above, to zone land as industrial have several different 
consequences for the municipality and landowner than other types of uses. All 
Galician land-use acts copied the regulations to zone residential land from the the 
Spanish act of 1956. In this act it was assumed that the landowner would be the 
developer of his own parcels. Assembling land parcels for residential development 
relies heavily on the private landowners' initiative; the municipality remains very 
passive with respect to this. However, in the case of industrial land is different. In 
this case landowners are not supposed to be developers of their plots of land. This 
is because to service industrial land is expensive and land prices use to be low 
compared with residential  uses.  Under this  context,  the municipality has to be 
involved in the search of industrial land, very often pressed by local entrepreneurs 
who want to establish their firms in the locality.
Results  of  the  interviews  suggest  that  in  around  in  60%  of  the 
municipalities that adopted LOUGA, the search for industrial land was one of the 
major triggers to make the plan. In particular, this trigger becomes more important 
in those municipalities that are more rural . More urban municipalities or peri-
urban  municipalities  tried  to  enlarge  industrial  land  under  LOUGA,  but  they 
pointed out that this was not the main reason for adopting the plan.
With regard to the non-adopter municipalities, the search of industrial land 
is  a  priority  in  25%  of  the  cases,  and  only  in  municipalities  with  growing 
population. However, instead of being a trigger for making a new land-use plan, 
these municipalities are modifying their current land-use plans to zone more land 
as  industrial  land.  In  fact,  three  municipalities  (20%)  were  doing  this.  They 
regarded their land-use plans as useful, they only need to update the amount of 
land for industrial uses.
Despite all efforts made by the municipalities to negotiate with landowners 
to find land as suitable for development (sometimes buys the municipality the 
land, other times they just zone the land), all these industrial areas are not being 
developed, for the costs of servicing the land are so expensive that municipalities 
(or  landowners)  cannot  afford  them.  When  they  are  developed,  it  is  mostly 
because land development is carried out by regional (Instituto Galego de Vivenda 
e Solo) or provincial agencies (Xestures).
To  sum  up,  it  can  be  said  that  to  zone  industrial  land  (together  with 
possibility to issue building permits) is one of the main triggers to adopt LOUGA, 
in order to zone more residential and industrial land (notice that the adopters did 
not have a land-use plan or it was very outdated). In the case of non-adopters, this 
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problem is solved by a modification of their current plans.
Were the environmental goals a source for adopters?
All  municipalities  were asked if  they  have  adopted  LOUGA to  protect 
certain areas of the municipality from environmental treats. All adopters answered 
that this was not a a reason for adopting LOUGA. Only one of them mentioned 
that the municipality protected an area with plan,  but it  was only to prevent a 
conflict. A a company dedicated to the extraction of aggregates wanted to move to 
that area, something that the neighboors were not willing to accept.
This  shows  that  municipalities  do  not  use  land-use  plans  with  an 
environmentalist perspective. To adopt a plan in compliance with LOUGA means 
that  municipalities  have  to  identify  all  their  historical  heritage,  the  best 
agricultural  land,  etc.  and  to  protect  them.  But  this  is  not  something  that 
municipalities do because they are willing to do it, they do it because the LOUGA 
forces to do it if they want to have plan that allows the to issue building permits. 
Municipalities do not primarily protect areas  with land-use plans. Municipalities 
use other regulatory tools to protect heritage sites, that offer more security. These 
tools include natural parks (regional and national level of protection), the network 
Natura 2000 (European level of protection) or Natural Monuments (world level of 
protection). For instance, one municipality answered that they would never use a 
land-use plan to protect a certain area, since this can always be changed. In this 
case,  the  local  authorities  were  interested  in  protecting  the  coast  area  of  the 
municipality and for this they used the Natural Monument, which is much more 
difficult to change.
In  the  case  of  non-adopters,  only  one  municipality  answered  that  the 
environmental reasons that could trigger the plan would be to protect certain areas 
of the municipality from wind farms (the municipality has the highest number of 
wind  farms  in  Galicia),  something  that  the  municipalities  starts  regarding  as 
threatening  to  preserve  the  environmental  values.  However,  the  authorities 
recognize that wind farms represent their major revenue source.
5.2. Reasons of resistance or continuity 
Because of its  complexity,  the administrative procedure of plan-making 
should be considered as a reason for resistance.  The plan-making is a laborious 
process for two main reasons. The first reasons has to do with the fact that plan-
making requires six steps to be completed, including two public exhibitions of the 
plan. In these public exhibitions, the general public can make amendments to the 
plan, which eventually may lead the planners to reformulate many parts of the 
plan.  Although  plans  are  made  by  a  planners'  team in  collaboration  with  the 
municipality, it  is the regional government who gives the final approval to the 
plans after checking that plans meet all the requirements of LOUGA. The regional 
government pays attention to the amount of land that municipalities convert from 
rural to urban use as well as the reasons that the municipalities provide to justify 
their growth need. Moreover, the plan has to obtain the approval of several public 
bodies which have their own laws, for instance legislation related to water and 
coastal areas, public infrastructure, cultural heritage, etc. In the worst of the cases 
–  a  municipality  on the  coast,  with  harbors,  airports,  etc.  –  around 15 public 
bodies have to give the approval to the plan. In addition, during the plan-making, 
local elections may take place (the average age for making a plan under LOUGA 
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is 7  years, that means that most of municipalities need more than one term in 
office), and newly elected local authorities may disagree with the planning goals 
of the previous government. 
The  second reason for delays in the plan-making has to do primarily with 
the instability of LOUGA. The act has undergone 7 changes (3 major and 4 minor 
changes) in 9 years. This means that municipalities have reformulated parts of the 
plans – and sometimes practically the whole plan – to be in compliance with the 
new changes.  
To better understand what were the real reasons for delay that may prevent 
municipalities from adopting the plan or that delayed the plan-making in those 
that adopted LOUGA, we asked each municipal planner which reason was the 
most important for the delay of the plan-making (for adopters) or that may be 
preventing the plan-making (for non-adopters). The option they had were: 1) the 
planners'  team  (for  adopters),  2)  the  municipality's  unjustifiable  growth 
expectations  (for  adopters),  3)  administrative  procedures  or,  changes  in  the 
legislation (for both).
In terms of legislation what factors are preventing municipalities from adopting  
LOUGA?
For adopters, the most part of municipalities (44%) suggested the approval 
of the many sectorial bodies of the public administration was the main reason for 
delay.  Local  planners  mentioned the  plan proposed by the  municipality  which 
contained an unjustifiable population  growth as the second main reason (18%). 
One of the local planners suggested “there is a continuous tension between what 
municipalities  want  and  what  the  regional  government  wants”.  The  regional 
government  wants  municipalities  to  recognize  the  real  trends  of  population 
growth,  while  municipalities  want  to  project  unrealistic  high  growths.  Around 
11% of municipalities pointed out the planners teams were responsible for delays 
because they did not use to meet the deadlines. Only 7% mentioned the legal 
changes as one of the main reasons of delay. 
However,  in  the case of non-adopters,  the reason they identified as the 
most important (in almost 80% of the municipalities) was the continuous change 
of  the  land  planning  legislation.  This  prevents  them  from  adapting  because, 
according to many answers that the planners gave, “what is the use of adapting if 
within a couple of years your plan becomes obsolete in legal terms?”. 
Are the lack of resources to manage the plan preventing municipalities  
from adapting  LOUGA?
A few Galician  scholars  have  pointed  out  that  municipalities  may  not 
adopt  plans  because  they  do not  have  resources  to  make them or  human and 
financial  resources  to  manage  them (González-Cebrián  y  Tello,  1980;  García-
Vidal,  2002).  And  this  seems  to  be  true  since  all  municipalities  that  adopted 
LOUGA, except two, said that they would have many difficulties to finance the 
land-use plan. In most of the cases, local planners said that if the municipalities 
had  a  budget  to  finance  the  land-use  plan  at  their  own expenses,  they  would 
probably dedicate these financial resources to other expenses rather than to the 
plan. However, what it is interesting is that almost all local planners (both in the 
adopter and in the non-adopter municipalities) consider that municipalities have 
enough resources to manage the current land-use plan. Only in two cases, planners 
answered that they do not have enough human and economic resources to manage 
the plan. This seems to be in contradiction with the hypothesis of the Association 
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of Architects, which believe that the lack of land-use planning is due to the lack of 
resources of municipalities, both lack of human resources (many architects are 
working part time) or financial resources (García Vidal, 2002).
Are people's relationships (both cultural and economic) to property preventing  
municipalities from adopting LOUGA?
Around 64% of the non-adopters answered that people would show resistance if 
the municipality would want to make a land-use plan, and therefore to change 
their property rights. This would probably prevent municipalities from adopting, 
but  notice  that  these municipalities  do not  find  any reason to adopt  LOUGA. 
Around 21% answered that  people would show resistance,  but  this  would not 
prevent  the  municipality  from  adopting  to  the  LOUGA.  Only  14%  of  the 
municipalities  answered that they do not consider that people would show any 
resistance.  Curiously,  all  municipalities  that  answer  this  are  located  in 
mountainous areas, whereas municipalities that answered that people would show 
resistance are mostly located in peri-urban areas. This suggests that more than a 
cultural factor (like ideology of property), what really causes people to resist the 
adoption  of  plan  is  the  possibility  that  the  plan  reduces  the  value  of  their 
properties. This is more likely to occur in the urbanized municipalities than in 
very remote municipalities of the mountains.
In the case of adopters, only two municipalities mentioned that landowners 
showed resistance. In the rest of the cases the resistance was not remarkable. 
6. Conclusions
This paper provides insights about the type of institutional change and the 
sources  of  institutional  change  with  the  adoption  of  LOUGA  by  Galician 
municipalities.  This  paper  shows  that  all  municipalities  that  adopted  LOUGA 
either did not have a land-use plan (the half of them) or the one they had was very 
obsolete,on average 15 years old when LOUGA was passed in 2002, therefore a 
plan in compliance with the LOUGA was somehow a radical departure from their 
daily planning activities. 
In fact, the main reason that led municipalities to adopt LOUGA was the 
municipal goal of converting agricultural land into developable land, either for 
residential o industrial uses. In many cases the approval of the plan was delayed 
because there is a conflict between the growth expectation of the municipalities 
and the regional government's goal of growth control. This confirms the results of 
previous research . In the case of non-adopters, the resistance to adopt LOUGA is 
due to three main factors. First, most of them do not see any need in adopting 
LOUGA. If they had – as some of them does have – a need of making a land-use 
plan,  most  municipalities  acknowledge  that  citizens  would  show  resistance, 
particularly in the more urban municipalities. To adopt LOUGA would mean to 
make a plan with a shorter endowment of developable land. In addition to this 
reason,  municipalities  pointed  out  that  the  continuous  change  in  the  planning 
legislation prevents them from adapting to LOUGA.
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Chapter 6: Poisoning the mother-in-law. Four case 
studies on land-use conflicts,  externalities and 
planning
Abstract
Land-use planning is considered a rearrangement of property rights. But what are the 
reasons  for  this  rearrangement?  Why do societies  change the  bundle  of  property 
rights of their individuals? The most frequent reason given in the literature is that  
societies  rearrange  property  rights  to  deal  with  externalities.  A  definition  of 
externalities has been a contested issue in the literature. The aim of this paper is to 
clarify and set up a definition of externalities. Then, in the light of that definition, we 
want to understand the role that  externalities may have played in the adoption of 
land-use  plans  by  four  local  authorities  that  have  been  carefully  selected. 
Furthermore, the role of local authorities as an actor that has its own interests that are 
not  always  coincident  with  the  voters'  interests,  as  commonly  assumed  in  the 
literature, is explored and included in the discussion. The main conclusion of this 
paper is that a classical concept of externalities is of little value to understand the 
behaviour of local authorities with regard to land-use planning
Key words: Externalities, land-use planning, planning implementation
1. Introduction 
Galicia is a region of Northwest of Spain with a short tradition in land-use 
planning. In 2002 the region passed a planning act aiming at controlling the urban 
sprawl  in  rural  areas.  However,  the  act  yields,  after  10  years,  a  low level  of 
implementation. Until 2011, only 10 % of the Galician municipalities decided to 
make a plan in compliance with the act. We undertook four cases studies of four 
municipalities (two adopters of the act and two non adopters) to explore the role 
of externalities in the adoption or not of the act.
Jacobs and Paulsen (2009) argue that land-use planning is fundamentally 
about  the  allocation,  distribution,  and  alteration  of  property  rights.  The  most 
recurrent reason for this rearrangement given by the economic literature has been 
the market failure argument. A market failure occurs when individuals' pursuit of 
pure self-interest leads to results that are not efficient and therefore that can be 
improved  upon  from the  social  point  of  view.  The  negative  social  effects  of 
market failures are called externalities.
The definition of  externalities was a contested debate in the 1960s and 
1970s, particularly in the economic literature analysing the market failure, though 
in the last decades this debate was  fading away (Lagueux, 2010). However, in the 
planning literature, and despite the  emergence of collaborative planning as new 
way of handling conflicts differently from the regulation of land use rights by the 
government  (Healey,  1998),  the  concept  of  externality  is  still  very  lively, 
especially in the literature in the interface between economics and law.
Within this literature, one of the main reasons why societies develop land 
policies  is  to  tackle  externalities (Pogodzinski  and  Sass,  1990;  Chung,  1994; 
Needham, 2006:58; van der Krabben, 2009). In the seminal work by Klosterman 
(1985), “Reasons for and against planning”, all reasons for planning are related to 
the  negative  effects  of  externalities.  This  explanation  of  planning  is  in  the 
subconscious of all planners, and it is usually expressed as the conflict among the 
public interest versus the private interest. However, planners refer to this conflict 
or divergence in a very imprecise way. Planners are not to be very familiar with 
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many of the concepts used in the theory of externalities. Sorensen (1994:201-202) 
observed that "our ability to define and measure externalities is severely limited, 
yet and entire professional edifice has been erected on these flimsy foundations". 
These “flimsy foundations” hampers the understanding of key areas for planners, 
like  planning  implementation  and  the  question  why  societies  develop  land 
policies. The implementation of planning tends to be answered with normative 
statement  such as  the  reduction  of  the  divergence  between public  and private 
interest. This does not tell us much about what is going on in the real world.
From an institutional point of view a land-use plan is a set of institutions 
that  regulate  behaviour  of  landowners  and land  users.  Within  the  institutional 
literature,  the so called rational choice institutionalism, as defined by Hall and 
Taylor (1996) seems to be the approach that has a more clear answer about why 
societies regulate land-uses.  The question of why society chooses to adopt the 
institutions of government regulation of land uses has been addressed within this 
paradigm (Lai, 1997; Chung, 1994).
The main aim of this paper is to understand if the theory of externalities 
and social choice is useful to shed light on outcomes in four municipalities that 
have been carefully selected. The paper is organized into four main sections. In 
section  two  we  discuss  briefly  the  concept  of  externalities  as  well  as  the 
relationship that authoritative agents (parliaments or courts) have with regard to 
externalities. In section three we present the four case studies and in the fourth 
section, we discuss the outcomes of the case studies in the light of the conceptual 
framework of the first section. The last section consists of a set of concluding 
remarks.
2. The concept of externalities and the role of authoritative 
agents
To  better  understand  the  reasons  given  by  the  rational  choice 
institutionalism that may explain the adoption (and non-adoption) of a new land-
use plan in the four case studies, we first explain some ideas about the concept of 
externalities.  The  classical  theoretical  background  discussed  in  rational  choice 
institutionalism is provided mainly by Pigou and Coase. These scholars have had 
a considerable influence in how planning is understood and interpreted nowadays. 
In his work “The economics of Welfare”, Pigou (1920) suggested that the free 
play of self-interest in markets does not lead always to allocative efficiency of 
resources,  and,  therefore,  government  intervention  is  required.  By  allocative 
efficiency of resources it is meant that a market organization that is not Pareto 
efficient, and implies that a certain change in allocation of goods may result in 
some individual made “better-off” with not individual being made worse-off. It is 
commonly accepted that outcomes that are not Pareto efficient are to be avoided, 
and therefore  Pareto  efficiency  has  been an  important  criterion  for  evaluating 
economic systems or public policies. 
In  the  Pigouvian  tradition,  a  land-use  plan  can  be  regarded  as  a 
government  intervention  in  the  housing  or  land  market  when  markets  cannot 
achieve by themselves a competitive equilibrium or Pareto-Optimity, that is to say, 
that the government can do better than the markets does. It is commonly argued 
that Pareto efficiency is not achieved because of the existence of externalities. 
And again, in welfare economics these externalities lead to market failures and 
therefore they are considered to be justification for government intervention, i.e., 
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land-use  planning.  Coase  (1960)  included  a  new  concept  called  “transaction 
costs”. Transaction costs can be defined as “the costs involved in operating the 
various  social  arrangements”  (Coase,  1960)  or,  more  broadly,  as  the  costs  of 
“operating the economic system” (Lai,  1997).  When transaction costs  tends  to 
zero, markets tend to efficiency in terms of Pareto-optimality, for there are not 
barriers to transactions and litigant parties achieve agreement instantly. However, 
the  world  of  economic  transactions  is  full  of  transaction  costs,  and  market 
transactions are almost never frictionless (Buitelaar,  2007).  In this way, public 
policy makers should consider what is the best institutional arrangement in order 
to reduce transaction costs. 
The literature based on Coasian and Pigovian approaches recognize that 
there are externalities and that there are land-use regulations to tackle with these 
externalities. Also both approaches make a set of assumptions related to actors' 
behaviour. The main assumption, and by the way, the most important source of 
externalities rely on the self-interested behaviour of actors, with a well-established 
scale of preferences (Héritier, 2007; Hall and Taylor, 1996). In both approaches it 
also seems quite clear that externalities and the social conflicts are the driving 
force  that  give  shape  to  the  new  institutional  arrangements.  These  new 
arrangement are made in such a way that they provide more efficient outcomes. 
Pigovians  develop  tax  and  subsidies  to  tackle  externalities,  whereas  Coasians 
develop new institutional arrangements that tend to reduce transaction costs. Both 
approaches, however, tend to be equally normative in the planning literature, for 
markets “should” achieve  Pareto optimum to reduce the transaction costs23 . For 
Coasians, if zoning is still popular in our current societies it is because it provides 
a more efficient way to deal with externalities (Lai, 2005; Webster, 1998). 
However,  there  is  a  difference  to  the  two approaches.  In  the  Pigovian 
approach, the market intervention is justified when external effects move from the 
optimal  Pareto-equilibrium to an  inefficient  state.  Despite  this,  nothing is  said 
about  the  nature  of  these  external  effects.  The  Coasian  approach  goes  a  step 
forward  and  understand  externalities  as  a  manifestation  of  the  high  costs  of 
transacting over property rights. Coase (1960) suggests that it is a legal decision to 
decide  if  a  harmful  effect  is  or  not  an  externality,  and according to  him this 
decision should be based on a cost-benefit analysis. 
The Coasian approach, and Transaction Costs Theory based on property 
rights have been quite influential in recent times in trying to explain what kind of 
institutional  arrangements  in  land-use  regulation  can  better  reduce  transaction 
costs (Buitelaar, 2007; Alexander, 2001; Musole, 2009).
 
2.1. The four features in the classical concept of externalities
If societies make plans with the aim of tackling externalities, it seems quite 
obvious that,  to  better  understand the process of institutional  change (i.e.  why 
societies  adopt  new  land-use  regulations)  we  should  answer  first  what  are 
23 Héritier  (2007)  divides  rational  choice  explanation  of  institutional  change  into  functional 
(intentional) approach which views institutions as an efficient and stable solution to a particular 
collective action problems (most historical institutionalist literature could belong to this group) and 
a rational non-intentional evolutionary approach viewing the outcome of institutional change as a 
selection and adjustment process. The first approach influenced authors like Williamson, whereas 
the second one has little influence on explaining institutional change because it would focus more 
on  how  institutions  survive  over  time  rather  than  how  and  why  they  change  (Kingston  and 
Caballero, 2009; Hall and Taylor, 1996)
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externalities,  where  externalities  come  from  and  how  they  are  defined  and 
formalized by societies.
Externalities arise in the work of Pigou (1920) to explain how a market 
transaction can be optimal at the individual level, but not optimal at the social 
level.  This  occurs  because  externalities  are  indirect  effects  of  consumption  or 
production  activity  which  do  not  work  through  the  price  system;  that  is, 
externalities have effects on the utility function of third parties (Laffont, 1987; 
Bator,  1958,  Buchanan  and  Stubblebine,  1962).  Therefore,  the  existence  of 
externalities relies on the inability of price system to account for all costs involved 
in private market transactions. Externalities are thus the by-products of the market 
activity, and we have knowledge about them only when third parties are taken into 
consideration.  As  a  consequence  of  this,  externalities  cause  inefficiencies 
(resources are not allocated efficiently) and thus markets cannot attain a Pareto 
optimality. So, the first characteristic of externalities is that they have effects on 
utility functions of third parties without their having agreed to that and therefore 
they are not compensated.
A second characteristic of externalities is given by Mishan (1971:2) when 
arguing  that  externalities  are  “not  a  deliberate  creation  but  an  unintended  or 
incidental  by-product  of  some  otherwise  legitimate  activity”.  In  the  classical 
example of  the  factory and the  laundry owner,  the  factory does  not  harm the 
laundry  owner  intentionally.  If  the  factory  were  polluting  the  air  to  harm the 
laundry on purpose the laundry oner, we could not call it an externality. Mishan 
illustrates this by saying that if someone gradually poisons his mother-in-law, it is 
affecting the production function of  the former and the consumption function of 
the latter. This would seem to fit the concept of externalities. But Mishan (1969) 
points out that the act of poisoning does not “accord with the popular notion of an 
external effect” (Mishan, 1969:343). So, externalities are unintended.
According to Coase (1960), externalities arise because of high transaction 
costs. But transaction costs may be high for three main reasons in the Coase's 
example of straying cattle that destroy crops on neighboring land. First, because 
the  farmer  and  the  cattle  raiser  have  entitlements  over  land  secured  by  an 
inalienable rule, using the Calabresi and Melamed (1972) terminology. This rule 
can be a zoning plan. If this plan hampers the efficient use of land, we are not 
talking about an externality problem, we are rather talking about a government 
failure, for property rights were badly assigned by the government. However, and 
again drawing on the Calabresi  and Melamed (1972) terminology, entitlements 
over land can be secured by property rules. This is already the case in Coase's 
cattle-crop example. In this case we would face an externality if transaction costs 
are too high (for instance, if it is too costly to quantify the damage). Though one 
can wonder where did the cattle raiser and the farmer obtain their property rights 
from if only there was a market and no government (Canterbery and Marvasti, 
1992;  McChesney,  2006),  we  have,  just  in  order  to  be  logically  coherent,  to 
conclude with Demsetz (1967; 2003) that in the Coase's cattle-crop example, there 
is not an externality. Demsetz's argument is that it is optimal since the potential 
gains in solving the conflict are less than the implied costs.
The  third  source  of  high  transaction  costs  is  the  lack  of  well-defined 
property rights. Furthermore, externalities are external to the market because they 
cannot be traded, and they cannot be trade because there are not property rights 
assigned to them. In this  way externalities use to be defined as “a conflicting 
reciprocal claim over a rival undefined use”,  for when rights  are well  defined 
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“property  rights  could  not  be  enforced  without  violating  a  pre-existing  jural 
correlation  of  rights  and  duties”  (Nicita  and  Rizzolli,  2007:3).  For  instance, 
manure is a product of growing cattle that can have in many cases a negative 
effect on the utility function of third parties. However, as Mishan (1971) suggests, 
these  negative  effects  could  be  internalized  into  the  economy if  a  market  for 
manure comes into being. To create a market  (actors interested in  buying and 
selling) would be required to assign property rights, like in the case of carbon 
emissions  trading.  Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that  having  not  well-defined 
property rights is a feature of externalities. 
Finally, the fourth feature of externalities is that externalities are source of 
conflicts. Even a nuisance fulfills the three features of a negative externality cited 
above,  it  would  be  difficult  to  consider  it  as  a  negative  externality  if  nobody 
complains about it. Since the beginning, the theory of externalities was linked to 
conflicts.  In this  way,  Buchanan and Subblebine (1962:  373)  in an attempt to 
define the notion of externality rigorously and precisely, argue that an externality 
is  “potentially  relevant  [in  terms  of  Pareto  optimality]  when  it  generates  any 
desire on the part of the externally benefited to modify the behaviour of the party 
empowered  to  take  action  through  trade,  persuasion,  compromise,  agreement, 
collective action, etc.”. If an externality continue exerts no such desire is “defined 
as irrelevant” (Buchanan and Subblebine, 1962: 374). Putting together all features 
of negative externalities, they can be defined as follows:
Negative externalities are unintended effects produced in settings of  
weak or undefined  property rights that affect utility functions of third parties,  
leading to conflicting estates of non-Pareto optimality in resource allocation.
2.2. Externalities and authoritative agents
In the classical literature on externalities, there are only two actors. Think 
for instance of the classic example “the laundry owner vs. the smoke factory”. In 
this example there is one emitter and one victim. When the authoritative agents 
(the government or the court) comes to light it is only to decide about the conflict. 
For  the  government,  both  in  the  Pigouvian  and  the  Coasian  tradition,  the 
government should be committed to the social costs of the conflicts. Curiously, 
these traditions never reflect on the costs that making a decision could have for 
the authoritative agent, in  particular when this is elected in democratic elections.
Since the pioneering work of Arrow (1952) “Social choice and individual 
values”, a considerable literature on voting rules and the required conditions for 
efficient  decision-making has been growing,  aiming at  developing models  and 
understanding  which  voting  rule  renders  outcomes  that  are  better  in  terms  of 
Pareto-optimality (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Young, 1995; Özkal-Sanver and 
Sanver, 2006; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2008). All this literature emphasizes the idea 
of  making  decisions  by  aggregating  preferences  of  individuals.  When  a 
government or authoritative agent is mentioned,  this is referred to an instrument 
that represents the aggregate preferences of individuals. Even when some scholars 
suggest that voting externalities could be a new way of tackling externalities that 
differs from the Pigouvian or Coasian tradition, the chosen policies merely present 
the preferences of a majority (Anderson, 2011). It is certainly astonishing that so 
little attention has been paid to the possibility that, once in office, the politician's 
preference may diverge from those of his constituents, and that he may therefore 
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choose policies at variance from his platform. Instead it is simply assumed that 
promises will be kept whether or not such behaviour is congruent with the interest 
of the officeholder (Ferejohn, 1986). Furthermore, most of this literature fails to 
recognize that when governments make decisions they are very concerned with 
the political costs that these decisions may bring to them. Thus, the analysis of 
externalities cannot be reduced in democratic societies to the classical actors, one 
emitter and one victim. First because the victim does not complain to the emitter, 
it rather reports the nuisance to an authoritative agent, and not because it is more 
cheaply  to  do  so  than  a  bargaining  process  as  suggested  by  Priest  and Klein 
(1984),  but  rather  because  the  authoritative  agent  has  the  immediate  power. 
Second,  when authoritative agents are subjected to elections, they may consider 
the political costs of getting involved in the conflict. There are only two options 
for authoritative agents in deciding about a conflict: take the side of the victim and 
consider its claim as reasonable, then the  authoritative agents becomes a victim 
itself. Or take the side of the emitter as more reasonable and do nothing, then the 
authoritative agent becomes the emitter itself. In taking one side or other, there are 
not only political costs, but also power relationships. All this has been neglected 
by the existing literature on social choice and externalities.
3. Four case studies
In the following case studies  we try to  identify conflicts  and therefore 
externalities that might lead municipalities to adopt a land-use plan. For doing 
this, the four case studies consist of two municipalities that adopted a land use 
plan in compliance with the LOUGA and two municipalities municipalities that 
did not adopt LOUGA. Each pair of municipalities is formed by one rural and 
urban municipality (in Chapter 4, these municipalities belong to cluster 3 and 2 
respectively). This allows to understand what are the differences between the kind 
of externalities that might be leading municipalities to adopt LOUGA.
The case studies are based mainly on semi-structure interviews with local 
authorities,  planners,   NGO organizations,  developers,  farmers and some other 
relevant  actors.  Relevant  information  has  also  been found in  reviews  of  local 
newspapers  and the  plans  in  force  in  each municipality.  The aim of  the  case 
studies is twofold. First we want to understand the relationship between a classical 
definition of externalities and the plausible adoption of a land-use plan to tackle 
them. Second, we want to analyse how the final decision of making a land-use 
plan has been influenced by the political costs of making the decision.
3.1. Oleiros: an urban adopter
Oleiros  is  an  urban  municipality  known  in  Galicia  by  its  residential 
character  and  low density  development.  Most  part  of  its  population  commute 
everyday  to  work  in  near  cities  like  A Coruña  and  surroundings.  It  is  the 
municipality of Galicia with the highest rent per capita (several of the richest men 
of Spain live in Oleiros) as well as the municipality with the highest proportion of 
inhabitants  with  an  university  degree.  In  Galicia,  Oleiros  is  known  for  the 
amazing quality of its land-use planning.
Oleiros is governed since 1987 by a local political party, without regional 
representation, called Alternativa dos Veciños (Neigbors' Alternative). It is one of 
the few political parties that has a vote system based on open lists. Voters are able 
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to vote for any of the candidates on the list, giving to the voters some say over the 
order of the list  and thus  which candidates get elected.  This culture of citizen 
participation is also reflected in the making of participatory budgets. All this has 
contributed to make Oleiros the municipality of Galicia with the highest rate of 
public spaces and social services.
Oleiros was the first municipality in Galicia that made a land-use plan after 
the Spanish dictatorship, concretely in the year 1984. Since them, only two more 
plans  were made,  but all  of them were based on the vision that  the first  plan 
developed for the municipality. Oleiros did not have a plan in compliance with the 
previous land use act of 1997. This means that the land-use plan that has been 
adapted to the LOUGA was based on the first land use act of 1985. 
The municipality has tried,  since the early beginning of the democratic 
period, to protect the environmental values. In particular Oleiros always tried to 
protect the coast from development. For instance, the coastal area called “Costa de 
Dexo-Serantes”  was  already  protected  in  the  previous  land-use  plans,  but  the 
municipality decided to give it the highest level of protection in 2000 by declaring 
the  area  “Natural  Monument”.  This  makes  Oleiros  the  only  municipality  in 
Galicia that has protected its coast. 
Carlos Vales,  who is  now the director  of the Centre  for Environmental 
Dissemination,  and  who  encouraged  the  protection  of  this  area  in  the  1990s, 
recalls that in the 1980s, the residential  development was becoming chaotic, with 
overcrowded schools and urban sprawl and land speculation.  But  the land-use 
plans and the decision to take land planning very seriously by the local authority 
stopped that  process.  According to  him,  today he  does  not  observe  any acute 
environmental problem, for the culture created in the municipality made people 
aware of respecting the land-use plan. This is even acknowledged by the members 
of the opposition parties. The biggest environmental NGO of Galicia, ADEGA, 
also said that they do not recall any environmental or other conflicts in Oleiros.
With  regard  to  the  adoption  of  the  LOUGA, Oleiros  started  making  a 
modification of the former land-use plan before the passing of the LOUGA in 
2002. This modification aimed, according to the local authorities, at increasing the 
developable areas in two parishes in which residential  land had been used up. 
Meanwhile the LOUGA was passed and the municipality decided to make a whole 
new land-use plan.
The reason given by the local authority to adopt a LOUGA plan is that the 
endowment of developable land had run out in some parts of the municipality by 
he beginning of 2000. In these years, when the plan-making started, there was a 
high demand of residential housing due to the buoyant housing market in Spain. 
Furthermore, the municipality wanted to make projects like the golf course and 
the yacht harbour. The supply of land under the previous plan was, according to 
the local authority, not enough for the demand of residential land and the projects 
conceived by the local government. The previous plan was, therefore, restricting 
the growth capacity of the municipality. 
Some members of the political opposition pointed out that the reason to 
make the plan was to promote urban growth, in an excessive way according to 
them.  In fact,  they  mentioned that  the  regional  government  recommended the 
municipality to cut down the growth projections when considering the first draft 
of the plan, for they were not justifiable. The regional government argued that 
8000 dwellings projected in the plan for a period of eight years were unjustified 
given the trend of population growth. The municipality modified the plan and 
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made a projection of 8700 dwellings, but now  for a time-frame of 12-16 years. 
The municipality also reduced the number of developable areas, a total of 14. The 
regional  government  considered  that  in  the  new  time-frame,  the  growth 
projections  were  correct  and  issued  a  report  where,  after  having  evaluated  a 
second draft of plan, gave its approval to around 25% of the plan. A last obstacle 
to  definitely  approve  the  plan  was  the  airport  footprint.  The  section  of  Civil 
Aviation, from the Ministry of Public Works, issued a report about the plan where 
it did not allow any of the stipulated developments within the 220 ha of the airport 
footprint. The municipality disagreed with this decision and reported it. Finally, 
the Supreme Court of Galicia found in favour of the municipality in 2012 and the 
footprint was reduced to only 0,015 ha.
The interest of local authorities in growing is explained by the opposition 
parties through the clientelistic relationship that the local authority has with big 
developers that find in the Oleiros a market for extremely expensive homes. For 
instance, the opposition parties have criticised that the municipality had used the 
land-use plan to allow the building of a golf course of 577.309 sqm. together with 
688 dwellings and a luxury hotel. The project was conceived by the mayor in the 
early years of 200024. The developer, Jove, who would carry out the construction, 
was one of the biggest developers in Spain at  that time. In fact he started his 
activity as developer in Oleiros around 1993. The mayor rejects these critics. He 
argues that the golf course, which would be owned by the municipality, is a very 
effective way to protect that area from development. With regard to the dwellings, 
the mayor said that half of them will be social housing, which are located in one 
of the best places of the municipality. For the local authority, this project seems to 
be a way to combine development with social and environmental goals. Some 
members of the opposition  parties pointed out that the municipality, due to the 
increasing costs of social services, takes the easy way out for getting resources by 
fostering more development, suggesting the idea that the municipality is trapped 
into  a  so-called  growth machine.  This  is  also  so  for  some local  official,  who 
pointed out that the first land-use plan which promoted a urban growth of high 
quality was “the goose that laid the golden egg”,  allowing Oleiros so provide 
social services that ended up attracting more population.
The mayor certainly evaluated the political costs of making the land-use 
plan. According to him, he knew that he would lose votes and that probably he 
would have problems in getting approval for the plan, for his party did not have a 
majority.  But  the  scarcity  of  developable  land  when  the  housing  market  was 
flourishing fuelled the government desire of making the plan. In a certain way, the 
mayor realised that there was no choice and the benefits of making the plan would 
be greater than the loses.
A new plan  would  also  increase  legal  security.  According  to  the  local 
planner and the plan maker, since the former plan was approved in 1997, two 
land-use Acts were passed. In fact, though there was more developable land, the 
land-use plan would be made anyway because uncertainty about the permitted 
uses had increased considerably after the passing of two land-use acts.
The  only  problems  that  several  interviewers  contemplated  is  the  weak 
transport infrastructure. The municipality doubled its population in the last years 
while the transport networks remained almost the same. Sometimes this causes 
heavy traffic jams. This, however, does not seem to be a problem for the local 
authorities.
24 http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/04/26/galicia/1398533877_215898.html
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It is important to recall that neither environmental conflicts or other kind 
of conflicts played any kind of role in triggering the adoption to LOUGA.
3.2. Ames: a urban non-adopter
Ames  is,  like  Oleiros,  a  residential  municipality,  near  the  capital  of 
Galicia, Santiago de Compostela. It was the Galician municipality that grew the 
most from 2001 to 2010. The current land-use plan was made in 2002 and is based 
in  the  land-use  Act  of  1997.  This  land-use  plan  converted  large  areas  of 
agricultural land to developable land. Although there are 15 municipalities with 
more population, only seven municipalities zone more developable land than the 
municipality of Ames. The municipality did not contact the Regional Government 
to make the land-use plan.
The  understanding  of  the  making  of  the  current  plan  will  help  to 
understand why Ames did not engage in the making of a new land-use plan. When 
the land-use plan was approved in 2002, the mayor was José Astray Mariño, from 
the conservative party PP. Astray was the mayor of the municipality between 1979 
and 2003. During all these years the mayor established a close relationship with 
the developer Mahía (the biggest developer of Galicia after Jove at that time). The 
plan adopted in 2002 converted 19 areas to developable land, though many of 
these areas were protected forestry areas.  The developer  Mahía received,  by a 
planning agreement,  more than 50% of all  developable areas  (around 140.000 
sqm)to build thousands of dwellings25. 
The very restrictive plan of the near municipality, Santiago de Compostela, 
favoured  the  migration  of  new  residents  to  Ames.  The  population  of  the 
municipality  of  Ames  grew rapidly  in  the  last  20  years.  When  the  capital  of 
Galicia moved from La Coruña to Santiago, many government officials moved as 
well.  They were young couples at  the age of having children.  In addition,  the 
number of students were increasing in the university of Santiago de Compostela. 
Many others young professors and government officials, decided to move to other 
near locations seeking lower housing prices. The urban growth of Ames needs to 
be understood not only as a consequence of a very expansive land-use plan, but 
also as consequence of the lack of flexibility of the land-use plan of Santiago to 
accommodate new residents. 
According to an official of the local authority, the main problem of the 
municipality, which has its origins in the land-use plan approved in 2002, is that 
Ames is  today a  municipality  with urban demands but with a  rural  settlement 
pattern. This means that municipal services (sewerage, public lights, roads, etc.) 
are very expensive. Local officials also point out several environmental conflicts 
that take place in the municipality and whose the land-use plan of 2002 is the 
cause. There are some forestry areas that were developed after being zoned as 
residential  in the land-use plan of 2002, like Aldea Nova.  In 2006 these areas 
suffered an acute wave of forest fires that placed at risk the residential zones and 
even people's lives. Local officials point out that residents complain every  year 
about landowners that do not clear the vegetation on their properties. The local 
official takes the side of landowners when saying that they should not assume the 
costs  of  clearing  their  properties  and  blame the  municipality  for  converting  a 
forestry area into a residential one. 
25 http://www.elcorreogallego.es/comarcas/ecg/astray-otorgo-2002-mahia-52-suelo-recalificado-
convenio/idEdicion-2009-08-25/idNoticia-460886/
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Another serious environmental problem caused by the plan of 2002 is the 
conversion  of  areas  with  flooding risk into  residential  areas,  like  the  Agra  da 
Condomiña. There are many other areas of Ames that have suffered from floods 
and have brought actions against  the municipality.  However,  floods have been 
occurring in the last eight years and the municipality does not recognize officially 
any mistake in land-use planning (Devesa Fernández and Fra Paleo, 2013). A local 
official  argues  that  although  the  residents  have  raised  protests  again  the 
municipality,  these  problems  are  not  regarded  as  a  source  of  environmental 
conflict  to  be  solved  through  a  land-use  plan.  And  this  makes  sense  for  the 
interviewer since it was a plan that caused the conflicts. One of the local planners 
has given similar reasons. He explained that the municipality was working on the 
land-use plan when the LOUGA came into effect. To avoid the  restriction that 
LOUGA would impose, in particular for developable areas in rural settlements, 
the municipality pushed the works of plan-making.
Another severe problem in Ames, recognized by the local planner and the 
local official, is that the municipality does not have enough public land to build 
enough schools or sport centres that population increase would require. The lack 
of publicly owned land is  a long-lasting problem in Ames. In a governmental 
report (Consello de Contas, 2003) is pointed out that Ames has carried out many 
residential developments without using the legal instruments of value capturing. 
These instruments would provide the municipality with around 10% of land of 
every development project. This land, once public owned, could be used to build 
schools, health centres or social housing.
Several of these problems could be considered as drivers for a new land-
use plan. An in fact this is what happened. In 2003, the democratic candidate won 
the local election after having severely criticised the land-use plan approved one 
year before by the conservative government. One of the key arguments pointed 
out that the around 80% of the developable areas are in hands of big developers 
whereas only 20% are in  hands of citizens  (Xornal  Avance,  2003)26.  Only the 
developer Mahía owned around 50% of the developable land. But there were also 
other reasons that explain the conservative defeat.
Astray, the conservative mayor that lost the election, explained his defeat 
arguing: “I lost because in 4 years 5.000 new voters came from the city” looking 
for more affordable housing. He recognized that he was not able to connect with 
this new segment of population (El País, 2005)27. Astray was in this way victim of 
the urban expansion that he encouraged. For the next electoral period, the socialits 
mayor offered as an electoral promise the making of a new land-use plan. 
During the term in office of the new mayor, the proposal of making a new 
land-use plan faced serious challenges. According to the new socialist mayor, he 
slowly started to realize (and many people convinced him of this) that it would be 
incredibly hard, at the peak of the Spanish housing bubble, to change the land-use 
plan. Although he recognized that the land-use plan was harming the collective 
interests  of the municipality  (for instance,  one pressing issue was that schools 
were overcrowded and the municipality did not own land to build new schools28), 
the private interests were  more powerful. Even the mayor's aim of softening the 
private interests of the developers in favour of the collective interests, in particular 
26 http://es.calameo.com/read/000586710167439dca208
27 http://elpais.com/diario/2005/05/28/espana/1117231215_850215.html
28 http://www.elcorreogallego.es/comarcas/ecg/ames-modifica-su-pxom-para-otro-colegio-un-
parque-e-iglesia/idEdicion-2011-03-17/idNoticia-649723/
136
forcing developers to comply with the law and transfer 10% of each developable 
area to the municipality, the mayor recognized he has facing serious obstacles29. 
The developer Mahía filed ten judicial appeals against him in only 12 months and 
started a media campaign against the local authority stating that Mahía “was being 
persecuted by the mayor” who “has a campaign of sabotage against us” and even 
threatened to fire employees (El Correo Gallego, 2006). The mayor admitted: “I 
spent more time at the court than at the town council. I came up with the idea that  
I would never be able to change the plan. They had [this big developer] such an 
unbelievable power”. 
The plan adopted in 2002 was having its consequences, in particular with 
regard to the cost of providing municipal services. Ames is the only municipality 
where  local  officials  suggested   that  the  costs  of  providing  services  of  high 
quality,  similar  to  services  provided  in  big  cities,  to  a  population  that  lives 
scattered  in  the  territory,  like  in  a  populated  rural  area,  is  very  high.  The 
municipality faced more and more problems in paying for al these costs. In 2005 
the municipality commissioned a study to know the needs of public services if the 
population  kept  increasing.  This  study  suggested  that  the  municipality  would 
required 11 million Euro only for sewerage and water supply30.
Another important reason (both for the former and current government) to 
make a new land-use plan is that the municipality cannot locate new businesses in 
the municipality and has seen how all them go to neighboring municipalities. This 
is so despite the fact that the current plan zones a large industrial area. However, 
the landowners are unwilling to sell the land, and according to a local official, the 
municipality does not want to expropriate because it would cause a social conflict 
with considerable political costs for the local authority. Prices for industrial uses 
are considerable lower than for residential uses, and landowners believe that the 
plan will be changed some day in the future. Recently, the owners of the industrial 
land, requested the current local authority the conversion of the industrial area, for 
they are very unhappy with paying a lot of taxes and not being able to sell their 
parcels31. Clearly, the local authority prefers to give up annuals revenues of 50.000 
€ on property taxes  than to  have a  conflict  with the landowners of the zoned 
industrial area.
But  not only the big developers were against  adopting LOUGA. Other 
local  officials  mentioned  that  to  adopt  LOUGA would  mean  to  reduce  the 
endowment of developable land, and this would have severe political costs for the 
municipality. A conflict among the landowners and the local government would 
arise  immediately,  since,  as  one  of  official  said:  “how  would  you  explain  to 
people, who have been paying high property taxes during the last ten years for 
owning development rights, that now these rights are going to be taken away and 
all what they have been paying was in vain?”. Other local officials mentioned that 
this would have a negative impact for the municipal budget as well, for a plan in 
compliance  with  LOUGA  reduces  the  endowment  of  developable  land  and 
therefore it reduces the amount of taxes that can be collected by the municipality. 
With regard to the industrial land, current local officials agree that, although the 
29 When carrying developments, in Spain it is legally required that the developer (who is usually 
the landowner as well) gives to the land bank of the municipality 10% of the developable land.  
This is a type of value capturing. The municipality can use this land to build facilities like  
schools, sport centres, etc.
30 http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/hemeroteca/2005/09/06/4045761.shtml
31 http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/santiago/2014/06/01/concello-ames-descalificara-suelo-
industrial-pegarinos/0003_201406S1C9996.htm
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plan zones an industrial area, it could not be serviced and developed because it 
would require expropriation and this would make the landowners unhappy.
In  2011,  the  socialist  mayor  started  to  be  accused by the  conservative 
opposition to have supported some developers by giving them building permits32. 
The  conservative  party  won  the  local  election  in  that  year.  The  new  local 
authorities also want to make a new land-use plan. But the reasons they have are 
quite different. In an interview with the the urban councillor, he suggested that the 
developable areas in the municipality, in particular industrial land, are used up. He 
also suggested  that the new land-use plan should reduce the size of developable 
land to encourage the building of single family homes. He also recognizes that 
there is a lack of municipal owned land for public facilities like schools or sport 
centres. All these examples leave clear that making certain decisions have political 
costs for the local authorities.
Ames is  today,  after  almost  20 years of large developments and where 
between 2001-2011 the number of dwellings increased around 77%, one of the 
municipalities  of Spain with more empty dwellings  (around 23%)33.  There are 
huge  harmful  effects  (conflicts  among  landowners  and  residents,  floods, 
expensive urban and municipal  services that are  not sustainable,  etc.).  Though 
there are forces that push to make a new land-use plan, the distribution of property 
rights made in the current plan seems to make it difficult to accomplish.
3.3. Castroverde: a rural adopter
The  municipality  of  Castroverde  is  a  rural  municipality  near  the  third 
biggest city of Galicia, Lugo. The main activity in the municipality is agriculture 
(mainly  dairy  milk  production)  and  timber  production.  Like  most  rural 
municipalities,  Castroverde experiences  a population and an economic decline. 
Between 2001 and 2010 the municipality lost around 12% of its population which 
corresponds with the median of the municipalities that lost population in Galicia. 
Castroverde  had,  before  adopting  the  LOUGA,  a  very  simple  land-use  plan 
approved in 1984 that only zoned the urban centre of the municipality. Other land-
uses (forestry or agricultural, or even small rural settlements) did not have any 
land-use classification. 
The idea of making a land-use plan was encouraged by the current socialist 
mayor  who  won  the  local  election  in  1999.  However,  the  former  mayor  had 
already in mind the idea of making a land-use plan which basically would protect 
the Way of St. James as well as the medieval urban centre of the municipality.
It  was,  however,  the  current  mayor  in  his  second  term in  office,  who 
finally succeeded in making the land-use plan. According to him, there were three 
main  reasons for  making the plan.  First,  in  the  municipality  there  is  a  severe 
conflict among farmers that retire and afforest their parcels with those farmers that 
continue the agricultural activity. The trees in afforested parcels project shadows 
that reduce the crop production in adjacent agricultural parcels. More than 10% of 
the municipal surface has been afforested or abandoned between 1984 and 2005 
(Corbelle Rico and Crecente Maseda, 2013). The mayor, who is himself a farmer, 
explained that farmers very often went to him complaining about neighbors that 
afforested their parcels. In the mayor's words, these conflicts were a neverending 
32 http://www.elcorreogallego.es/comarcas/ecg/ibercelta-niega-trato-de-favor-alguno-por-parte-de-
su-antiguo-empleado/idEdicion-2011-03-25/idNoticia-652502/
33 http://www.ine.es/prensa/np775.pdf
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story. As the frequency of the claimant farmers increased he started to consider the 
land-use plan as a tool that could effectively solve these conflicts. The second 
reason the mayor points out is that,  when the LOUGA was passed,  the whole 
municipality  (except  the  urban centre)  was  zoned directly  as  “rustic  land”,  as 
prescribed by the LOUGA for those municipalities that do not have a land-use 
plan. This made very difficult for the municipality to issue building permits. In 
fact, the local planner, who helps people that seek building permits to build or to 
repair a house, explains that people became really angry when they knew that the 
municipality was not allowed to issue building permits. The third reason pointed 
out  by  the  mayor  has  to  do  with  industrial  land  zoning.  Several  years  ago, 
entrepreneurs from the municipality were looking for land to locate their firms. 
For the same reason that the municipality could not issue building permits for 
residential use, it could not issue building permits for industrial land either.
According  to  other  sources  of  evidence,  like  local  officials  and  the 
planners involved in the plan-making, some of the reasons given by the mayor 
might be relativized. Local officials pointed out almost the same reasons quoted 
by the mayor, giving more or less weight to some of them. However, nobody else 
beside  the  mayor  pointed  out  the  land  use  conflict  between  agricultural  and 
forestry uses. On the contrary, both the local planner and the certifying officer 
stressed the idea that the main reason for adopting the LOUGA was an obsolete 
land-use plan that, under the LOUGA, did not allowing them to issue all of the 
demanded building permits.
Although the mayor did not  mention  this,  the  aim of  the  municipality, 
according  to  the  planners  that  made  the  plan,  was  to  promote  urban  growth. 
Indeed, the first draft of the plan projected the building of 700 dwellings every 
year for a period of 12 years, what makes a total of 10.200 dwellings. Considering 
that  the  municipality  lost  12%  of  its  population  in  one  decade,  the  regional 
government  took the projection of the plan as  too optimistic  and required the 
municipality to reduce it. Finally, the land use plan projected the growth of 1.039 
dwellings  for  the  12  years,  which  is  considerable  lower  than  the  initial 
projection34.
Reviewing the newspaper news it becomes clear that one of the main aims 
for the mayor was to promote urban growth. The mayor lightly mentioned that the 
municipality also wanted to enjoy the growth that a new hospital, built near the 
boundary with a neighboring municipality, could bring for the town Vilar de Cas. 
But one of the planners that worked on the plan provided evidence that this was a 
significant reason for the local authority to make the land-use plan. Actually, in 
the first draft of the plan, there was a developable area near the boundaries of the 
municipality, but the regional government opposed this idea concluding that land 
in  that  area  had  a  great  agricultural  value.  The  mayor,  disappointed  with  the 
decision  of  the  regional  government  said  at  that  time,  in  a  public  statement 
reported in the media, that the local  authority and the neighbors of Vilar de Cas 
should “keep fighting to get it”35. One of the key arguments for the mayor in that 
public statement was that the municipality,  since “it is within the metropolitan 
area of Lugo, should have possibilities of future urban growth”. This leaves clear 
that  one  of  the  main  goals  of  Castroverde  was  to  foster  growth  and  urban 
expansion. 
34 http://www.planeamentourbanistico.xunta.es/siotuga/documentos/urbanismo/CASTROVERDE
/documents/26345me004.PDF
35 http://www.galiciae.com:81/2008/3/18/18032008comarcas_2.pdf
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With regard to the land use conflicts among forestry and agricultural use, 
the farmers differ from the point of view of the mayor. One of the most important 
farmers of Castroverde points out  that he has to rent agricultural land in other 
municipalities  because  there  is  not  land  available  in  Castroverde.  Though  he 
recognizes that there are conflicts among landowners, he does not see that the 
land-use plan has solved anything. The farmer relates the example of a relative of 
his  that  afforested  one  parcel  in  agricultural  land.  After  protesting  the  farmer 
received this answer from the relative: “if you don't sue me, I am not going to fall 
the  trees”.  This  kind  of  behaviour  used  to  be  very  common  in  agricultural 
municipalities. Farmers do not want to report neighbors because they believe this 
can be a source of further and even worse problems. Though they think that a 
land-use  plan  would  prevent  the  indiscriminate  afforestation  of  agricultural 
parcels, when this finally occurs, they seem to forget that the land-use plan is a 
binding rule that prevents agricultural zones from being afforested. Furthermore, 
it has been shown that farmers usually tend to think that the municipalities have a 
land-use plan that prescribes land-use when in most cases there is not such a plan 
(Osorio-Castelao,  Corbelle-Rico,  Onega-Lopez,  in  press).  This makes clear  the 
limited relevance of a land-use plan for farmers when considering the protection 
of their rights.
We  should  not,  however,  play  down  the  fact  that  Castroverde  is  the 
municipality of the province of Lugo (and probably of Galicia) where the regional 
government carried out more actions after getting reports of illegal afforestation. 
However, the number of reports taken into consideration, only 30 between 2007-
2012, is ridiculously low compared with the number of parcels that have been 
illegally  afforested  (Cuba Campello  and  Ónega  López,  in  press).  Most  of  the 
reports (around 70%) are usually made by citizens, but only 30% of the reports 
are made by the different bodies of the regional policy. The mayor complains that 
the municipality does not have a policy to enforce the land-use plan. Considering 
the date,  the regional  surveillance seems to be scarce as  well.  In comparative 
terms, however, the forestry-agricultural conflict is more notorious in Castroverde 
than in the rest of Galician municipalities.
With regard to the industrial park, there is the idea that it came too late. 
The local entrepreneurs lobbied the mayor for several years. Though the LOUGA 
provides ways to zone industrial land without making a whole land-use plan, the 
municipality realized that the land-use plan could solve several problem at the 
same time. A timber dealer suggested that many entrepreneurs that wanted their 
firms located in the municipality, decided to buy industrial land in other near by 
municipalities, mostly the bigger ones like Lugo. The timber dealer himself left 
because it took 12 years from the time a group of entrepreneurs started lobbying 
the former mayor in the 1990s to have an industrial park.  Another entrepreneur 
also left after a couple of years of trying to get an industrial plot. Some others 
decided to buy a parcel in the industrial  park, but now, having investments in 
other industrial parks and with the financial crisis, they do not see it as viable to 
open  their  firms.  All  interviewed  entrepreneurs  agreed  on  the  idea  that  the 
industrial park came too late in Castroverde and that the productive fabric of the 
municipality was weakened because of that.
With regards to the relationship between developers and the land-use plan, 
it  is  important  to  notice  that  in  Castroverde,  as  a  rural  municipality,  the 
construction industry is very tiny. The developers interviewed seem to be happy 
with the land-use plan and consider that today the issuing of building permits is 
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considerably more expeditious, even when it can be delayed when the building 
permits  need  an  approval  by  other  sectorial  government  departments  like  the 
General Directorate of Cultural Heritage. Since developers are small, they own, if 
any, very small areas. One developer illustrated this when saying that he bought a 
parcel of land for 30000 € thinking it would be zoned as developable. Finally it 
was  not,  but  the  developer  accepts  this  in  part  because  the  investment  was 
relatively low. In general, developers are of the idea that now there is not any kind 
of clientelism in the municipality when issuing building permits, a situation that 
differs considerably from the one when there was not a plan. Permits are issued 
according with what the plan zones. The interviewed developers declared that, 
now, they feel more secure when getting permits to carry out developments.
Despite all these reasons form making the plan, the mayor was concerned 
with the political costs of approving it. Only a couple of months before the local 
election  of  2007,  the  team  of  planners  had  finished  the  review  of  citizens' 
amendments to the plan and was ready to send it  back with the answers. The 
mayor pointed out that he was advised not to delay to gain time and after the local 
election  notify  the  results  of  the  amendments.  He  recognized  that  during  the 
political campaign he had to hear many people complaining about the plan. Even 
the mayor himself recognized that no mayor in his place “would not do such as 
crazy  thing”  as  he  did.  The  land-use  plan  provided  several  benefits  for  the 
municipality,  some  of  them  unexpected.  The  municipality  now  issues  more 
building  permits  and  the  tax  property  revenue  increased  considerably,  for  the 
property values of developable areas increased. 
3.4. Abadín: a rural non-adopter
Abadín is a rural municipality in the province of Lugo. It is an hour drive 
from the capital of the province. It has lost population between 2001 and 2010, 
around  16%,  slightly  more  than  the  lost  of  population  of  Castroverde.  The 
municipality,  unlike  Castroverde,  does  not  have  any  land-use  plan.  The  only 
planning tool  is  a  demarcation of urban growth boundaries  approved in 1992. 
With Ribeira de Piquín, it is the only municipality in Lugo that did not start the 
adoption of the LOUGA. The municipality  has been steadily governed by the 
conservative  party  PP  since  1983,  obtaining  majority  of  votes  in  all  local 
elections. Abadín is a municipality with scarce industrial activity, being the main 
economic activity agriculture. However, in the last years, many wind farms were 
located in the mountains of the municipality and today the municipality has in this 
activity its more substantial revenue source, making a total of around 300.000 € 
every year.
According  to  the  mayor,  the  municipality  does  not  have  any  land  use 
problem  that  required  the  making  of  a  land-use  plan.  Although  the  LOUGA 
forbids  issuing  building  permits  in  unzoned  land,  this  does  not  seem to  be  a 
problem for the mayor. The mayor argues that when someone wants to build a 
house,  it  is  the  municipality  who  bears  the  costs  of  zoning  a  small  area  in 
compliance with the LOUGA. The reasons for this, the mayor argues, is that the 
municipality has been losing population for decades and in his opinion, a land-use 
plan  that  should  zone around 198 rural  settlements  of  the  municipality  is  not 
necessary since in most of them there will never take place any development. On 
the  other  hand,  zoning  single  developments  seems  for  the  municipality  much 
easier. The usual procedure to do this in most municipalities that do not have a 
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land-use plan is the following: the interested person has to hire a planner to make 
a kind of very small plan to zone the area where the building should be located.  
The local planner of the municipality may give advice about whether the more 
suitable locations with more possibilities to get the building permit according to 
legal requirements. This plan, which has to be very detailed (a project of the house 
and a study of the area where it will be located), has to be sent to the regional 
government for approval. The new resident has little certainty about whether the 
building permit will be granted or not. (S)he assumes the costs of plan-making 
without knowing in advance if the building permit will be granted or not. 
In the case of Abadín, the local authority acknowledges that these costs 
could prevent people from seeking building permits in the municipality. As far as 
the municipality has sufficient resources coming from the revenues of wind farms 
and  the  zoning  of  a  rural  settlements  costs  about  3000  €,  what  is  perfectly 
affordable for the municipality, the municipality decides to bear the costs of the 
plan-making.  In  the  last  seven  years,  the  municipality  zoned  eight  rural 
settlements aiming at issuing building permits.
The mayor  adds  another  important  reason for  not  making the  land-use 
plan. He recognizes that a land-use plan would have fiscal implications for the 
land-owners.  Owners of developable should pay more property taxes.  But this 
would be in direct conflict with the ideas of the mayor, since the most important  
of  the  local  policies  (this  has  been  suggested  by  other  members  of  the  local 
authorities) is to keep taxes as low as possible. Municipal services like water or 
garbage collection are almost free of charge. The only reason to make a land-use 
plan,  the mayor continues,  would be to experience a rapid population growth, 
what is not the case and it is not expected.
However,  there  are  currently  several  conflicts  in  the  municipality  that 
would not occur if  land-use plan were in force. For instance, a stone quarry was 
located in a place of great natural value. The environmental NGO Adega reported 
it when it realized that the quarry did not have any permit to develop its activity.  
The mayor, who admitted he knew that the quarry was carrying out its activity, 
explains that the origin of the conflict was not the activity of the quarry itself. The 
conflict arose when one person “sold”  (obviously illegally) a parcel of common 
land  to  the  quarry.  The  municipality  did  not  react  to  this,  even  knowing  it, 
showing  a  very  passive  attitude.  The  argument  of  the  mayor  is  that  the 
municipality did not issue any permit and should not have reasons to worry about.
Zoning rural settlements is also causing some problems. The approval of 
one of the rural  settlement plan has been delayed because of cultural  heritage 
restrictions.  However,  some  neighbors  needed  the  approval  to  build  a  social 
centre. If they did not, they would lose the grant they got. So they decided to start 
the construction, and again  the municipality had a very passive attitude by not 
stopping it, knowing perfectly well that it was an illegal construction. Then it was 
reported that the works did not have any permit, and the municipality declared it 
had nothing to do with that.
The other big issue in the municipality, like in the previous case studies, is 
the industrial park. Abadín does not have any industrial area. The mayor said that 
already in 2006 the municipality started working on a plan to zone industrial land. 
Today the plan is already finished but it has not yet been approved because the 
sectorial administration is reviewing for the final approval. The mayor recognizes 
that  the  municipality  has  been issuing building  permits  to  locate  industries  in 
unzoned land. He argues that theses firm are related to agricultural activity, like a 
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shipper, and the LOUGA does allow this. He does not seem to recognize that this 
is a very loose interpretation of the LOUGA articles with regard to permitted uses 
in rustic land.
The municipality  acquired  some parcels  of  land  to  build  the  industrial 
park. However, the location where the municipality is giving permits is another 
place, called A Xesta, a location that is connected with the recently built highway, 
and therefore preferred by the entrepreneurs. In fact, the plan for the industrial 
park is being made to legalize the firms located here. Several entrepreneurs in this 
area recognize that they have a building permit, but in many cases the procedures 
to obtain them involved many agents and discussions. The processes took so long 
that sometimes entrepreneurs were discouraged and left. For example, one timber 
dealer  and one transportation firm.  The opposition parties  reported  even more 
cases, like a garage for agricultural machinery and a manufacturing industry of 
pieces for wind farms that left because the municipality was unable to provide 
them with a place with the required conditions.  Entrepreneurs believe that not 
having  a  land-use  plan  and  the  instability  with  regard  to  residential,  and  in 
particular  industrial  land  uses,  is  harming  the  economic  development  of  the 
municipality.  On  the  contrary,  the  mayor  believes  that  he  offers  all  kind  of 
possibilities to those that want to locate their firms in the municipality. In fact, the 
industrial park was his electoral promise for the local elections of 2011, since the 
building of a new motorway would make Abadín less than one hour drive from 
several cities. 
The  opposition  parties  admit  that  it  is  hard  for  one  municipality  like 
Abadín to make a land-use plan because people do not see what problems a plan 
could solve. But at the same time, when talking to the people, what they hear is 
that the municipality needs “spatial planning”. Although  opposition parties have 
always offered a land-use plan as an electoral promise, until now it seems they did 
not get the support of the people. One spokesman of an opposition party declared 
that the mayor has only one policy, that is the policy of “no-conflicts”. According 
to him, the mayor “does not want to have conflicts with anybody, and a land-use 
plan means to cause and face conflicts”.  Some members of the local authority 
criticise this, in particular when they try to convince him of rising taxes, and that 
this would be good for the municipality. However, the mayor does not want to 
face the conflict that this could carry for him in political costs. And in the end, the 
municipality can afford this, because the revenues of wind farms are more than 
enough for a rural municipality like Abadín.
4. Discussion
In the four case studies we have identified a set of conflicts that may be 
symptom  of  externalities  and  that  are  represented  in  table  15.  Notice  that 
sometimes there is  only one party with an interest  that  cannot  be fullfiled for 
whatever  reasons.  Depending  on which  party  has  the  interest,  there  are  three 
hierarchical levels than range from the interests of private actors, interests of local 
authorities  to  interests  of  regional  government.  Most  of  the  conflicts  emerge 
because of the primary interest of the local government in urban growth. The legal 
requirement  of  making a  plan that  zones developable areas is  imposed by the 
regional government. The interest of the regional government in controlling the 
urban expansion diverge, as we have seen in the case studies, from the interest of 
local government in fostering that urban growth. However,  we cannot say that 
behind  this  divergence  there  is  an  externality  problem,  for  no  effect  on  third 
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parties  takes  place  before  the  development.  Planners  would  suggest  that  the 
interest of the regional government or some of the interest of the local authorities 
(like the preservation of open spaces in Oleiros) is to prevent externalities, but 
according to a classical definition of externalities, the prevention of externalities is 
no an externalities in itself. Preventive actions define what is an externality and at 
the same time indicate who has to internalize them by liability or inalienability 
rules
What we see rather in Oleiros and Castroverde when adopting the LOUGA 
(and also in Ames, which is a non-adopter because its current plan is much more 
expansive that it would be under the LOUGA) are municipalities that seek urban 
growth and try to stimulate urban expansion with their land-use plans. A land-use 
plan is for then mostly a tool to enhance housing activity by giving legal security. 
If these municipalities did not want to grow (or did not expect growth of any kind 
like Abadín), the truth is that they would probably never make a land-use plan. 
The making of the plans by Oleiros and Castroverde (as well as the non-adopter 
Ames)  is  explained  much  more  by  the  idea  of  land-based  elites  that  utilize 
governmental  authorities  at  local  level  to  assist  in  achieving  growth  and 
transforming localities in “growth machines” (Molotch, 1976) than explained by 
the theory of externalities.
Unintended 
effects
Undefined 
property 
rights
Affects 
utility or 
production 
function
Create 
conflicts
Possibility of 
Pareto-
improvement 
Interest of 
the regional 
government 
Airport footprint 
in Oleiros
Prevention * * * *
Excessive 
developable 
areas in Oleiros 
and Castroverde
Prevention * * * *
Interest of 
local 
authorities
Preservation of 
open spaces in 
Oleiros
Prevention * * * *
Urban growth       
(Castroverde and 
Oleiros)
Controlling 
fffects of  urban 
growth in Ames 
(the costs of 
municipal 
services)
Intended 
effects 
(there is a 
plan)
There is a 
plan 
assigning 
property 
rights 
* * *
Agricultural and 
forestry conflicts 
in Castroverde
* * * * *
Interest of 
private 
actors
Residential and 
forestry conflicts 
in Ames
Intended 
effects 
(there is a 
plan)
There is a 
plan 
assigning 
property 
rights 
* * *
Floods in Ames Intended 
effects 
There is a 
plan 
* * *
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(there is a 
plan)
assigning 
property 
rights 
Forestry-
agricultural 
conflicts in 
Castroverde
* * * * *
Industrial park 
(Ames, 
Castroverde, 
Abadín)
* * * * *
Reliability of 
building permits 
(Abadín)
* * * * *
Table 15: Types of conflicts and the five characteristics of externalities
With regard to the the numerous negative effects of urban growth in Ames, 
we can conclude that these effects are not externalities, for there is a land-use plan 
assigning property rights. These property rights indicate who has to internalize the 
externalities.  It  is  true  that  there  are  possibilities  for  Pareto  improvement. 
Economists  would call  this  situation a  government failure (Wolf,  1979).  Thus, 
there are only four possible conflicts that in appearance would meet our definition 
of externalities:  agricultural  and forestry conflicts  in Castroverde,  reliability of 
building permits in Abadín, and the search of industrial land in Ames, Abadín and 
Castroverde.
The classical  literature  on  externalities  would  argue  that  in  these  three 
cases there is room for improvement toward Pareto efficiency. Let us pay attention 
to  the  conflict  between  forestry  and  agricultural  uses  in  Castroverde,  which 
represents  a  classical  example  of  externalities.  In  a  classical  example  of 
externalities  there are  only two actors,  one is  the emitter  and the other  is  the 
victim. The government only appears when it observes that is necessary, in order 
to  gain  efficiency,  to  restore  the  lost  equilibrium by taxing the  emitter,  or  by 
reducing  transaction  costs  to  solve  the  conflict.  But  the  classical  example  of 
externalities is misleading with regard to the number of actors. The government is 
not an impartial part in the negotiations; it is involved in the conflicts because it 
has interests in it or just because it favours the victim or the emitter. An when the 
government  does  not  get  involved,  it  is  not  because  what  is  occurring  in  the 
municipalities  is  not  relevant  to  the  local  authority.  Rather,  the  lack  of 
involvement comes from its interests in not getting involved.
Taking this into consideration, we have to reframe the classical example of 
externalities and  include the government as a third party that has also an utility 
function. This utility function depends on the number of votes. In all the four case 
studies we have seen that the mayors make calculations, in terms of political costs 
and  possible  benefits,  and  receive  advice  about  getting  or  not  dragged  into 
conflicts.  This  changes  completely  the  reasoning behind the  Pareto-optimality, 
since now the losses or the benefits of the local authorities has to be considered. 
The local government can have only two roles in the conflict. Either  it can be 
regarded as emitter when does not want to get involved in the conflicts, for it 
takes the part of the emitter and does not assume its responsibility to mitigate the 
pain of the victim. Or it  can play the role  of the victim when  it  assumes its 
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responsibility  by  declaring  that  the  emitter  has  to  bear  the  costs,  that  is  to 
internalize the externalities.
Drawing on the work of Dahlman (1979), the local authorities may find 
themselves in four situations with regard to conflicts. This is illustrated in table 
16.
     
Expectations
Correct Incorrect
Conflicts Reduced I III
Endured II IV
Table 16: The four mayor's expectations with regard to conflicts
In the case I, the municipality correctly anticipates the costs of bargaining 
to be low enough for him to gain from eliminating the conflict, and the externality 
becomes  internalized  by  the  emitter.  In  case  II,  the  local  authority  correctly 
anticipates the costs of eliminating the conflict and it  does not act, having the 
externality  internalized  by  those  that  were  affected.  There  is  no  inoptimality 
problem. In the case III, the local authority decides to carry out, in John Commons 
terminology, managerial bargaining but finds during the process of bargaining and 
policing  the  arrangement  costs  him too  much  to  do  so.  In  case  IV,  the  local 
authority decides to live with the conflict in belief that it would cost too much to 
eliminate it but is incorrect: he would have gained from eliminating it in view of 
the costs with the emitter.
Dahlman (1979) show that case I and II are not Pareto-relevant externality 
remaining. In case number II there is obviously not Pareto-relevant side effects 
remaining. In case III is not Pareto-relevant, and it does not matter if the conflicts 
endures or no, for the local authority realizes that the costs of making a land-use 
plan are too high. In case IV the local authority should have bargained for the 
abatement of the conflict but failed to do so. In case IV Dahlman (1979) would 
argue that from the point of view of the local authority, it would not appear that is 
a mistake to endure the conflict, because 
“[G]iven  the  information  that  he  has  at  his  disposal,  he  performs  his  constrained  
optimization and does nothing. His information is incomplete or wrong, so he makes the  
wrong decision: given the correct information there is a loss of income and the situation  
looks very much like what we associate with an externality.  Yet  that  interpretation is  
fundamentally incorrect […]. This can be regarded as an externality only if you assume  
that he should have known better or that there is someone else who does know better” 
(Dahlman, 1979:150). 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  case  I corresponds  to  Castroverde,  case  III 
corresponds to Ames and the negative effects of urban growth, and case II and IV 
corresponds to Abadín (see Table 17). Notice that it is not possible to know if the 
expectations  of  the mayor about  making or  not  a  land-use plan are correct  or 
incorrect, when most planners around the world – and probably most economists 
– would argue that the he is incorrect, since the endure negative effects reduces 
Pareto-optimality. Since the early theoretical debates around externalities, some 
authors have argued that the real problem of externalities is that Pareto-optimality 
exists and it is a desirable goal and externalities move markets further away from 
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the Pareto-optimality. However, it is not possible to define how far we are from 
the Pareto-optimality, if  there is any distance.
Mayor's expectations
Correct Incorrect
Conflicts Reduced Castroverde Ames
Endured Abadín Abadín
Table 17:  The four case studies and mayor's expectations 
Baumol (1972) has suggested that a very substantial portion of the costs 
that impose externalities is physic, and “even if we knew to evaluate the psychic 
costs to some individuals we seem to have little hope of dealing with effects so 
widely diffused through the population” (p.11). This lack of information has also 
been  pointed  out  by  Atwood  (1969)  when  arguing  that  there  is  not  judicial 
machinery capable of producing the information needed to master an externality 
issue.  Given the fact that even in the simplest  case it  is impossible to draw a 
dividing  line  such  that  an  “externality”  can  be  meaningfully  identified,  some 
authors  have  declared  that  the  concept  of  externality  is  not  an  useful  term 
(Cheung, 1970; Randall,  1983). In Dahlman's words (1979:156) “it is doubtful 
whether the term “externality” has any meaningful interpretation,  except as an 
indicator of political  beliefs and value judgements of the person who uses (or 
avoids  using)  the  term”.  The  striking  conclusions  of  this  analysis  is  that 
externalities, that is what is external to markets, are prescribed by governments by 
setting institutional frameworks that indicate who has to internalize the external 
effect  and  in  which  degree.  The  plan  of  Castroverde  that  tries  to  solve  the 
agricultural-forestry conflict is an example of this. The plan of Oleiros does not 
solve any externality issue, rather it defines externalities. As Vatn and Bromley 
(1997)  points  out,  it  is  the  institutional  setting  which  defines  what  is  to  be 
considered internal and what is considered external.
The utility function of authoritative agents and Pareto-optimality
In the four case studies the mayors have evaluated the chance of success in 
making the land-use plan and the risks that the plan could entail with regard to the 
local elections. So there are consequences if local authorities do not decide to 
make a land-use plan, and these consequences cannot be called “unintended”. If 
municipalities do not take responsibility in the conflicts that are going on in the 
municipality, they take the side of the emitter or polluter.
We try to understand this through the analysis of the two non-adopters. 
One of them, Ames, has a plan that assigns property rights and prescribes who has 
to  internalize  externalities.  The  other  is  Abadín,  which  has  no  land-use  plan. 
Giving this situation, we try to clarify in the classic terminology of externalities 
who is the “polluter” and the “victim”.
When the mayor of Castroverde, after evaluating the risks of it, decides to 
adopt a land-use plan, a Pareto-optimum is attained. However, when the mayor of 
Abadín, after evaluating the political costs of adopting a land-use plan, decides 
not to adopt it, the result is Pareto-optimum as well. And this is so because the 
responsibility of shifting costs (that is, deciding who is going to internalize the 
externality)  may have political  costs  for  the municipality.  These costs  may be 
higher than the benefits of having a plan, like in the case of Abadín.
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Governments have interests. When these interests are in the well-being of 
the people, like in Oleiros, the land-use plans provide all the social benefits that a 
planner would desire. But very often, plans may reflect the interests of regulatory 
bodies that have clientelistic relationships (James, 2000). Arrow (1969:13) is right 
when arguing that:
Political policy is not made by voters, not even in the sense that they choose the  
vector  of  political  actions  which  best  suits  them.  It  is  in  fact  made  by  
representatives  in  one  form  or  another.  Political  representation  is  an  
outstanding example of the principal-agent relation. This means that the link  
between individual utility functions and social action is tenuous, though by no  
means completely  absent.  Representatives  are  no more a random sample of  
their constituents than physicians are of their patients.
The case of Ames is a good example of this. It shows also how difficult it 
is to reverse a situation in a democratic society when economic power displaces 
political power. The actions of  government or courts (taking into consideration 
that courts decide on the base of laws passed in parliaments) are never unintended. 
These actions may be poisonous or curative.
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have shown that a classical definition of externalities is 
not suitable to explain the array of conflicts that we have found in the four case 
studies. We have seen in the four case studies that the alleged externalities do not 
meet a classical definition of externalities outlined in this paper. In all conflicts 
studied in  the four  cases,  there  are  not  unintended effects,  if  we consider  the 
government as what it is, a third actor that may take the side of the victim or the 
emitter. In several cases, the rights are perfectly defined by inalienability rules 
(plans). And in the cases that conflicts really seem to fit the definition, there is no 
room for Pareto improvement if we again consider the government as a third actor 
with a utility function. The only two features of a definition of externalities is that 
they are conflicts that have effects on utility functions.
This  challenges  the  traditional  justification  of  planning,  and  land-use 
planning, as a collective action that deals primarily with externalities and social 
good.  The theoretical  body around externalities  is  confusing and lacks  logical 
consistency.  This  have  been  pointed  by  some  scholars  (Cheung,  1970; 
Randall,1983). 
The problem with the definition of externalities is quite clear and it was 
clear from the beginning. It becomes an issue because economists and political 
scientist refuse to accept that if markets do not work as they are supposed to work, 
maximizing the utility function of rational individual, then there must be a kind of 
“dark  matter”,  of  course  external  to  the  market,  that  makes  markets  work 
inefficiently,  that  is,  externalities.  But  if  we  just  accept  that  there  are  not 
individuals, that there are groups of individual, that are maybe rational in several 
ways but not in economic terms (acting as maximizers) and that there are power 
relationships,  etc.,  that  is,  if  we admit  what  we observe every day in  the real 
world, the definition of the problem of externalities disappear and it becomes only 
what it is: a political discussion discerning about who has to bear the costs of the 
running of markets.
With regard to the Pareto-optimality, it seems to be the main interest of 
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economists when analyzing externalities. This “devotion to Pareto optimality”, as 
Bromley  (1982)  points  out,  is  based  on  the  widespread  belief  that  economic 
efficiency is the only matter on which economists can pass scientific judgements. 
Furthermore,  this  idea  has  also  been  accepted  by  planners  in  order  to  gain 
legitimacy when trying to influence decision-making. However, when looking at 
the  four  case  studies  studied  in  this  paper,  we  observe  that  in  all  of  them 
externalities are not Pareto-relevant, and it does not matter if a land-use plan has 
been adopted or not. The insights of authors like Dahlman (1979) and others have 
shown why this is so. In conclusion, what seems to be an scientific justification of 
planning,  turns  out  to  be  a  political  decision  (whatever  it  is)  away from any 
scientific justification.
However,  this  should  not  prevent  planners  of  getting  involved  in 
understanding these issues. As noted above, we do not know if Abadín is making 
the correct decision  in not adopting a land-use plan. Imagine that the mayor of 
Abadín is incorrect. This would imply that if he would decide to make a land-use 
plan, he would not be affected by political costs and the private actors could be 
made  better-off.  This  leads  us  to  the  following  argument: when  the  lack  of 
accurate information prevents actors from making economic transactions. This has 
already been noticed by other scholars that define transaction costs as “the costs 
that  are  incurred  to  increase  the  information  available  to  us  and  to  reduce 
uncertainty”  (Buitelaar,  2004).  Needham (2006),  referring  to  transaction  costs, 
states that land-use planning reduces uncertainty about the economic context for 
investment decision. The transaction costs associated with the lack of information 
(which land-uses are  permitted and which not) can prevent them from making 
investments  on  land.  By  trying  to  generate  more  reliable  information  and 
knowledge,  the  role  of  planners  is  key  to  improving  the  decision  making.  If 
planners can show that in municipalities from like Abadín many entrepreneurs and 
people  left  because  of  the  insecurity  with  regard  to  building  permits,  local 
authorities  may start  reconsidering  their  particular  cost  benefit-analysis,  and a 
situation where costs  were much more than benefits,  can turn into a  situation 
where a plan can provide more benefits than costs. Although there are many more 
reasons  for  making  a  land-use  plan,  like  justice,  legitimacy  or  environmental 
protection,  in  the  end they  are  implemented  if  it  is  less  costly  for  the  actors 
involved  than  the  benefits  of  a  current  situation.  Land-use  planning 
implementation has to do more with showing the current costs, understanding cost 
broadly, of not having undertaken planning than giving normative assumptions 
about having it.
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Conclusions 
Clarifying concepts 
We started this dissertation making a concrete research question stated in 
Chapter 1: why are some municipalities in Galicia willing to adopt a land-use plan 
and why are most municipalities reluctant to do it? To answer this question we 
have focussed our research on two groups of municipalities: those municipalities 
that did adopt a LOUGA plan (31 municipalities) and those municipalities that did 
not  start  plan-making (19 municipalities).  In  Chapter  4  we found out  that  the 
adopters are mostly rural municipalities that had, before adopting LOUGA, very 
obsolete land-use plans or did not have any land-use plan at all. The non-adopters 
are  either municipalities in  remote areas,  or they are urban municipalities that 
have  zoned  areas  of  developable  land  that  are  considerable  larger  than 
developable areas in the rest of municipalities. From the institutional perspective 
we use in the research, how can this be explained?
In  the  search  of  a  hypothesis  that  could  be  a  plausible  answer  to  the 
question, we first reviewed the main ideas about implementation of public policies 
and more specifically about land planning. However, we soon realized that this 
literature did not provide an accurate explanation because the arguments suffer 
from  considerable  circularity.  For  instance,  it  is  very  common  to  find  the 
argument of the sort “good plans from the technical point of view are easier to 
implement”. The problem of such a statement is that plans are not randomly good 
or bad from the technical point of view. If they are good it is maybe because there 
is a real interest or will to implement them. Thus, most arguments in the literature 
are consequences rather than causes of plan implementation.
When considering will  or interests  in planning,  we are already moving 
toward considering land-use plans as a set of institutions. From an institutional 
approach,  plan  implementation  can  be  understood  as  institutional  change. 
However,  many  of  the  concepts  within  institutional  literature  are  extremely 
confusing and make them inapplicable to understanding public policies like land 
planning. In this dissertation it took a great deal of effort to precisely define what 
is meant by concepts like institutions and institutional change. 
To cite  an example,  imagine that  we had used Hodgson's  definition of 
institutions. For Hodgson institutions are only institutions if they shape behaviour, 
and  they  shape  behaviour  if  they  are  somehow in  the  mind.  But  what  is  the 
consequence of this if we try to understand the implementation of LOUGA under 
this definition, knowing that LOUGA was adopted by 10% of  municipalities? 
Does this means that the act was not an institution because it did not shape the 
behaviour of most municipalities? How many municipalities should have adopted 
it to consider it an institution? If we consider that LOUGA is an institution only 
for the municipalities that adopted it, then for the rest of municipalities it is not an 
institution? They do not follow the rule because it is not an institution (normative 
belief) for them or because they obtain more benefits trespassing the rule? In the 
first case it would be not an institution? It would be an institution in the second 
case? All these questions make clear that Hodgson's definition of institution is not 
enough clear to understand our research question.
In  Chapter  3,  when  analysing  the  passing  and  implementation  of  the 
Galician  and  Dutch  land-use  acts,  we  have  shown  that  both  of  them  are 
institutions for the local authorities. To follow these institutions does not depend 
on  the  fact  that  they  become  “normative  beliefs”.  It  rather  depends  on  an 
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enforcement mechanism. The Dutch land act had a better performance in terms of 
adoption  than the  Galician act  because  the enforcement  mechanism was more 
credible  and  the  government  had  more  legitimacy  to  implement  the  act.  In 
political  terms, this  just  means that the Dutch government  has more power to 
force  municipalities  to  comply  with  the  act  than  the  Galician  government. 
Rational  institutionalists  have  neglected  formal  institutions  that  are  normally 
secured by fiat, and this is surprising since almost all public policies have this 
basis. The reasons for this is that rational institutionalists have an ambivalence 
relationship with the concept of power. They recognize its relevance yet they push 
it to the analytic periphery (Moe, 2005).
The sources of institutional change and continuity
The passing of the Act by the regional government, as well as the adoption 
of land-use plan in compliance with the act by the local authorities, are understood 
in  this  dissertation  as  institutional  changes.  As  explained  in  Chapter  1, 
institutional  changes  have  drivers  that  fuel  it,  but  also  opposite  forces  that 
contribute to the continuity of the existing institutional framework. The passing of 
a land-use act or the adoption of the act by the municipalities is always the result 
of  the  conflict  between  these  two  forces,  and  adoption  takes  effect  when the 
drivers are able to overcome the forces hampering the change.
In  Chapter  2  we  have  developed  a  model  of  institutional  change  that 
basically  relies  on  the  concept  of  institutional  contradictions.  The  model  has 
proved to be useful to understand why the LOUGA was made and finally passed 
by the Galician Parliament. Based on the idea of institutional contradictions, we 
have identified a set of sources that induce institutional change. The first source of 
institutional change identified in the making of LOUGA is, in Seo and Creed's 
(2002) terminology, “intrainstitutional  conformity that creates  inter-institutional 
incompatibilities”. Decentralized administrations are very prone to create this sort 
of  incompatibilities  because  when  one  administrative  level  undertakes 
institutional change, other levels are affected too, very often unintendedly. The 
land-use act  LOUGA was passed because the Spanish government passed an act 
that created legal incompatibilities with the previous land-use act, and not because 
the Spanish land-use act wanted to have a direct effect on Galician land planning. 
Galicia  adopted  a  land-use  act,  but  instead  of  just  solving  the  legal 
incompatibilities, the main goal of the act was to control urban sprawl that was 
taking place, primarily in sub-urban municipalities. However,  the municipalities 
that finally adopted a land-use plan were very rural municipalities where urban 
sprawl was not an issue. And this happened because the LOUGA created legal 
incompatibilities with the land-use plans (or lack of) of the municipalities. What 
we observe here is that an institutional change at the state level created a cascade 
of changes at lower levels, and the policy goals are far away of being aligned with 
the policy goals of the upper institutional changes. Why does it happen?
When  institutional  change  occurs,  not  only  one  source  of  institutional 
change is at  work. Single sources do not explain completely the direction and 
scope that institutional change takes. As said above, the LOUGA could be very 
similar to the previous act if the only goal of the act were to remove the legal 
incompatibilities. To explain the scope of the LOUGA, we have to rely on other 
sources  of  institutional  change.  We have  shown in  Chapter  2  that  the  source 
“adaptation that undermines adaptability” is very useful to understand the scope 
of the LOUGA and also of other land policies like the Land Bank of Galicia. The 
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massive privatization of land-ownership in the early 20th century, something that 
can  be  considered  an  adaptive  move  in  the  past,  resulted  in  undermining  the 
adaptability  of  Galician  society  to  new developments  and  creates  several  and 
acute conflicts for society. At the municipal level we did not find however any 
additional source of institutional change that can explain why rural municipalities 
that are losing population adopted a land-use plan that converted large areas of 
agricultural land to developable land.
To explain this, and also to explain the scope of the LOUGA (why did it go 
beyond the  adjustment  with the  Spanish legislation and tried  to  control  urban 
sprawl)  and  to  explain  the  scope  of  the  land-use  plans  adopted  by  the 
municipalities (why did they convert so much land to urban uses if the goal of 
LOUGA was to prevent urban sprawl), it is necessary to pay attention to the role 
of agency. In our model of institutional change in Chapter 2, and drawing on the 
work  of  Bromley  (2006),  we  define  two  key  actors  involved  in  institutional 
change.  First,  actors  that  belong  to  an  epistemic  community  and  create  in 
Bromley's  phrase  “warranted  belief”.  Second,  there  must  be  actors  that 
acknowledge the warranted beliefs as certain and decide to act upon them. We 
have identified the first  type of actors and their  influence in defining the final 
scope of  the  LOUGA. It  was  however  harder  to  identify  them at  local  level, 
because there are a myriad of individuals that try to influence the decision making 
of the local authorities.  However,  what we found is  that developers and other 
collectives like entrepreneurs play a key role in defining the final scope of the 
land-use plan. Big developers and landowners lobby local authorities and local 
authorities  get  convinced  that  the  construction  industry  will  foster  the 
development of the municipality. 
Sources of continuity
First,  we have to understand continuity as an opposite force to change. 
This means that we can only identify sources for continuity in those municipalities 
where  there  are  sources  of  institutional  change  as  well.  For  a  small  set  of 
municipalities, that are located in the mountains and remote areas, the only reason 
for continuity is that they do not find any reason for change since they almost 
never issue building permits.
What we have found as reasons for continuity is that a new land-use plan 
alters  the  distribution  of  property  rights.  In  the  case  that  one  municipality 
frequently  issues  building  permits  (which  in  our  model  means  a  driver  for 
change), there is more pressure for institutional change. Because of the high value 
of development rights, we have seen that either municipalities without a land-use 
plan  are  reluctant  to  adopt  a  land-use plan  that  my reduce  the  expectation  of 
landowners of future urban uses, or as it is stated in Chapter 6, there is a land-use 
plan assigning development rights to power developers that do not want to get rid 
of them and have had considerable political and economic power in defining the 
land-use plans that are currently in force, like the case of Ames.
These  sources  of  continuity  and change  identified  are  in  line  with  the 
conclusions on institutional change of a few authors. For instance, Knight (1992) 
argues that, when we emphasize the distributional consequences of institutional 
change,  and  give  up  considering  institutional  change  as  a  result  of  voluntary 
bargaining, then institutional change is “function of the distributional conflict over 
substantive  social  outcomes;  maintenance  and  stability  are  function  of  the 
continuing ability of institutional rules to provide distributional advantages” (p. 
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210). And because institutional change entails distributional effects, this explains 
why municipalities have many conflicts with the regional government and with 
other sectors of municipalities; these conflicts make mayors fear the political costs 
of adoption. Thus, when plans are adopted and the distributive effects are made 
effective, the change is rather traumatic than smooth (Bromley, 1989). This tells 
us something about the nature of institutional change of formal institutions, which 
differs  considerably  from the  definition of  institutions  that  is  used  by rational 
choice institutionalists, or institutionalists like North (1990) or Thelen (2004) who 
consider institutional change as gradual and incremental.  Again, this result seems 
to support the understanding about institutional change of old institutionalists. For 
Commons (1934), the legal framework in societies is designed fort deciding of 
disputes according to prevailing customs (Commons, 1934). Commons called this 
process  ‘artificial  selection’ to  differentiate  it  from  evolutionary  theories  that 
involved ‘natural selection’ (Commons, 1934:376)
In  Chapter  6  we  have  studied  with  more  detail  one  of  the  sources  of 
institutional change, “Isomorphism that conflicts with divergent interests”, which 
is  according  to  Seo  and  Creed  (2002)  the  most  common.  This  source  of 
institutional change is mostly personified in the concept of externalities, widely 
used by rational institutionalist to explain institutional change. We have found, 
however, that a classical definition of externalities is of little use to understand the 
adoption of land-use plans, in particular if we consider institutional change as a 
way to improve Pareto-optimality. This is so because of three reasons. First, the 
negative effects  usually  took place in  the past and because many of  them are 
irreversible (like urban sprawl in the case of Ames), now it  is not possible to 
restore a Pareto equilibrium (Bromley, 1982). Second, negative effects that are 
taking place in the present are not abated, this is because the costs of doing it are 
higher than the benefits (Dahlman, 1979), in particular if we consider the political 
costs  for  the  local  authorities  like  in  the  case  of  Abadín.  And  if  we  prevent 
negative  effects  from occurring  in  the  future  by  assigning  inalienability  rules 
(zoning), we are not dealing with an externality problem, we are defining what 
externalities are and therefore internalizing them, like in the case of Oleiros.
Why the scope of the institutional change?
Although  we  have  understood  why  the  municipalities  have  adopted 
LOUGA, we wanted to analyze with detail the scope of the land-use plans plans 
in terms of conversion from agricultural to developable land use. We have found 
that  conservative  municipalities  (with  more  than  40%  of  the  seats)  tend  to 
significantly  convert  more  land  from  agricultural  to  developable  uses.  This 
conclusion is not new since it has been shown that in Spain or California (USA) 
conservative  authorities  are  prone  to  develop  more  land  (Solé-Ollé  and 
Viladecans-Marsal, 2013; Kahn, 2011). What it is interesting is to understand is 
why, in general, municipalities have used the LOUGA to convert land. It is very 
paradoxical that main goal of LOUGA had been to prevent urban sprawl, and that 
the reason that municipalities have to adopt the act is to promote urban growth. It 
seems that the municipalities choose those planning tools that give them more 
development rights..
The main hypothesis in the literature is that local authorities foster urban 
growth because in doing so they can increase the revenues from property taxes or 
other fees related to development and also promote the economic activity. This is 
the  Molotch  (1976)  hypothesis.  However,  we  have  shown  that  Galician 
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municipalities  are  very  loose  in  collecting  all  these  revenues  compared  for 
instance with the rest of Spain (see Chapter 3). In another studies, we have found 
out that Galician municipalities seem not to be interested in one the main value 
capturing instruments such as the right to acquire 10% of the developable areas 
after a land readjustment project (Rodríguez-Egido, Tubío-Sánchez and Crecente 
Maseda,  in press;  Domínguez-Gómez, Tubío-Sánchez and Crecente-Maseda,  in 
press).  In addition,  there is  evidence that  mayors  are  very concerned with the 
political costs associated with taking possession of part of the rent that land-use 
planning activity create for landowners.
This may make look Galician municipalities appear to act in a irrational 
way. However, this is not so. There is another explanation that goes beyond the 
scope  of  this  dissertation  but  that  is  worth  mentioning  here.  Solé-Ollé  and 
Viladecans-Marsal  (2012)  have  shown  that  municipalities  with  low  political 
competition tend to  be captured by developer  lobbies in  order  to  obtain more 
expansive land policies. In Chapter 4, we have shown that the group of adopters 
had  the  lowest  variation  of  seats  between  the  elections  of  2003  and  2007, 
compared with non-adopters or the group working on plan-making. In Chapter 6, 
two of the four case studies support  also this  argument.  The municipalities of 
Ames  and Oleiros  have  been governed by the  same mayor  for  a  period  of  2 
decades. In both of them there were and still are ties between the mayor and the 
biggest developers. Notice than these ties may speed up the approval of a land-use 
plan like in the case of Oleiros, or they may be an obstacle if a new land-use plan 
proposes to reduce the developable areas, like in Ames. Notice too, that the ties 
between developers and municipality may be symbiotic and provide benefits to 
both parties, like in Oleiros, or they may provide most benefits to the developers, 
like the case of Ames. There is also another reason that, together with the previous 
one, can help to understand why conservative municipalities are more prone to 
convert  more  land.  Solé-Ollé  and  Viladecans-Marsal  (2012)  suggest  that 
conservative government tend to represent more the interests of developers than 
the  interest  of  environmental  organizations.  In  a  context  where  the  political 
competition is low and the environmental organizations are weak, the opportunity 
for developers lobbying local authorities is practically without obstacles.
Future research lines. Is land planning in Galicia ruled by a clientelistic mode of 
governance?
When  looking  at  Galician  land  planning  what  we  have  from  an 
organization  point  of  view  is  an  upper  authoritative  agent,  the  regional 
government, that passed a land-use act to prevent urban sprawl because it was not 
happy with it. Land-owners could obtain building permits in a very loose way, and 
this was having negative consequences in the view of the regional government. So 
the regional government had a conflict of interest with the landowners. It would 
be a mistake to believe that  municipalities are a second authoritative agent with 
regard to the goals of the act, and thereby supporters of it. Traditionally, there are 
only 3 municipalities (barely 1% of the municipalities) that are (or at least were) 
very careful with land-use planning and used to tools and practices to content 
urban development: Oleiros, Santiago de Compostela and Allaríz. The rest of the 
municipalities were, some of them more and some less, quite happy with what 
they were doing. So, the question is:  if  the government is  the one who has a 
conflict of interest with the landowners, and it is in the end paying for the making 
of the land-use plans, why are the municipalities in the middle of the conflict? Are 
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municipalities an obstacle to solving this conflict?
Legal  scholars  would  answer  this  question  by  saying  that  the 
municipalities have to be in the  middle because  the Galician constitution gives 
municipalities  their  own  competences  on  land-use  planning.  If  the  regional 
government interferes in this, it could be reported by the municipalities. However, 
this explanation is not completely convincing. The regional government is right 
now  making  a  new  land-use  use  act  that  will  take  most  of  the  municipal 
competences on agricultural and forestry uses and neither municipalities nor legal 
scholars have raised protests. There may be another reasons for this.
What we have seen in Chapter 4 and 5 is that in Galicia there are many 
administrative bodies that have to make a report about the land-use plan. Most of 
these administrative bodies are not well connected amongst themselves in terms 
of information sharing and policy objectives. Furthermore, most of the time of 
plan-making is  taken up in  gathering the required information (that  should be 
provided  by  the  administrative  bodies  themselves),  so  that  they  can  make  a 
decision about the plan proposal.  Taking into consideration that many of these 
administrative  bodies  have  their  own  policies  that  conflict  among  them  (the 
forestry policy is at odds with the agricultural policy or the infrastructure policy), 
it is quite normal that the reports that they make about the draft of the plan are 
very often contradictory. Thus, the plan-making becomes an exercise of unifying 
all  sectorial policies but only for one administrative district, the municipality. If 
land planning is about coordinating interests and sectorial policies (Faludi and van 
der Valk 1994), the government is failing in doing this. But, may we hypothesize 
why there is  this lack of integration?
It would not be absurd to assume that regional government prefers that the 
municipalities are the ones that deal with the “dirty” work of telling citizens that 
certain rules  have  to  be  followed when using  land.  In  fact,  what  the regional 
government is doing with this is shifting the political costs to municipalities. It is 
therefore understandable that municipalities want to get rid of this costs. However, 
the regional government may be profiting from this situation by not only shifting 
political costs to the municipalities but also creating clientelistic relationships with 
them. We try to go deeper into this hypothesis.
Galician municipalities obtain funding both from tax and fees revenues 
and transfers from the government. The municipal budgets use to be much smaller 
compared to the rest of Spain because municipalities are not interested, as shown 
in the dissertation, in increasing the income from tax and fees revenues. On the 
other hand, the transfers from the government are assigned on the basis of certain 
criteria, and are quite similar for all municipalities. In the case of municipalities 
with less than 2000 inhabitants (almost 30% of the municipalities), government 
transfers represent almost 85% of their income. However, the government also 
grant subsidies to municipalities. Corbacho (2003) has shown that for the years 
1998-99, Galician municipalities received 200 million Euro in subsidies granted 
through  individual  agreements.  Most  of  the  subsidies  were  used  to  finance 
infrastructures. Though we do not have current data, this seems to be part of the of 
the financing culture between regional government and municipalities. Corbacho 
(2003:35) suggests that the regional government uses these subsidies as a tool to 
“distribute favors in calculating and clientelistic way”.
This would explain why municipalities are very reluctant to make land-use 
plans  and  to  generate  their  own  income  through  planning.  But  also  why  the 
regional government may not be interested in forcing municipalities to make land-
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use plan. The loser the municipalities are in generating their own revenues from 
the planning activity,  the more room the government has to create clientelistic 
relationships  and  gaining  support  from  them.  This  idea  may  complete  the 
conclusion of Chapter 3, when saying that the regional government does not have 
enough power (credibility) to enforce the land-use act. However, we would need 
to carry out more research to obtain more evidence that the governance structure 
with regard to land-use planning is clientelistic.
Implication of these results for land policies
In the introduction of the dissertation we referred to four institutionalisms. 
However, we end up focusing more on rational choice institutionalism, for it has 
developed a conceptual framework to understand action. Other institutionalisms 
are neither useful to understand change nor continuity because they practically 
define  institutions  based  on  their  continuity  over  time,  for  the  continuity  of 
institutions is an essential feature that allows us to call them institutions. This is 
not useful. Within the rational choice institutionalism we have focused more on 
the  new  institutional  economics  (NIE),  in  particular  on  authors  like  Coase, 
Demsetz and Williamson. 
A  key  concept  of  NIE  is  that  of  transaction  and  costs  of  making 
transactions. In the model that new institutional economists have in mind, there is 
one seller A and one buyer B that have as goal to maximize their utility function. 
In addition,  the world seems to be plenty of resources. The free bargaining of 
agents A and B create mechanisms of voluntary cooperation, that is, institutions, 
that aimed at  reducing transactions costs.  When these changes occur,  we have 
institutional changes. The emerging institutions are self-enforced, for they provide 
mutual benefits to A and B. A government or a authoritative agent is absent in the 
model. Demsetz, who wants to be more Coasian that Coase himself would be, 
argues that what we only need is to clearly define property rights and individual A 
and B can bargain and solve everything by themselves.
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  we  have  found in  this  dissertation,  when 
looking at the real world, challenges this model in several ways. Between A and B 
are  information  asymmetries,  power  asymmetries,  etc.  And  many  of  these 
asymmetries  are  created  by  the  institutional  setup  where  they  are  embedded. 
Something that restrains A to act in a certain way liberates B to act in a certain 
way. A may be very upset, but there is a power that restricts his behaviour to free 
the behaviour of B. The case studies in Chapter 6 are full of these situations. The 
problem  with  new  institutional  economists  is  that  they  tend  to  consider 
transactions between individuals that only try to maximize their utility function 
without any third party influencing that transaction. And that simply does not exist 
in the world.  
In front of the dysfunctional concept of transactions of new institutional 
economists, we have seen that there are other definitions that are more accurate 
and precise, especially the definition  of  transactions of John R. Commons. For 
Commons (1931: 447) “ transactions are, not the "exchange of commodities," but 
the alienation and acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of property and 
liberty created by society” and “all transactions are controlled and liberated by 
working rules” (p. 447). This means that all transactions are embedded in a set of 
institutions that define how to carry out transactions. However, in defining these 
set of rules there are not criteria of efficiency. Commons argues that the working 
rules liberate some transactions and control others in order to solve ongoing social 
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concerns.
When trying to understand the research question, we have found that NIE does not 
give a satisfactory answer for three main reasons.
1.- Land policies are not the result  of the evolution of institutions that aim to 
reduce transaction costs to make markets work more efficiently. Rather, they are 
the  result  of  collective  action  to  achieve  certain  goals.  For  the  regional 
government, the passing of the LOUGA had as goal to prevent urban sprawl. For 
the municipalities,  the making of a land-use plan under LOUGA was the only 
way, giving the institutional setting under LOUGA, to foster urban expansion in 
the years of the Spanish housing boom. 
2.-  Land policies  like many other  institutions secured by fiat  and enforcement 
mechanisms are strange to the new institutional concept of institution. And this is 
so  because  NIE understands institutions  as  a  result  of  cooperative  bargaining. 
There is nothing external that can force free individuals to bargain in a certain 
direction. Thus, NIE is very weak when it comes to explain institutions that are 
secured by fiat and enforcement mechanisms. Curiously, all public policies are of 
this  kind.  All  public  policies  develop enforcement  mechanisms because public 
policies entail distributional consequences, which may upset those that lose. So, it 
is surprising how many now want to understand a public policy like land planning 
from a NIE perspective.
3.-  New institutional  economists  do  not  explicitly  treat  the  concept  of  power 
because power threatens their model of free exchange. But what we have seen in 
this  dissertation  is  that  institutions  are  the  result  of  political  processes  where 
power is key to understand the final outcomes.
The consequences of making land policies based on the NIE definition of 
transaction (and therefore of institution) or based on the concept of transaction of 
an old institutionalist like Commons are huge. For instance, a new institutional 
economist  considers  zoning  as  an  institutional  arrangement  that  reduces 
transaction costs, since it reduces the bargaining costs to decide about land uses. 
Furthermore, (s)he will consider that land prices are related to the stringency of 
zoning, for zoning may constrain the supply of land. However, what we observe is 
that zoning, and in particular high levels of stringency, are used by communities to 
prevent the value of property from falling. Communities do not reduce transaction 
costs through zoning, what they actually do is to increase transaction costs to the 
the maximum by giving to individuals inalienable entitlements that they cannot 
trade.
Imagine that housing prices are so high that some people cannot afford a 
house. The policy recommendation of new institutional economists would suggest 
to reduce zoning stringency, so that in the new situation individuals can bargain 
easier.  His  model  of  transactions,  where  there  is  not  power  or  enforcement, 
prevent  him  from  understanding  that  zoning  was  a  consequence  of  valuable 
property and not its consequence. If he uses, however, Commons'  definition of 
transaction,  the  policy  recommendation  would  be  to  create  and  enforce  new 
institutional arrangements that solves the conflict.  And in the new institutional 
setup, some individual may lose.
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There are many examples of polices based on the new institutional concept 
of transaction. The land reforms that took place in Latin America or Africa in the 
1980s  and  1990s  expecting  to   create  functional  land  markets  by  just  given 
entitlements to landowners. Or all the policies that most post-Soviet states have 
been  implementing  through  massive  privatization  of  land  expecting  that 
individual A and B happily started bargaining. In the best cases, the outcomes of 
these policies did not have any effect. But in several cases, the consequences were 
disastrous.
 
Policy recommendations
In  this  dissertation  we  have  shown that  municipalities  are  reluctant  to 
adopt  the  LOUGA because  this  has  distributional  effects.  In  many  cases,  the 
adoption of the LOUGA would mean that a new land-use plan either would take 
away development rights (or the expectations) of many landowners (something 
that  scares  municipalities  due to  high political  costs)  or  it  will  take  away the 
development rights of very powerful landowner and developers that are not happy 
with the idea. Thus, to improve the implementations rates of the LOUGA, the 
regional government could introduce the mechanism of transfer of development 
rights (TDR). A TDR approach will begin with the identification of specific areas 
or districts  where the value of development rights is so high that hampers the 
adoption of the LOUGA. This area becomes a “sending” area of development 
rights to another district, called “receiving” areas of development rights, that will 
increase their density. There are many models of TDS, but the underlaying idea of 
all of them is to create a market mechanism to transfer development rights. This 
has the benefit  of landowners being compensated by selling their  development 
rights to landowner in receiving areas,  which frees municipalities from paying 
compensation to landowner for taking away their development rights. TDR have 
been widely used in the USA, and when they are well-designed, they are very 
effective.
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 Appendix I. Interview questions
The interviews of chapter 5 were carried out between April and August of 2012. The interviews 
of the case studies were carried out between September and October of 2012
The following questions were made to adopters. The questions made to non-adopters are the 
same but the required changes to fit the case of non-adoption.
1.- What are the main reasons that led the municipality to adopt the LOUGA?
2.- Do you remember what were the main obstacles to adopt the LOUGA?
3.- Do you think that the previous plan (or lack of it) did not fulfil the goals of the municipality? 
Why?
4.- Have you ever heard talking about the costs of providing municipal services like water, 
sewerage, etc. in the municipality? Was anyone thinking that the plan could be a solution?
5.- What processes were going on in your municipality that have triggered the adoption of the 
plan?
6.- Do you think there was any conflict (environmental, among citizens, environmental hazards, 
etc.) that had triggered the adoption of the plan?
7.- Was legal security an important reason to adopt the plan?
8.- Did the municipality undertake process of public participation in order to let people 
participate in the plan making?
9.- Did environmental reasons play any role in the adoption of the plan, like to protect certain 
areas of great value?
10.- Did economic reasons play any role in the adoption of the plan, like to promote 
development or to increase revenues coming from the building activity?
11.- Do you think that procedures to adopt the plan took too long? Who was responsible for 
that? The planners, the municipality, the regional government?
12.- How do you evaluate the capacities and resources of the municipality to manage the plan?
13.- Do you think that the subvention was important to adopt the plan?
14.- What are the negative effects after adopting the plan that you did not expect before the 
adoption?
15.- What are the positive effects after adopting the plan that you did not expect before the 
adoption?
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Appendix II. Extended summary in Galician
A definición do problema
En  2002  Galicia  aprobou  a  súa  terceira  lei  do  solo,  a  lei  9/2002  de 
ordenación urbanística e protección do medio rural (LOUPMR, ou de xeito máis 
abreviado, LOUGA) que esixía a cada unha dos 315 municipios facer un plan 
xeral de ordenación municipal antes do 2006. O goberno galego incluso cubría os 
custes  da  redacción  do  plan.  Sen  embargo,  dunha  década  despois  da  súa 
aprobación, soamente 53 municipios (no ano 2011) se adaptaron á lei,  mentres 
264  non  o  fixeron.  Case  tódolos  municipios  que  non  se  adaptaron  están 
traballando  na  redacción  do  plan,  e  únicamente  19  non  comezaron  aínda  os 
traballos. A LOUGA diferénciase das leis anteriores porque trata de asignar usos 
do  solo  a  todo  o  territorio  municipal,  prestando  especial  atención  ós  usos 
agroforestais, pois o gran obxectivo da lei era o de controlar o crecemento urbano 
desordenado.
Galicia ten algunhas características que a fan ideal como un laboratorio 
para  intentar  atopar  as  respostas  á  pregunta  por  que  as  sociedades  crean  e 
implantan políticas de ordenación de usos do solo. As razóns desta idoneidade son 
varias, pero principalmente teñen que ver con que en Galicia non hai unha gran 
tradición nin cultura na planificación de usos. O territorio galego estivo manexado 
durante séculos por institucións informais no sentido de Ostrom. Aínda que desde 
a aprobación da lei estatal do solo en 1956 pódese dicir que o territorio español 
dotouse dun corpo lexislativo para a regulación dos usos do solo, especialmente 
urbanos, só nos últimos 25 anos, o goberno rexional levou a cabo serios intentos 
de  crear  unha  lexislación  autonómica  que  puidese  resolver  os  problemas  de 
planificación  de  usos  do  solo.  Tódolos  estes  intentos  fixeron  que  en  25  anos 
aprobáronse 3 leis do solo, en 1985, en 1997 e en 2002. 
Unha  das  características  principais  do  territorio  Galego  é  a  fragmentación  da 
propiedade. Varios autores indican que é precisamente este fragmentación e a súa 
complexidade de xestión a razón de ser de moitas políticas e accións territoriais. 
As  leis  do  solo,  como  reguladoras  dos  dereitos   de  propiedade,  vense 
evidentemente afectadas por esta estrutura da propiedade.
A pregunta de investigación
O parlamento de Galicia a probou a Lei de ordenación urbana e protección 
do medio rural (LOUPMR) en 2002. A lei indicaba así mesmo que os concellos se 
deberían  adaptar  á  nova  lei  antes  de  2006;  o  goberno  autonómico  incluso 
subvencionaba a redacción do planeamento para facilitar a implantación, sobre 
todo naqueles que dispoñían de poucos recursos. Analizando un período de case 
unha  década  (entre  2002  e  2011),  compróbase  que  a  adopción  por  parte  dos 
concellos foi moi desigual. En 2011 só 53 dos 315 concellos se adaptaron á nova 
lei  do solo,  19 dos  315 nin  sequera  comezaron os  traballos  de  redacción e  a 
meirande parte deles atópanse redactando o planeamento en diferentes fases. A 
pregunta de investigación é: por que un grupo de concellos decidíu adaptarse á lei 
do solo e outro grupo nin sequera comezou os traballos de redacción?
Hai que ter en considerar na definición do grupo dos que se adaptaron que 
dos  53  concellos  que  se  adaptaron  á  LOUGA,  22  deles  xa  viñan  realizando 
traballos de redacción para adaptarse a lei do solo anterior. Polo tanto estes 21 
concellos non se adaptaron á LOUGA porque compartiran os obxectivos da propia 
lei,  senón que se adaptaron porque o cambio lexislativo atopounos na fase de 
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redacción.
En canto ó grupo de concellos que non se adaptaron, non contamos todos 
aqueles  que están traballando na redacción de planeamento,  pois  estes  non se 
poden considerar  que non se adaptaran;  están no proceso de adaptarse.  O seu 
estudo non se inclúe nesta investigación pois significaría ter dúas preguntas de 
investigación, ademais de incluír unha variable máis na análise como é o tempo de 
adaptación.  Esto  crearía  dificultades  metodolóxicas  e  faría  máis  confusos  os 
resultados da investigación.
Metodoloxía
A metodoloxía  utilizada  nesta  investigación  é  unha  mistura  entre  unha 
metodoloxía  cualitativa e  outra  cuantitativa.  Este  tipo de métodos combinados 
caracterizan os procesos analizados así como comprensión dos mesmos. Na parte 
cuantitativa  da  investigación  o  que  se  pretende  é  caracterizar  ós  municipios 
segundo unha serie de variables. É precisamente desta caracterización de onde se 
escollen  os  casos  de  estudo  a  analizan  na  análise  cualitativa.  Esto  permite 
comprender  como  funcionan  as  hipóteses  de  investigación  formuladas  en 
diferentes contextos, xerando análises que testen con maior rigor a súa validez.
Revisión da literatura e hipóteses principais
Despois de comprobar que a teoría da implantación de políticas públicas 
sobre dunha considerable circularidade nos seus argumentos, a aproximación pola 
que  se  optou  para  responder  á  pregunta  de  investigación  é  a  da  literatura 
institucional. O plan é considerado como un conxunto de institucións que regulan 
os dereitos de propiedade, é dicir, como hai que usar a terra. A aprobación dun 
plan  considérase  un  cambio  institucional  mentres  que  a  non  aprobación  é 
resistencia  ó  cambio  institucional.  Na literatura  existen  catro  grandes  tipos  de 
institucionalismos,  o  da  elección  racional,  o  histórico,  o  sociolóxico  e  o 
discursivo. Analizáronse os catro institucionalismos tratando de ver en cada un 
deles os argumentos que explicaban tanto cambio institucional como resistencia ó 
cambio.  Veuse  que  tanto  o  instituicionalismo  histórico  como  o  sociolóxico 
céntranse  máis  en  explicar  a  resistencia  ó  cambio.  Esto  sucede  así  porque 
entenden institución – incluso desde a propia definición – como inalterables e 
permanentes  no  tempo.  O  instuticionalismo  discursivo  non  formula  realmente 
unha teoría de por que aparecen os discursos en determinados momentos e cunha 
certa  dirección,  polo  tanto  non parece  explicativo  do  cambio  institucional  nin 
tampouco  da  resistencia  ó  cambio.  En  canto  ó  institucionalismo  de  elección 
racional, vemos que formula unha teoría da acción e polo tanto do cambio, así 
como de  resistencia  ó  cambio.  Considerouse  como unha  hipótese  a  valorar  o 
concepto de externalidades negativas como a base da creación de moitas políticas 
públicas, en particular políticas de uso da terra. En canto á resistencia ó cambio, o 
institucionalismo racional tamén proporciona algunha razón valiosa, sobre todo 
aquelas  teorías  que  están  na  interfaz  coa  behavioural  economics,  como  por 
exemplo os efectos distributivos do cambio institucional ou incluso a teoría da 
prospección de Kahneman.
Sen embargo, todo esto non parecían suficientes hipóteses para responder á 
pregunta con satisfacción. Nin sequera podían explicar o cambio institucional de 
moitas institucións, como por exemplo a aprobación da propia LOUGA. Para esto 
necesitábamos  comprender  os  mecanismos  de  cambio  institucional  con  máis 
detalle. O concepto de contracción institucional, de Seo e Creed, proporcionaban 
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unha nova visión á  hora  de entender  o cambio institucional.  Gran parte  desta 
investigación céntrase en entender o cambio desde esta perspectiva. A concepto de 
contradición  institucional  céntrase  na  idea  de  que  as  institucións  sociais 
reprodúcense no tempo ata que por unha serie de razóns (as propias fontes de 
cambio  institucional),  algunhas  institucións  entran  en  contradición  co  setup 
institucional  existente.  Sobre  esta  idea  elaborouse  un  marco  conceptual  e  un 
modelo de cambio institucional.
Contido dos capítulos
A  investigación  divídese,  á  parte  do  capítulo  introdutorio,  en  cinco 
capítulos  e  nun  apartado  de  conclusións.  No  segundo  capítulo  estúdase  a 
aprobación da LOUGA por parte do parlamento galego en 2002. Préstase especial 
atención a  entender  por  que  ese  ano se aproba unha lei  que  trata  de cambiar 
substancialmente  a  política  do planeamento  local  en Galicia,  sobre todo se se 
compara coas leis anteriores de 1997 e 1985. En realidade a LOUGA é o resultado 
da suma de dous corpos lexislativos que nun inicio ían estar separados, por un 
lado a Lei de ordenación urbanística (que é moi continuísta co articulado das leis 
anteriores) e unha novo articulado, o da protección do medio rural, que é novo. A 
lei non se pode entender sen o grado de desorganización territorial que sufríu o 
Galicia na década dos 80 e 90 e como un concepto como o feísmo foi relevante á 
hora de dirixir atención a este fenómeno.
No terceiro capítulo compárase a aprobación da lei do solo holandesa en 
2008 e coa aprobación da LOUPMR en 2002 e trátase de ver cal foi o patrón de 
difusión  das  leis  nos  municipios.  Préstase  especial  atención  ó  mecanismo  de 
cumprimento  (enforcement  mechanism)  que  se  establecía  en  ambas  leis.  O 
principal resultado deste capítulo é que a implantación da lei holandesa foi máis 
efectiva  que  a  galega.  O mecanismo de  cumprimento  non é  explicativo  en  si 
mesmo; o mecanismo de cumprimento é función da lexitimidade dun goberno 
para facer cumprir a propia lexislación que aproba no parlamento. O que vemos é 
que  o goberno holandés  ten  máis  lexitimade que  o goberno galego á  hora  de 
condicionar o comportamento municipal en relación ós usos do solo.
No cuarto capítulo analízase desde unha perspectiva cuantitativa, baseada 
na  estatística  descritiva,  as  principais  características  dos  municipios  que  se 
adaptaron e  os  que non iniciaron os traballos  de redacción.  Obsérvase que os 
municipios que se adaptaron son na súa maioría rurais, e que ou ben tiñan un plan 
moi obsoleto (a metade deles) ou non tiñan ningún tipo de figura de planeamento 
(a outra metade). Obsérvase ademais que utilizaron os plans para clasificar máis 
solo como urbanizable, sendo os municipios con gobernos do PP en maioría (con 
un número maior de 40% dos concelleiros) os máis proclives a clasificar máis 
solo como urbanizable nos seus plans.
En canto ós municipios que aínda non comezaron a realizar planeamento, 
pódense diferenciar dous grupos. Un deles, moi pequeno, de municipios en áreas 
remotas de montaña,  e outro máis grande nas periferias urbanas. Este segundo 
grupo ten plans aprobados ó abeiro da lei do solo de 1997.
No  quinto  capítulo  levamos  a  cabo  entrevistas  vía  telefónica  cos 
arquitectos  municipais  de  tódolos  concellos  que  se  adaptaron,  así  como  dos 
concellos que aínda non iniciaron a tramitación. Estas entrevistas, de tipo semi-
estruturado, que non duraban máis aló dos 20-30 minutos, tiñan como obxectivo 
coñecer cal fora a razón pola cal se aprobara o plan no caso dos que se adaptaran e 
cal é razón de non iniciar a tramitación no caso dos que se adaptaron. En segundo 
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lugar  pretendíase  coñer  a  percepción  dos  arquitectos  municipais  en  torno  ás 
principais hipóteses formuladas na investigación, tanto da literatura internacional 
como da literatura galega. Comprabamos que o principal motivo para aprobar o 
plan foi o de conceder licencias de construción e o de crear polígonos industriais, 
pois a LOUGA impedíalle facelo ó ter o municipio o planeamento moi obsoleto 
ou  non  ter  ningún  tipo  de  planeamento.  Comprobamos  ademais  que  non  se 
adaptaban, nin facían os plan máis expansivos, para poder obter máis recursos a 
través de taxas ou impostos que xera a actividade urbanística. 
En canto ós concellos que non se adaptaron, comprobamos que a razón de 
resistencia  é  a  non  necesidade  de  facer  un  plan,  pois  o  vixente  permítelles 
conceder licencias, ou de non facer sequera un plan pois apenas hai actividade 
urbanística no municipio.  Os arquitectos dos concellos que teñen plan apuntan 
que, unha adaptación á nova lei implicaría reducir o tamaño de moitos dos núcleos 
rurais, polo que xeraría resistencia entre a poboación. OS resultados cuantitativos 
deste capítulo confirmar desde a vertente cualitativa os resultados cualitativos do 
capítulo anterior. 
No  capítulo  sexto  e  último  lévanse  a  cabo  catro  caso  de  estudo,  que 
consisten  en  dous  municipios  que  se  adaptaron  á  nova  lei  e  dous  que  non  o 
fixeron.  Ademais  procurouse  que  nas  parellas  dos  que  se  adaptaron  e  non se 
adaptaron un deles fora rural e outro urbano, e que pertencesen ós conglomerados 
máis  relevantes  desde o punto de vista  da maior  número de concellos  que se 
adaptaron (conglomerado 3) e da menor número (conglomerado 2) establecidos 
no capítulo cuarto. Os concellos escollidos foron Ames, Oleiros, Castroverde e 
Abadín. Os dous primeiros pertencen ó conglomerado 2, Ames non se adaptou e 
Oleiros  si.  Castroverde  e  Abadín  pertences  ó  conglomerado  3,  Castroverde 
adaptouse a Abadín non. Nos casos de estudo prestouse especialmente atención ós 
conflitos e ó papel que as externalidades puideron ter na adopción da nova lei. 
Comprobouse que os alcaldes miden o custe electoral de facer un plan, e non son 
propensos a facelo ata que están seguros de que ese custo é asumible para eles. No 
caso de Ames, a pesar de que houbo intentos por facer un novo plan, o goberno 
local non foi capaz debido á distribución de dereitos de construción que facía moi 
conflitivo (e custoso políticamente) calquera alteración dos mesmos. No caso de 
Abadín, a razón principal para non adaptarse son as implicación negativas que 
tería para os veciños en canto aumento de IBI, ademais de que debido á case nula 
actividade  urbanística,  en conxunto con suficientes  recursos  que proveñen dos 
parques eólicos, para o concello parécelle máis sinxelo ir delimitando núcleos na 
medida que se vaian pedido licencias de construción. 
En  canto  ós  que  se  adaptaron,  as  principais  razón  para  o  concello  de 
Oleiros  foi  o  esgotamento  do  solo  urbanizable  do  anterior  plan,  xunto  coa 
necesidade de actualizar o plan ós novos marcos legais pois o anterior plan non 
estaba adaptado é lei do 97. No caso de Castroverde xogou un papel importante 
adaptarse o feito de que tivesen unha normas subsidiarias que só delimitaban o 
núcleo  urbano  e  que  non  permitían,  unha  vez  aprobada  a  nova  lei,  conceder 
licencias no resto do termo municipal. Tamén xogaron un papel os conflitos entre 
usos agrícolas e forestais.
Conclusións
O  concepto  de  cambio  institucional  que  empregamos  para  entender  a 
aprobación  da  lei  do  solo  e  a  súa  difusión  nos  municipios  galegos  é  unha 
alternativa á literatura da implantación á hora de entender por que se implantan ou 
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non  as  políticas  territoriais.  Apoiándonos  no  concepto  de  contradición 
institucional  como  impulsor  do  cambio  institucional,  observamos  que  sempre 
existen varias tipos de contradición ou fontes de cambio institucional que non 
operan  sempre  na  mesma  dirección.  Neste  sentido,  unha  administración 
descentralizada  con  varios  niveis  administrativos  é  propensa  a  que  emerxan 
contradicións entre as institución dos diferentes niveis administrativos. Debido á 
aprobación dunha lei  estatal  coa  que  a  lei  anterior  do  solo  galega  tiña  certas 
incompatibilidades,  xurdíu  a  oportunidade  de  facer  unha  nova  lei  do  solo,  a 
LOUGA.  Sen  embargo,  en  vez  de  resolver  as  principais  contradicións  e 
incompatibilidades legais, a LOUGA tivo como obxectivo controlar o crecemento 
urbano disperso. A pesar desto, os municipios que aprobaron a lei do solo foron 
municipios rurais, a meirande parte deles sen planeamento ou con planeamento 
obsoleto, onde o crecemento urbano disperso non era o maior problema. E esto 
sucedeu  porque  a  nova  lei  do  solo  creaba  incompatibilidades  co  marco 
institucional  vixente  nestes  municipios  (plan  obsoleto  ou  falta  del).  O  que 
observamos polo tanto é que un cambio institucional a nivel nacional séguelle 
unha cascada de cambios moitas que toman direccións moitas veces imprevistas. 
Esto  sucede  así  porque  cada  vez  que  sucede  ou  hai  oportunidade  dun 
cambio institucional,  este  non é  soamente dirixido por  unha fonte do cambio, 
actívanse outras fontes que ata ese momento estaban aletargadas. Por exemplo, 
vimos no Capítulo 2 que unha fonte de cambios, que operou sobre todo en darlle 
dirección á nova lei do solo, foi a de adaptacións feitas no pasado, a privatización 
masiva de parcelas de pequena dimensión, que terminou por minar a capacidade 
de adaptación no presente, como a capacidade de controlar a urbanización difusa 
ou as consecuencias da propia estrutura da propiedade (que fomenta o abandono e 
crea barreiras para iniciar actividades agrarias) nas vagas de incendios que ten 
Galicia cada verán. Vimos que a nivel municipal foi máis difícil encontrar outras 
fontes de cambio institucional que o propio conflito ente a nova lei do solo e os 
seus planeamentos obsoletos (ou falta deles) que explicase o obxectivo dos plan 
de clasificar tanto solo urbanizable en concellos que están perdendo poboación. 
Que o período onde se aprobasen estes plans vaia desde 2002 ata 2011, e cubra 
prácticamente todo o percorrido da burbulla inmobiliaria en España pode axudar a 
entender por que se fixeron plan tan expansivos, con moitos sectores urbanizables 
que, polas condicións dos concellos onde se aprobaron e independentemente da 
crise financieira, nunca se van a desenvolver. O que si parece que quedou claro é 
que os municipios non fixeron os plan máis expansivos co obxectivo de aumentar 
os seus ingresos. Os gobernos locais non se mostran moi interesados en facer unha 
ponencia  de  valores  catastrais  despois  de  aprobar  o  plan,  a  cal  aumentaría  os 
valores catastrais das parcelas. Tamén son moi laxos no cobro da diferentes taxas 
que xera a actividade urbanística. Os municipios galegos teñen, neste sentido, un 
comportamento  diferente  ó  resto  dos  municipios  españois,  onde  a  actividade 
urbanística  si  se  utilizou  moitas  veces  como  unha  oportunidade  para  o 
financiamento local.
As fontes de continuidade para o grupo de municipios que non iniciaron os 
trámites son sobre todo as implicacións redistributivas dos dereitos de propiedade 
que implica facer un novo plan. Hai que ter en conta que moitos do municipios 
que non iniciaron a tramitación para adaptarse, teñen un plan aprobado ó abeiro da 
lei  do  solo  de  1997.  Os  seus  núcleos  rurais  son  moi  expansivos,  concedendo 
licencias directas para construción de vivenda unifamiliar. Estes núcleos serían 
recortados se os municipios se adaptaran á LOUGA, o que acabaría ocasionando 
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conflitos que os alcaldes consideran de un alto custo político.
Os municipios galegos que se adaptaron á noval lei do solo poden parecer 
estar  actuando  dunha  maneira  irracional  na  medida  en  que  promoven  o 
desenvolvemento pero parece que non se queren beneficiar  del.  Sen embargo, 
unha explicación a esto basease na baixa competencia nas eleccións municipais, 
polo que os gobernos locais acaban desenvolvendo lazos con sectores económicos 
como  os  da  construcións  ou  empresarios  que  desexan  desenvolver  certas 
actividades  no  municipio.  Os  casos  de  estudo  de  Oleiros  e  Ames  parece  dar 
suficiente evidencia desto.
Desde a perspectiva da nova economía institucional, é difícil de entender 
os cambios institucionais que deron lugar tanto como a aprobación da lei do solo 
como da aprobación por parte dos concellos dun plan de acordo á LOUPMR. Na 
resposta  á  pregunta de investigación, comprobouse que as institución como as 
políticas do solo non son o resultado do obxectivo de reducir custes de transacción 
para  lograr  que  os  mercados  funcionen dun xeito  máis  eficiente.  Ademais,  os 
economistas  da  nova  economía  institucional  non  adoitan  estudar  os  casos  de 
políticas públicas que se implantan mediante mandatos legais, pois entenden as 
institucións  como  o  resultado  de  negociacións  cooperativas,  exentas  da 
intervención de poderes autoritativos (parlamentos, cortes, etc.).
Recomendacións
Nesta investigación comprobamos que a razón pola cal os municipios que 
non iniciaron os traballos de redacción foi principalmente porque a adopción tería 
efectos  redistributivos  da  propia  aprobación  do plan.  A adaptación  á  LOUGA 
significaría recortar boa parte destes dereitos. Sen embargo, esto é algo que os 
concellos consideran custoso desde o punto de vista político e ata inxusto, pois os 
propietarios levan moitos anos pagando un elevado IBI por posuír eses dereitos. O 
principal problema para implantar a LOUGA é a compensación do propietarios ós 
que se quitarían os dereitos de edificación.
Unha  solución  que  permitiría  unha  compensación  sen  custe  para  a 
administración local, sería a de introducir un mercado de dereitos de edificación. 
Este  mercado  consistiría  na  demarcación  dun  distrito  emisor  de  dereitos  de 
edificación (aquelas  zonas onde se quere restrinxir  a  edificación)  e un distrito 
receptor (aquelas zonas onde se quere promover a edificación). Este mecanismo, 
que é coñecido en inglés como  Transfer of Development Rights  (TDR), permite 
que os os demandantes de dereitos de construción da zona receptora lle compren 
ós propietarios de dereitos na zona emisora os dereitos de edificación. Deste xeito 
os propietarios  na zona emisora son compensados a  través dun mecanismo de 
mercado por non se lles permitir construír. Os TDR son amplamente utilizados en 
EE UU, e cando están ben deseñados soen dar moi bos resultados.
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